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Abstract
“Saving Salt City: Fighting Inequality through Policy and Activism in Syracuse, NY,
1955-1975” offers an in-depth exploration of civil rights and antipoverty struggles in the Salt
City between 1955 and 1975. It centers the agency of activists who built interracial and crossclass organizations through which they contested the marginalization and segregation of Black
Syracusans. By examining the struggles around major issues including education, housing, police
brutality, employment, and a broader vision of economic justice, “Saving Salt City” documents
the alternative visions and unrealized agendas for change generated by citizens in Northern urban
spaces. This project recovers Syracuse’s legacy as a laboratory of experimentation for social
movement organizing as well as federal social welfare policy implementation. It contributes to
the historiographies of the long civil rights era, economic inequality, and urban spaces.
The Salt City was a microcosm of many of the forces that shaped urban spaces after
World War II: highway development, urban renewal, demographic changes, and
deindustrialization. By proposing visions of a more equitable, racially integrated city, activists
destabilized a dominant narrative of progress and offered alternatives to the urban decline that
unfolded in the second half of the twentieth century. Centering the struggles of Black Syracusans
for recognition and political power illustrates the historical importance of individual agency as
well as contingency. Although the civil rights movement collapsed with many of its goals
unrealized in the mid-1970s, Syracuse experienced more than a decade of concerted activism to
disrupt racial inequality and to amplify marginalized voices. The hypersegregation and
concentrated poverty that became features of the city by the end of the twentieth century were
not inevitable. This project argues that the unrealized agendas of Black Syracusans may have
mitigated the impacts of urban decline.
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Introduction
Tensions in the Deep North: Racial Inequality in the Salt City

In fall 1960, John F. Kennedy, the junior senator from Massachusetts and the Democratic
presidential nominee, made a campaign stop in Syracuse, New York—the Salt City.1 The
Syracuse Post-Standard issued a warm welcome to him in an editorial that also lauded the city
itself:
When Senator Kennedy visits Syracuse, he will be coming into a community that is far
more free from bigotry and intolerance than almost any city in the land. Syracusans of all
races and of all religions work together and live together in peace and harmony, and most
of us are continually striving to combat the ignorance which breeds bigotry, hate,
religious intolerance and race prejudice.2
The conservative-leaning newspaper and the city’s white leaders routinely touted Syracuse as an
exceptional city virtually devoid of racial strife. They did not discuss peace and harmony in
aspirational terms; rather, they issued self-congratulatory messages that peace and harmony had
already been achieved and were undeniable facts of life.
Less than five years later, a Greyhound bus rolled to a stop, brakes hissing, at Syracuse’s
main bus terminal. The assembled crowd burst into applause as twenty-one weary passengers
spilled off the bus. The travelers were “Reverse Freedom Riders” who had arrived in the Salt
City from Selma, Alabama. With no time to recover from their journey, the group formed a
column and led 250 marchers downtown to Clinton Square. There they participated in a rally
along with approximately 1,000 Syracusans and listened as James Farmer, CORE’s national
1

Salt, produced from Onondaga Lake’s salt springs, was a major industry for Syracuse throughout the
nineteenth century. S. David Stamps and Miriam Burney Stamps note that two former enslaved men were among the
first producers of salt in the region in the late eighteenth century. “The Origins of the ‘Salt City,’” Onondaga
Historical Association, 18 October 2014, Accessed 19 March 2022, https://www.cnyhistory.org/2014/10/1353/; S.
David Stamps and Miriam Burney Stamps, Salt City and Its Black Community: A Sociological Study of Syracuse,
New York (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 27.
2
“Welcome to Kennedy,” The Post-Standard, 29 September 1960, Editorial.
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director, and Fannie Lou Hamer, iconic member of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party,
addressed the crowd.3
The twenty-one activists traveled to Syracuse to protest discrimination in the urban
North. Only two months earlier the group had participated in voting rights protests in Selma that
had captured national attention and spurred Congress to introduce a Voting Rights Act. The
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) had coordinated the Reverse Freedom Ride with the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to draw connections between the civil
rights struggles unfolding in the North as well as the South. CORE’s associate national director,
George Wiley, a Black chemist-turned-civil-rights-organizer who began his activist career with
Syracuse CORE, explained that the Salt City was “a major testing ground in the North.”4 Indeed,
CORE intended Syracuse to be the destination for the first of a series of “Freedom Rides North.”
The Reverse Freedom Riders disrupted white elites’ representation of the city as exceptional and
racially progressive.
In the mid-twentieth century, Syracuse was a laboratory of innovation where activists
deployed creative strategies to expose the contours of Northern racism and structural economic
inequality. Through interracial and cross-class initiatives, Syracusans proposed agendas for
change based on unique conceptions of citizenship and the role of the state. The struggle to
define the city’s social agenda exposed deep divisions over who was responsible for generating
change, the appropriate pace of change, and the locus of political power. After two decades of

3

Peter Kihss, “Negroes to Begin Freedom Rides to the North,” The New York Times, 30 April 1965,
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2010); “Selma Negroes Coming to Syracuse for
Protest,” The Post-Standard, 30 April 1965; Philip Benjamin, “20 Selma Riders Reach Syracuse: Southern Negroes
Joined by 300 for Job Protest,” The New York Times, 6 May 1965, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York
Times (1851-2010).
4
Malcolm R. Alama, “Mayor, NM, Syracuse Scored in CORE Rally: 21 Selma Negroes in March to
Square,” The Post-Standard, 6 May 1965.
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steady and varied protest, significant federal investment, and some important national attention,
racial and economic inequality remained. In fact, these problems only intensified.
In the twenty-first century, many African Americans and Latinos in Syracuse live in
hypersegregated neighborhoods with some of the highest concentrations of poverty in the
nation.5 The processes of deindustrialization and federal disinvestment shaped Syracuse’s fate as
a member of the Rust Belt. The fact that the negative impacts of these larger economic and
political transformations were borne disproportionately by Black Syracusans was not, however,
inevitable. Between 1955 and 1975, grassroots activists seized the opportunity to propose a more
equal and just Syracuse. Yet city officials and business elites rarely took into account the voices
and concerns of the Black community. In place of the progressive image to which the city’s
white citizens so fiercely clung, this dissertation offers a history that takes much more seriously
the critiques that African American communities have leveled about racial and economic
inequality.

Inserting the Salt City into Civil Rights and Antipoverty History
“Saving Salt City” offers an in-depth exploration of civil rights and antipoverty struggles
in the Salt City between 1955 and 1975. It centers the agency of activists who built interracial
and cross-class organizations through which they contested the marginalization and segregation
of Black Syracusans. By examining the struggles around major issues including education,

5

Paul A. Jargowsky, “The Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the Concentration of Poverty, and
Public Policy,” Issue Brief (New York: Century Foundation, August 9, 2015), http://apps.tcf.org/architecture-ofsegregation. According to the Brookings Institution, out of the one-hundred largest metro areas in the U.S., Syracuse
was the ninth most-segregated city in 2010. Between 2007 and 2011, 50% of children in Syracuse lived in poverty.
The city had forty-one census tracts with poverty rates of 20% and in 40% of the census tracts the poverty rate was
between 41 and 82%. “Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing: Syracuse and Onondaga County, NY.” Syracuse,
NY: CNY Fair Housing, 2014, 29, 84, http://media.syracuse.com/news/other/2014/11/17/CNY-Fair-HousingReport.pdf.

3

housing, police brutality, employment, and a broader vision of economic justice, “Saving Salt
City” documents the alternative visions and unrealized agendas for change generated citizens in
Northern urban spaces, even as cities experienced economic decline, population loss, and
increasing racial segregation. This project counters discourses of inevitability by inserting
historical contingency into the narrative.
One of the most significant interventions this project makes is to recover Syracuse’s
legacy as a laboratory of experimentation for social movement organizing as well as federal
social welfare policy implementation. Historians have largely neglected the social and political
history of twentieth-century Syracuse, which receives only passing mention in most studies.6 To
date the most detailed account of civil rights activism in the Salt City can be found in the
excellent (and only) biography of activist George Wiley, who went on to found the National
Welfare Rights Organization.7 Written by journalist Nick Kotz and writer Mary Lynn Kotz, the
biography traces Syracuse CORE’s evolution between 1961 and 1965, with a focus on Wiley’s
leadership. My project offers a more nuanced consideration of the grassroots actors involved in
CORE, particularly Black women. It situates CORE more firmly in the context of the city’s
social and political landscape, extending the narrative beyond 1965 to encompass federally
funded antipoverty initiatives.
This project builds on other histories of Syracuse’s civil rights activism by offering a
fresh and textured examination of specific campaigns and organizations, as well as by tracing
individuals across movements. Activists themselves have produced several valuable histories of
6

Sugrue mentions Syracuse’s faith-based activism to address housing segregation in the 1950s,
controversies over the War on Poverty, and summarizes Syracuse CORE’s role in George Wiley’s activists career.
Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, 222, 374, 388. Meier and Rudwick summarize CORE’s major campaigns in CORE,
15, 27, 28, 29, 31, 198, 229, 233, 308, 364, 371, 372. Felicia Kornbluh offers a succinct overview of the connection
between Syracuse’s civil rights, antipoverty, and welfare activism in The Battle for Welfare Rights: Politics and
Poverty in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 33-38.
7
Kotz and Kotz, A Passion for Equality.
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the period under consideration. CORE member Ron Corwin wrote a sociology dissertation on
Syracuse school desegregation in 1968, when the struggle was ongoing.8 The Human Rights
Commission of Syracuse and Onondaga County commissioned its own narrative of this history,
which incorporates more than seventy interviews with local participants.9 K. Animashaun Ducre
uses Syracuse’s South Side neighborhood for a study on the intersection of environmental justice
and Black feminism. She situates an innovative Photovoice Project, in which fourteen women
documented their neighborhood and environment, in the context of the city’s political and
economic history. Ducre highlights the repeated displacement of African Americans in the Salt
City throughout the twentieth century.10
Sociologists have given Syracuse somewhat more attention. S. David and Miriam Burney
Stamps’s sociological study of Salt City’s Black community is an important piece of scholarship
that explores the external and internal factors that shaped the community. They identify five
distinct phases of Black community life between the late eighteenth century and the 1980s, with
a particular focus on the twentieth century.11 My project overlaps with what Stamps and Stamps
describe as the protest era, which they periodize as 1960 to 1975. Although they acknowledge
the role of CORE in initiating a protest movement in the city, they do not offer a detailed
discussion of CORE’s numerous campaigns. Another sociologist, Noel A. Cazenave, pairs

8

Ronald David Corwin, “School Desegregation in Syracuse a Study in Community Decision-Making,”
Ph.D. diss. (Syracuse University, 1968).
9
This study also covers local Latino, Native American, women’s, and disability rights movements. The
treatment of CORE’s campaigns is truncated and somewhat disjointed. For example, the book begins with the
participation of Syracusans in the March on Washington in 1963, even though CORE initiated local protests the year
before. It addresses school desegregation in chapter eight, but does not mention either of two major school boycotts
led by Black parents. These quibbles aside, a tremendous amount of work went into the project, and it is a valuable
resource for historians. Zoe Cornwall, Human Rights in Syracuse: Two Memorable Decades: A Selected History
from 1963 to 1983 (Syracuse, NY: Human Rights Commission of Syracuse and Onondaga County, 1987).
10
K. Animashaun Ducre, A Place We Call Home: Gender, Race, and Justice in Syracuse (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2012), 23-47.
11
Stamps and Stamps, Salt City and Its Black Community, xvi.
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Syracuse with New Haven, Connecticut, in his study of the urban racial state, which he defines
as “the political structure and processes of a city and its suburbs that manage race relations in
ways that foster and sustain both its own immediate political interests, and ultimately, white
racial supremacy.”12 He presents the only in-depth case study of Syracuse’s two controversial
War on Poverty programs, the Crusade for Opportunity and the Community Action Training
Center. By highlighting the community organizing conducted by both CORE and War on
Poverty activists, my project uncovers new connections both among the civil rights and
antipoverty leadership as well as in the initiatives’ respective agendas.
The relative dearth of scholarship examining the Black community in Syracuse reflects a
broader gap in the historiography of urban space in America. The largest metropolitan areas have
enjoyed the preponderance of scholarly attention.13 Focusing on a smaller metropolitan area
broadens historical perspectives on urban activism and policy. Because of the small size of the
Black population in both relative and absolute terms, citizens in Syracuse forged paths to change
and political power that often looked dramatically different from those in large urban centers
such as New York, Chicago, or Detroit. As Elizabeth Hinton argues, directing scholarly attention
12

Noel A. Cazenave, The Urban Racial State: Managing Race Relations in American Cities (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 25.
13
The classic text on urban decline is Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005). Chicago has received extensive
attention, most notably in Arnold Hirsch’s Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles have been some of the most
analyzed sites of crisis and racial violence. See Gerald Horne, Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Race, Space, and Riots in Chicago, New
York, and Los Angeles (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Only a handful of studies on the history of the civil rights movement and community organizing have used
mid-sized northern cities as case studies. Cities such as Milwaukee and Cleveland had populations more than three
times the size of Syracuse in 1960. See: Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in
Milwaukee (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Randal Maurice Jelks, African Americans in the
Furniture City: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Grand Rapids (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
2006); Nishani Frazier, Harambee City: The Congress of Racial Equality in Cleveland and the Rise of Black Power
Populism (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2017); Mandi Isaacs Jackson, Model City Blues: Urban Space
and Organized Resistance in New Haven (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008). Herbert Ruffin’s book on
Silicon Valley explores civil rights struggles in a suburban context: Uninvited Neighbors: African Americans in
Silicon Valley, 1769-1990 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014).

6

to “lesser-known cities. . .open[s] up a more comprehensive understanding of American social
relations and the contours of racism and inequality.”14 Studying Syracuse captures the unique
texture of African American life and activism in mid-sized cities.
This project contributes to a growing body of “Freedom North Studies,” a subset of the
long civil rights era historiography that “invite[s] new approaches to the long, complicated, and
unfinished history of racism and liberalism in America.”15 Over the two decades since historian
Nikhil Pal Singh introduced the paradigm-shifting concept of the “long civil rights movement,” a
robust literature has emerged that contests the dominant narrative of the civil rights movement—
one that centers the movement in the South beginning in 1955 and ending triumphantly in
1965—by expanding the temporal and chronological boundaries of the movement as well as by
reconsidering its actors and agendas.16 Scholars have demonstrated that Northern metropolises

14

Hinton was speaking specifically of studying urban rebellions, but I extrapolate her argument to apply to
broader civil rights struggles. Elizabeth Hinton, America on Fire: The Untold History of Police Violence and Black
Rebellion Since the 1960s (New York, NY: Liveright, 2021), 12.
15
Brian Purnell, “Freedom North Studies, the Long Civil Rights Movement, and Twentieth-Century
Liberalism in American Cities,” Journal of Urban History 42, no. 3 (2016): 639.
See: Brian Purnell, Jeanne Theoharis, and Komozi Woodard, eds., The Strange Careers of the Jim Crow
North: Segregation and Struggle outside of the South (New York: NYU Press, 2019); Komozi Woodard, Matthew
Countryman, and Jeanne F. Theoharis, Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Laura Warren Hill, Strike the Hammer: The Black Freedom Struggle in
Rochester, New York, 1940-1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021); Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North:
Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Thomas Sugrue, Sweet
Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008); Robert
Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003);
Matthew Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2006). Although Clarence Lang is not a long civil rights proponent, his recent work on St. Louis
actually fits into the framework well. Clarence Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics and Black Freedom
Struggle in St. Louis, 1936-75 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).
16
See “Introduction: Civil Rights, Civic Myths” in Nikhil Pal Singh, Black is a Country: Race and the
Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-14. One of the best
articulations of the usefulness of a long civil rights framework is Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s 2004 Presidential Address
to the Organization of American Historians. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the
Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History 91.4 (March 2005): 1233-1263. For a critique of the long
civil rights era framework, see: Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire:
Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies,” The Journal of African American History 92, no.
2 (Spring 2007): 265–88.
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were sites of concerted civil rights action reaching back at least as far as the 1930s and 1940s.17
Syracuse provides an important example of a city where civil rights activism emerged in parallel
with the “classic phase” of the movement, with the most sustained direct-action protests taking
place between 1963 and 1965. Attention to Northern expressions of protest also better reveals the
collapse of the civil rights movement; though the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 successfully disassembled Jim Crow, the legislation hindered but did not destroy the
mechanisms that reproduced racial inequality in the North. Through federally funded War on
Poverty and Model Cities initiatives, activists in Syracuse pursued civil rights agendas into the
mid-1970s, at which point—inhibited by internal divisions, the loss of federal funds, presidential
intransigence, and unfavorable Supreme Court decisions—the movement lost coherence both in
the Salt City and nationally.
The long civil rights era historiography has established gender as an important lens for
understanding social movements.18 This project contributes to the recovery of Black women as

17
See: Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
18
See: Bettye Collier-Thomas and V. P. Franklin, eds., Sisters in the Struggle : African-American Women
in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Martha S. Jones,
Vanguard: How Black Women Broke Barriers, Won the Vote, and Insisted on Equality for All (New York: Basic
Books, 2020); Danielle L. McGuire, At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance, a New
History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power (New York: Vintage Books,
2011); Ransby, Barbara. Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision. Gender &
American Culture. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
I also draw on a rich body of scholarship that highlights Black women’s innovative leadership in
movements for economic equality. See: Kornbluh, The Battle for Welfare Rights; Premilla Nadasen, Welfare
Warriors: The Welfare Rights Movement in the United States (New York: Routledge, 2005); Annelise Orleck,
Storming Caesars Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005);
Annelise Orleck and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian, eds., The War on Poverty a New Grassroots History, 1964-1980 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2011); Rhonda Y. Williams, The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women’s Struggles
against Urban Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
This project applies an intersectional framework to understand how activists exercised agency within the
matrices of oppression that they experienced. Developed by Black feminist scholars in the late twentieth century and
best articulated by Patricia Hill Collins, intersectionality is a theoretical approach to understanding the factors that
constrain individual and group opportunities. This theory acknowledges that “social inequalities are multiple,
complex, and mutually constructing.” Patricia Hill Collins, “Social Inequality, Power, and Politics: Intersectionality
and American Pragmatism in Dialogue,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2012), 455.
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grassroots leaders in the North. As Kristopher Burrell argues, Black women participated in civil
rights struggles as “theorists, organizers, advocates, and mothers.”19 Syracuse CORE both
nurtured and relied on Black women’s activism in its campaigns. By tracing the stories of
women such as Anna Mae Williams, Inez Heard, Gloria Mims, and Elizabeth Ann Page, this
project offers a valuable perspective on the evolution of Black women’s leadership. It also charts
how Black women strategically worked through different movements and organizations to
achieve their agendas. To give but one example, Anna Mae Williams, who migrated to Syracuse
in the 1950s from Mississippi, became an activist through Syracuse CORE, went on to
participate in a War on Poverty organization, ran for political office, and was an early leader in
the welfare rights movement. By adopting a thematic approach focused on issues, rather than
offering merely an organizational history of Syracuse CORE, this project captures Black
women’s leadership across time and depicts the full expanse of their visions and efforts.
“Saving Salt City” further contributes to the long civil rights era scholarship by
complicating the relationship of the Northern and Southern movements.20 In contrast to the Deep
South, where Jim Crow laws constituted an explicit framework for maintaining white supremacy,
the “Deep North,” a term coined by Syracuse CORE, employed more covert means to
marginalize African Americans in all aspects of social, political, and economic life. Public
officials frequently decried discrimination while denying any responsibility to combat it. This
environment created particular challenges for activists. Rather than blurring regional differences,
the concept of the Deep North highlights the unique features of racial oppression and the
19

Kristopher Burrell, “Black Women as Activist Intellectuals: Ella Baker and Mae Mallory Combat
Northern Jim Crow in New York City’s Public Schools during the 1950s,” in The Strange Careers of the Jim Crow
North, ed. Purnell, Theoharis, and Woodward, 90.
20
The term “The Deep North” appears in Syracuse CORE’s April 1964 newsletter. Wiley’s biographers
attribute this term to Wiley, which seems plausible. The definition of the Deep North is my own. Kotz and Kotz, A
Passion for Equality, 119; “In the Wind,” Syracuse CORE, April 1964. Congress of Racial Equality (Syracuse
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strategies used to achieve change in the North. The very strength of the Southern movement
often inhibited Northern efforts by deflecting media attention and resources. Northern activists
grappled with a complex dilemma: they simultaneously wanted to support struggles to abolish
Jim Crow, call attention to local struggles in the North, and to enlist the support of Southern
activists in combating Northern discrimination and exclusion. Calling attention to the ways in
which activists in the North and the South interacted with one another adds nuance to scholarly
understandings of how the Southern movement both helped and hindered Northern activism.
Finally, by examining efforts to achieve justice in the areas of education, housing,
policing, employment, and poverty, this project brings together several historiographical
conversations in urban, political, and social history. It argues that spatial isolation created
opportunities for the poor and African Americans to organize but that these mobilizations could
not succeed if the isolation persisted. This approach acknowledges the roots of the urban crisis in
the postwar era, as Tom Sugrue has most compellingly illustrated, but also considers the missed
opportunities to change course in the 1960s. Sugrue argued that the crisis was not inevitable but
the cumulative result of decisions by both private and public actors.21 Likewise, in mid-sized
cities and cities with diverse industrial bases, the crisis might still have been averted in the 1960s
had white city officials been willing to address racial and economic segregation. Instead,
government-funded social programs largely targeted low-income neighborhoods without

21

One of the main insights of the body of literature on the formation of the “second ghetto” is that the
isolation of poor African Americans in decaying urban cores was not inevitable. Rather, it was the cumulative result
of the choices of private citizens; government officials; and banks, realtors, and businesses. The federal government
promoted white homeownership and suburbanization while financing urban redevelopment that benefited private
corporations and devastated poor and predominantly minority communities throughout the nation. See: Arnold
Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto and Hirsch, “Containment on the Home Front Race and Federal Housing Policy
from the New Deal to the Cold War,” Journal of Urban History 26, no. 2 (January 1, 2000): 158–89; Sugrue, The
Origins of the Urban Crisis; Massey and Denton, American Apartheid; Kenneth T. Jackson, “Race, Ethnicity, and
Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration,” Journal of
American History 6, no. 4 (August 1980), 419-452.
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addressing integration, thus re-creating and reinforcing the spatial isolation of the poor. The
effects of the macroeconomic shifts of the 1960s and 1970s would have been mediated if they
had not been borne disproportionately by primarily poor and Black urban citizens.22
This exploration of Syracuse traces the textures and contours of urban civil rights
activism in the 1960s and early 1970s to recover the contests that occurred over seemingly
inevitable processes. The Salt City was a microcosm of many of the forces that shaped urban
spaces after World War II: highway development, urban renewal, demographic changes, and
deindustrialization. By proposing visions of a more equitable, racially integrated city, activists
destabilized a dominant narrative of progress and offered alternatives to the urban decline that
unfolded after the collapse of the civil rights movement in the Salt City. Centering the struggles
of Black Syracusans for recognition and political power illustrates the historical importance of
individual agency as well as contingency. Although the civil rights movement imploded with
many of its goals unrealized in the mid-1970s, Syracuse experienced more than a decade of
concerted activism to disrupt racial inequality and to amplify marginalized voices. They did not
succeed in averting the outcomes of hypersegregation and concentrated poverty, but their
unrealized agendas offer a legacy for future generations to draw upon.

22
This project adopts the perspective of Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton that residential segregation is a
primary cause of urban poverty. In contrast, scholars such as William Julius Wilson have argued that class is
increasingly more relevant in determining opportunity than race. Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, 7.
William J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987) and William J. Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and
Changing American Institutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
Jason Hackworth sees a fundamental linkage between race and the fortunes of Rust Belt cities. He argues
that “the construction of blackness as a threat to white property, political power, and safety has been a fundamental
cause of urban decline.” He argues that beginning in the 1960s the conservative movement, in combination with
urban decline and perceived racial threat, generated federal urban policy that produced “organized deprivation,”
which is characterized by “state actions to reduce social welfare, liberate corporations from local regulation, and
punish ‘unruly’ people.” Manufacturing Decline: How Racism and the Conservative Movement Crush the American
Rust Belt. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 5, 12, 36.
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The Salt City Mythology
In the 1950s, city elites represented Syracuse as a harmonious and thriving mid-sized
industrial city with a diverse economic base. Located about forty miles south of Lake Ontario on
the former Erie Canal, Syracuse boasted companies such as General Electric, Carrier
Corporation, Chrysler, Crouse-Hinds, and the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.23 It also had
multiple institutions of higher education. Bolstered by the GI Bill, Syracuse University (SU)
tripled in size after World War II.24 Students also attended the Upstate Medical Center, part of
the State University of New York, and Le Moyne College, a Jesuit school on the city’s East Side.
Syracuse’s population peaked at just over 220,000 in 1950, after which it began to lose
population to the surrounding metropolitan area.
The Second Great Migration, a demographic shift in which five million African
Americans left the South for the North and West between World War II and 1970, transformed
the Salt City and challenged Syracuse’s progressive mythology.25 A combination of push and
pull factors—factory jobs in the North, the mechanization of agriculture in the South, and hope
for a better life away from Jim Crow—powered the migration. In 1940, the 2,082 African
Americans in the Syracuse represented only 1% of the population. Between 1940 and 1950, the
number of African Americans in Syracuse increased by 120%. The Black population grew by
another 144% in the following decade and nearly doubled again between 1960 and 1970.26 With
African Americans representing just over 5% of the population in 1960, Syracuse was
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Syracuse, New York: The Place to Set Your Sites! (Syracuse: Greater Syracuse Chamber of Commerce,
1965), E-4.
24
“Historic Overview: The GI Bulge,” Syracuse University Office of Veteran and Military Affairs,
Accessed 10 March 2022, https://veterans.syr.edu/why-su/history/gi-bulge/.
25
On the Great Migration, see: Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s
Great Migration (New York: Vintage, 2011).
26
In all three of these decades, the increase in the Black population exceeded the average rate of change for
U.S. central cities. Seymour Sacks, The Syracuse Black Community, 1970: A Comparative Study (Syracuse, NY:
University College, 1974), 24.
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comparable to cities such as Rochester, New York; Sacramento, California; and Kalamazoo,
Michigan. Reflecting national trends, the proportion of African Americans increased in part
because white residents moved to the suburbs: Syracuse’s white population decreased by 5.5% in
the 1950s and by 14.8% in the 1960s.27
Although Syracuse had a robust industrial base in the mid-twentieth century, with “more
than one-quarter of the labor force. . .employed in the electronic and industrial machine
industries alone,” it was agriculture that brought many Black families to the region. Arriving as
seasonal farm workers, many decided to put down roots in Syracuse. Confronted with fierce
housing discrimination, they settled in the Fifteenth Ward, a multicultural neighborhood situated
to the west of Syracuse University and to the southeast of downtown. Newly arrived African
Americans, a small but vocal and important group, quickly realized that a variety of barriers
blocked their political, economic, and social progress. The gap between hopes and reality was
wide and stark.

27
Sacks, The Syracuse Black Community, 1970, 21, 23. As many scholars have documented, the creation of
the suburbs was not caused by market forces alone. Rather, government policies at the federal, state, and local level
drove this phenomenon. See: Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race & Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983/1998); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996/2005); and Kenneth T. Jackson,
Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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Figure 1: Black Population in Syracuse, New York, 1940-1970
1940

1950

1960

1970

Total Black
Population

2,082

4,586

11,210

21,383

Total Population

205,967

220,583

216,038

197,208

Black Population
Percentage

1.0

2.1

5.2

10.8

Black Population
N/A
120.3%
144.4%
90.7%
Growth Rate
_______________________________________________________________________
Source: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics On Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990,
and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For Large Cities And Other Urban Places In The United States,” Population
Division Working Paper No. 76 (Washington, D.C.: United States Census Bureau, 2005), Table 33.

To white leaders’ who sought to preserve their idyllic portrayal of Syracuse, the growing
Black population posed a threat that needed to be contained. To protect their vision of the city,
officials chose to bulldoze the Fifteenth Ward through a federally funded urban renewal
project.28 In doing so, they sought to impose a new order on the city that would be built upon the
destruction and displacement of the community that nearly 90% of the city’s Black population
called home. This project evolved in tandem with plans for a north-south interstate highway that
would slice through the neighborhood and bisect the city.29 The highway, Interstate 81, was not
constructed until the second half of the 1960s, but it cast a shadow over the neighborhood long
before it existed in concrete and steel.30 By the early 1960s the Black citizens of the Fifteenth
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The Near East Side Urban Renewal Project slated 101 acres of the Fifteenth Ward for demolition. “17
Percent of City Land in Renewal Projects,” Syracuse Metropolitan Review, 1 no. 3 (Nov. 1967), 3.
29
See: Joseph F. DiMento and Cliff Ellis, Changing Lanes: Visions and Histories of Urban Freeways
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2013), 168-180.
30
The first houses were cleared to make way for the elevated arterial in 1964. A portion of the arterial
opened in January 1967, but the highway was not fully operational until it connected to Interstate 690 (an East-West
connection between I-481 on the East and I-90 on the West) in 1969. Aaron C. Knight, “Urban Renewal, the 15th
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Ward faced simultaneous crises in education, housing, policing, and employment alongside the
looming prospect of dislocation.

Figure 2: Urban Renewal Demolition in the Fifteenth Ward, ca. 1963

This study works to recover the agendas and visions that could have made Syracuse more
like the image it portrayed. It also reckons with the ways in which these efforts were too often
thwarted. What progress the city did achieve was in most cases the results of activism on the part
of Black citizens and their allies. The same white leaders who spoke about combatting bigotry
and race prejudice often simply denied or ignored the existence of racial inequality. Or, when
finally compelled to acknowledge the existence of injustice, they worked to discredit the activists
who exposed it. Through gradualism and delay, white elites forestalled altering the status quo. In
the face of such intransigence, efforts to further civil rights and antipoverty agendas required
creativity and persistence. Fortunately, the Salt City also nourished the seeds of activism that
increasingly took root in the 1960s.

Ward, the Empire Stateway and the City of Syracuse, New York” (B.S. Honors Thesis, Syracuse University, 2007),
12-13.
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Congress of Racial Equality
The story of Salt City’s emerging civil rights movement begins in many respects with the
city’s chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Struggles for equality are part of the
longue durée of the Salt City’s history.31 In the 1940s, Syracuse had one of the earliest Congress
of Racial Equality (CORE) chapters in the nation. CORE arose during World War II,
emphasizing civil rights activism in the midst of a global war to defend democracy. CORE drew
attention to the hypocrisy of undemocratic, racially discriminatory practices that persisted in the
United States. The fight against fascism created a favorable political climate in which racial
justice activists could press for change. Founded in 1942 by six Christian pacifist students at the
University of Chicago, CORE was an interracial organization committed to challenging racial
segregation by employing nonviolent tactics. They began by targeting discriminatory restaurants
and succeeded in integrating many places of business in Chicago. CORE affiliates emerged in
nineteen cities, including Syracuse, between 1942 and 1947.32
The first Syracuse CORE chapter formed in 1942 after James Farmer came to town to
address an interracial gathering of the local Fellowship of Reconciliation. Led by charismatic
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I borrow this formulation from scholar Alondra Nelson. She compellingly argues that the Black Panther
Party’s health activism constitutes part of a “longue durée of Black struggles for well-being [that] offers context for
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the nation, formed. See: Cornwall, Human Rights in Syracuse, Introduction; Sally Roesch Wagner, Matilda Joslyn
Gage: She Who Holds the Sky, 2nd ed. (Aberdeen, S.D: Sky Carrier Press, 2002).
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On the formation of CORE, see August Meier and Elliott M. Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil
Rights Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 8-38 and Frazier, Harambee City, 3-26.
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white pacifist Robert Vogel, CORE challenged discrimination in local restaurants and hotels,
pressured a company to hire Black bus drivers, urged the Syracuse Housing Authority to
integrate its housing project, and protested the Red Cross’s practice of segregating African
American’s blood donations. Unfortunately, the group experienced few tangible successes. For
example, the attempt to obtain employment for Black bus drivers was abandoned when SU
students left for the summer in 1944, and the Red Cross did not stop discriminating against Black
donors. Discouraged, the chapter dissolved in November 1945. Nationally, CORE lost
momentum in the late 1940s and seemingly bordered on extinction in the 1950s.33
The lunch counter sit-ins at Woolworth’s in Greensboro, North Carolina, reenergized
CORE in 1960. The organization helped replicate sit-ins in stores around the country. The
following year, CORE organized the Freedom Rides, which challenged bus segregation on
interstate transportation in the Deep South. Rudy Lombard, a Black SU graduate student and a
veteran Freedom Rider, provided the spark needed to re-establish CORE in the Salt City.
Inspired by Lombard’s activism, enthusiastic graduate students from SU’s Maxwell School of
Public Affairs decided to form a CORE chapter in fall 1961. They invited George and Wretha
Wiley, a Black chemistry professor and a white English literature graduate student who had
married that spring, to join them. The group soon elected George as its first chairperson, and
Wiley became a unifying force for civil rights activism in the city.34 Over the next few years,
Syracuse CORE evolved from its campus base to become a more inclusive organization located
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On the first Syracuse CORE, see Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 15, 27, 28, 29, 31. Background information
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in the heart of the Fifteenth Ward. Under the Wileys’ guidance, the organization identified and
cultivated grassroots Black leadership.

Figure 3: Syracuse CORE Publication, 1963

Syracuse CORE was a catalyzer of the various civil rights campaigns that emerged
between 1962 and 1965. The local CORE leadership was also pivotal in connecting the Salt City
to the broader national struggle for civil rights. Within months of its formation, CORE entered
local policy conversations by challenging an elementary school boundary change that would
have increased racial segregation. The chapter organized a successful school boycott in May
1962 and compelled the school board to launch a broader investigation into segregation in the
district. The following year, CORE launched a large direct-action campaign to demand that the
city halt its Near East Side Urban Renewal Project until it had a plan to guarantee that displaced
Black citizens would not be resegregated.
CORE reached the zenith of its power in 1964, when it organized a successful tenants’
council in a public housing project, waged a prominent campaign against police brutality, and
developed a 108-point proposal for achieving racial equality in the city. The following year,
18

despite changes in leadership, CORE waged a protracted but successful employment campaign
against the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. The company, which at the beginning of 1965
had fewer than ten Black employees in a Syracuse-based workforce of 1,500 people, ultimately
agreed to institute a nondiscrimination policy in its hiring practices. The successful campaign
exacted a costly toll from CORE members. Faced with criminal charges, financial debts, and
internal divisions, the organization’s unity shattered.
After 1965, CORE was no longer and agent for change in the city. CORE’s work
affirmed and informed antipoverty activists who would use a variety of methods and
organizational structures to pursue agendas for change after CORE’s influence waned. Between
1965 and 1972, the infusion of federal funds through the War on Poverty and Model Cities, two
major federal antipoverty initiatives, provided resources with which activists built new
organizations. Through these organizations, activists continued to pursue civil rights agendas and
to attempt to restructure power relations in the city. With the loss of federal funding in the mid1970s, these efforts collapsed. After more than a decade of steady and varied protest, significant
federal investment, and some important national attention, racial and economic inequality
remained.

Methodology & Sources
Syracuse serves as a lens for illuminating the social and political history of urban spaces
in the United States during the mid-twentieth century. A local study facilitates a textured
examination of a set of local organizations, their interactions with each other, and the public and
private entities they appealed to in order to achieve goals and to resolve conflicts. This approach
encompasses the perspectives of rank-and-file organization members, not just the most visible
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leaders. Using Robin Kelley’s definition of politics as “the many battles to roll back constraints
and exercise some power over, or create some space within, the institutions and social
relationships that dominate our lives,” this project recognizes that the low-income residents who
mobilized to improve their conditions were political actors.35 Documenting their agency requires
creatively reading oral history interviews and documentary sources such as newspapers to
understand how low-income Syracusans subverted dominant discourses of poverty, race, and
citizenship.
This project accesses the perspectives of activists and officials in the Salt City by drawing
on oral history interviews. Subaltern individuals are vulnerable to becoming twice marginalized:
first in life and again in historical scholarship. This silencing is part of what contributed to the
narrative of the Salt City as a progressive city largely free of racial inequality and conflict. Oral
histories therefore present the opportunity to correct imbalances in the historical record and to
fundamentally transform the kinds of narratives that scholars produce. Collecting and
interpreting these histories, however, requires a specialized methodology that recognizes the
unique nature of oral history sources.36 Rather than merely mining oral histories for facts to
determine “what really happened,” this project employs oral histories to analyze the agendas and
political identities that activists crafted, as well as how they theorized citizenship and the role of
the state. Triangulating interviews with documentary sources from local and national
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organizations and government officials allows for a nuanced depiction of the process of social
change.
This project weaves together interviews collected by a diverse set of scholars to assemble
a rich picture of activism in the Salt City. I personally conducted a series of oral history
interviews with five activists between 2014 and 2020. These interviews are particularly useful
because I was able to craft my own questions and to get a sense of the activists’ personalities. I
consider an interview to be an act of co-creation, and in this sense the interviewees are important
contributors to this research. The fact that these interviews took place fifty years after the events
covered in this dissertation is a limitation. The interviewees often had astonishingly vivid
memories, but some details and chronologies were understandably murky.
Another valuable set of interviews was conducted by journalists Nick and Mary Lynn
Kotz for their biography of George Wiley.37 After forty-five years, A Passion for Equality is still
the only biography of Wiley, providing one of the most detailed accounts of the civil rights
movement in Syracuse. Collected in the early 1970s, the Kotz interviews took place in much
closer temporal proximity than my own to the events discussed. One limitation is that the Kotz’s
biographical approach to the content shaped their interview questions, which often focused on
George Wiley’s actions and leadership. They were, however, very thorough researchers and
there is ample content that helps form a broader understanding of the Syracuse political
landscape. Some of the interviewees also donated extensive archival material, including audio
recordings, to the Kotzes. This material enables me to create a much more detailed picture of
civil rights activism in the city of Syracuse than the Kotz biography offers.
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This project benefits from two additional interview collections. The first was an oral
history project completed by the Human Rights Commission of Syracuse and Onondaga County
in the 1980s. Zoe Cornwall, a commission staff member, drew on nearly seventy interviews to
write Human Rights in Syracuse: Two Memorable Decades.38 When possible, I quote from the
interviews themselves. However, most interviews were not fully transcribed, and the original
recordings are difficult to access. I therefore cite interviews that are quoted and excerpted in
Human Rights in Syracuse. This book, while not entirely uncritical, adopts a generally
celebratory view of the civil rights movement in Syracuse. In this project, I strive to center the
voices of Black activists and residents whose experiences do not support this triumphal narrative.
Finally, I draw on interviews conducted by sociologist Noel Cazenave for a study of
Syracuse’s War on Poverty programs. In the early 1990s, Cazenave spoke with activists as well
as federal and local officials to understand how local governments attempted to deploy and
control federally funded Community Action Programs to manage urban race relations. I agree
with much of Cazenave’s thorough analysis of the conflicts that arose over the War on Poverty in
the Salt City. Recovering activists’ agendas as well as the conflicts that arose over program
implementation, my project expands our understanding of what the War on Poverty did and did
not achieve in the Salt City.
Newspapers and magazines constitute another significant source base. The two main
local newspapers during this period were the Syracuse Post-Standard and the Herald-Journal,
both owned by media mogul Samuel J. Newhouse, who helped establish the Newhouse School of
Communications at Syracuse University.39 This print media not only helps establish a
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chronology of events but, because both newspapers were generally conservative leaning, they
allow for an analysis of conservative, white political rhetoric around race and poverty. Although
Syracuse boasted several Black-owned newspapers in the twentieth century, I was only able to
locate and draw on a few issues of the Syracuse People’s Weekly and the Home Town News,
which were published in the 1960s.40 Additionally, Syracuse University’s student newspaper,
The Daily Orange, includes reporting on both campus events and Syracuse-area news. Beyond
Salt City, major newspapers with national distributions covered Syracuse’s most high-profile
developments, such as the 1963 urban renewal demonstrations and the War on Poverty
controversies. The primary newspaper in this category is the New York Times.
Government and organizational materials are another key set of sources. This project
draws extensively on Congress of Racial Equality papers housed at the Wisconsin State
Historical Society in the CORE, George Wiley, and Nick Kotz collections, as well as at Syracuse
University. Some of George Wiley’s audio recordings, including a July 1964 CORE
conversation about the use of violence to achieve change, have not, to my knowledge, been cited
elsewhere. Government papers held at the New York State Archives and the John F. Kennedy
and Lyndon B. Johnson Libraries provide insight into the perspectives of state and federal
policymakers who interacted with Salt City activists. I gathered additional correspondence, press
releases, organizational reports, and newspaper articles from local archives. These materials
provide insight into the perspectives of an array of actors, from city officials to civil rights and

For the time period I investigated, most issues of the Post-Standard and the Herald-Journal are available
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antipoverty leaders. Finally, the Ancestry database allowed me to piece together key biographical
information about individual activists.

Organization
The narrative that follows is organized thematically around the key issues of education,
housing, policing, employment, and economic justice. This organization entails overlapping
timelines across, and sometimes, within chapters. Tracing activists’ efforts to combat each issue
allows for a cohesive examination of the strategies and community responses that shaped
campaigns. Each chapter emphasizes an event that charts the rise and fall of the Syracuse CORE
chapter, as well as post-CORE conflicts over civil rights leadership and agendas in the Salt City.
Chapter One reframes our understanding of struggles for educational equality by recovering
grassroots efforts to navigate institutional intransigence and the school board’s deference to
white parents. It uncovers the tactics that educational advocates deployed to fight for equal
opportunities for all students in Syracuse public schools between the mid-1950s and 1969. It also
demonstrates how CORE successfully inserted school desegregation into community
conversations and established itself as a leading civil rights organization in the city. Ultimately,
the school board delayed integration for so long that the problem of school segregation became
intractable. The Salt City missed its opportunity to create integrated and equitable schools, but
the outcome was not inevitable.
Chapter Two explores activist responses to discriminatory housing conditions in the Salt
City. In contesting the city’s urban renewal policies, Syracuse CORE argued that the state was
accountable for the impacts of renewal and displacement on the Black community. CORE
challenged the city to guarantee that Black citizens would not be re-segregated. They also
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fostered tenant activism in public housing, supporting tenants both in their efforts to improve
their living conditions and to articulate their own vision of citizenship and the role of the state.
Recovering CORE’s urban renewal campaign and subsequent housing activism underscores the
centrality of resistance to spatial segregation to civil rights agendas. The failure to gain traction
against residential segregation inhibited progress in other key areas such as education, policing,
and employment. CORE failed to stop the processes that resulted in hypersegregation, but in
predicting the creation of an expanded ghetto it undermined the notion that the consequences of
urban renewal were unforeseen or unintentional.
The third chapter explores the range of responses Syracusans considered or pursued to
address the perennial problem of racialized policing in the 1960s. By highlighting three cases in
which CORE defended victims of police abuse, this chapter demonstrates the scope and nature of
racialized policing in the Salt City, the use of law enforcement to disrupt civil rights organizing,
and the resistance of city officials to any encroachment on police authority. Informed by their
local context, Syracuse activists proposed alternative visions of policing and community safety
that sought to reframe the relationship between Black Syracusans and the state. Meanwhile,
those who viewed racialized policing and racial inequality as intractable debated the use of
violence to achieve change. Recovering the visions of activists in the Salt City demonstrates that,
when federal law enforcement and criminal justice took a punitive turn in response to the urban
uprisings of the 1960s and early 1970s, policymakers ignored a robust set of alternatives that
were proposed at the grassroots level.
Chapter Four offers two case studies to analyze CORE’s efforts to press for economic
justice in the Deep North: CORE’s campaigns against employment discrimination at the Hotel
Syracuse in 1963 and the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation in 1965. It demonstrates how
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CORE strategically leveraged the national attention to civil rights issues to highlight employment
discrimination in the urban North. Finally, the chapter reveals the organizational costs of
combatting employment discrimination in the absence of broad-based civic, institutional, and
governmental support. In its confrontation with Niagara Mohawk, Syracuse CORE reached the
limits of what it could achieve through direct-action protest. The organization never recovered
from the costly and divisive campaign.
The final chapter considers the organizing strategies of community leaders who initially
emerged alongside—and sometimes from within—CORE, and who rose to prominence
following CORE’s decline. Between 1965 and 1972, federally funded War on Poverty and
Model Cities initiatives provided resources and institutional bases for a new set of leaders to
experiment with interracial economic justice activism. Examining the ways that grassroots
leaders implemented federal policy as part of their strategy for change sheds new light on the
relationship between the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty. By recovering the
contests over on-the-ground implementation of federal policy, the Syracuse case study also
highlights the tensions in mid-twentieth-century liberalism. Low-income Syracusans believed in
the power of the state, but they also believed that they were themselves were experts on the
conditions they faced, and their solutions. The struggle to reshape the local political landscape of
the Salt City played out on a national stage, and the experimentation speaks to the power of
marginalized citizens to seize the opportunity impact policy and catalyze change.
The story of civil rights and antipoverty activism in Syracuse demonstrates that the Salt
City was a laboratory of experimentation in both civil rights strategy and the implementation of
federal social welfare policy. Informed by their local context, activists attempted to hold elected
and civic officials accountable for delivering on the promises of mid-twentieth century
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liberalism. In doing so, they envisioned a robust role for the state in ensuring that Black
Syracusans could access education, housing, community safety, and economic security.
Ultimately, although activists achieved some tangible victories, they were unable to
fundamentally alter systemic mechanisms that reproduced inequality and segregation in the
urban North. Recovering the Salt City’s legacy of activism between 1955 and 1975 highlights
both the alternative agendas that had the potential to mitigate the negative impacts of
deindustrialization as the Salt City turned to rust in the last third of the twentieth century.
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Chapter One
“The Burden of Desegregation”: Educational Activism

In the Salt City, two aging school buildings are among the only surviving landmarks of
the old Fifteenth Ward, the multicultural neighborhood that was once home to the majority of
Jewish and later African American residents. Bulldozers and wrecking balls claimed homes,
churches, and businesses to make way for an interstate highway and urban renewal projects in
the late 1950s and 1960s. A red brick building, the former Washington Irving Elementary
School, still stands on Harrison Street. Today it houses the administrative offices for the
Syracuse City School District. A psychiatric treatment center is its neighbor. A few blocks to the
west and one block to the south sits the long-abandoned Central Technical High School. Closed
in 1975 as part of an effort to desegregate the city’s high schools, the building is listed on the
National Register of Historic Places. Syracuse officials have plans to create a regional STEAM
high school in the building, with a tentative opening date of fall 2023.41 With an elegant wrought
iron staircase and a large auditorium, the architecture lends itself to learning and the pursuit of
youthful dreams.42 Both buildings serve as reminders of Syracuse’s segregated and unequal
educational system.
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Figure 4: Central Technical High School in 2022

Over fifty years after she graduated from high school, Syracuse civil rights activist
Elizabeth Ann Page vividly recalled her educational experiences in the city. In an interview, she
framed her memories in spatial terms:
Washington Irving [Elementary School] is now the Board of Education. The old
Dunbar was on South Townsend Street. Now it’s part of McKinney housing,
Syracuse Housing Authority. We went [from Washington Irving] to Dunbar [after
school], and across the street was Pioneer Homes. Then we went to Madison
Junior High. I went to Central [Tech High School] when I left Madison. . .The
guidance counselor said, “Well, you don’t want to go to Nottingham, you want to
go to Central. You want to be a big fish in a little pool. If you go to Nottingham,
you’ll be a little fish in a big pool.” I said, “I don’t care what kind of pool I’m in!
My daddy said, I better get out of school and go to college.” That’s all I know!
Forget all that other nonsense. They were putting all the black kids, by and large,
if you didn’t have a lot of back up, into non-academic kinds of things. Folks did
well, considering all the barriers they went through.43

43

Elizabeth Ann Page, Interview by Author, Syracuse, NY, Audio Recording, 14 October 2014 and 31
October 2014, Possession of the Author.

29

Page’s progression from Washington Irving Elementary to Madison Junior High to Central Tech
was the standard path for the city’s African American students until Madison Junior High closed
in June 1965. From Central Tech, Page’s journey was exceptional. She went on to attend
Syracuse University (SU).44 Situated on the hill less than one mile east of Washington Irving, the
SU campus was virtually inaccessible to Black students. Page recalled that she was one of only
seven African Americans from the area in her first-year class of over 2,000 undergraduates in the
early 1960s.45
Few Black Syracusans attended college on the hill in part because at the end of each
school year, very few Black students walked across the stage to receive their high school
diploma. According to a former CORE member’s doctoral thesis, there were forty-one Black
high school graduates in the entire county in 1961, forty-two in 1963, and sixty-three in 1965.46
Estimating that the Black student population was divided evenly among each grade, more than
350 students should have graduated each spring.47 With fewer than 20% of Black students
wearing a mortar board on graduation day, the Syracuse schools were clearly failing to provide
an equal and quality education to all.
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In September 1962, Black families in Syracuse staged a boycott to protest the school
system’s neglect of Black students. On the first day of school, over eighty percent of students
from Washington Irving Elementary School stayed home. This bold collective action highlights
the power of school boycotts as a tool for effecting change in the Deep North. Following the
boycott and several weeks of picketing the school board, the Syracuse Area Council of the State
Commission for Human Rights formed a committee to study school segregation in Syracuse.48
Black parents hailed this acknowledgment of the inequality their children experienced as a
victory.49
The boycott had been coordinated by the nascent local chapter of the Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE), which formed at SU in fall 1961. The successful boycott propelled CORE’s
momentum as it attempted to evolve from a small, campus-based cadre of activists to a
grassroots organization that reflected the agenda of the local Black community. CORE spurred
years of grassroots activism that compelled the school board to take halting steps to address
segregation. These efforts did not integrate all Syracuse schools, nor did they guarantee quality
education for all students, yet Syracuse was a national leader in addressing desegregation in the
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absence of a court order. In a 1968 report, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights praised the Salt
City’s desegregation efforts.50 This chapter reckons with the contradiction that Syracuse became
a model for school integration even as Black parents contested the school district’s efforts, which
continuously prioritized the desires of white families over the needs and concerns of Black
citizens.
Scholars have explored school desegregation in the North and the South through
extensive case studies that account for local social, political, and economic contexts; document
the varied policy responses of government at the local, state, and federal level; trace the
evolution of white resistance; and recover the experiences of students who participated in
integration efforts.51 Desegregation was one of a range of ways in which activists fought for
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quality schools. Demands also included more resources, more Black teachers, and more inclusive
curricula. In An African American Dilemma, a recent regional synthesis of Northern educational
activism from the 1840s to the present, education historian Zoë Burkholder situates education
activism within the broader Black freedom struggle. Burkholder documents an ongoing dialectic
between integration and separation for Black education as activists negotiated white northerners
who “stymied, opposed, deflected, and dodged Black demands for school integration after
1954.”52 White Northern opposition came to focus on the use of buses to achieve integration. As
Matt Delmont has demonstrated, desegregation opponents collapsed complex policy debates into
a singular focus on “busing.” In doing so, white families used the media to reframe a public
discourse about “the constitutional rights of black students” as “a story about the feelings and
opinions and white people.”53
This chapter offers Syracuse, a city that “voluntarily” desegregated yet evaded
meaningful integration, as a case study of a critical missed opportunity.54 Although it received
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praise from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Syracuse’s desegregation plans placed the
burden of desegregation on Black students and their families. This chapter reframes our
understanding of struggles for educational equality by recovering grassroots efforts to navigate
institutional intransigence and the school board’s deference to white parents. It uncovers the
tactics that educational advocates deployed to fight for equal opportunities for all students in
Syracuse public schools between the mid-1950s and 1969. It also demonstrates how CORE
successfully inserted school desegregation into community conversations and established itself
as a leading civil rights organization in the city.
White civic leaders had an opportunity to situate the Salt City as a leader in school
integration, but instead they chose to delay and deflect. In doing so, they made choices that not
only impacted the city’s educational landscape, but also had broader repercussions for
Syracuse’s social, political, and economic geography.55 In Syracuse, parents worked alongside
civic and faith organizations to challenge the school board’s inadequate integration plans with
some success. Black mothers mobilized a second boycott in 1966 to demand that Croton,
overcrowded and with a Black student population of 90%, be “Open and Integrated.”56 The
boycott secured the former but not the latter objective. As Martha Biondi wrote of school
desegregation in New York City post-Brown, “the frustrated efforts [of educational activists]. .
.exposed the hypocrisy and fault lines of northern white liberalism.”57 Activists realized that
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desegregation would be a protracted struggle with potentially limited gains, while both the
school board’s responses and protest strategies evolved over time. Chapter Five will pick up the
threads of educational activism in the 1970s, as Black Syracusans continued to demand a voice
in policymaking through advocacy.

Education in the Fifteenth Ward

Figure 5: Children in the Fifteenth Ward, ca. 1960

By the early 1960s, the increasing number of Black children in the Syracuse public
schools magnified longstanding educational inequities. While African American citizens
represented 5.2% of the city’s overall population of 216,000 in 1960, approximately one out of
every six of the nearly 30,000 students enrolled in Syracuse public schools
was
Black.58 A U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report noted that “during the 1962-63 school year
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58 percent of all Negro elementary school children attended two of the city’s 33 elementary
schools. In the same year, more than one-third of the Negro junior high school students attended
one of the 14 junior highs.”59 These segregated schools were Washington Irving Elementary,
Croton Elementary, and Madison Juniors High Schools—all located in the Fifteenth Ward. In
1963, thirteen of the thirty-three elementary schools were 99% white, and eight elementary
schools had no Black students enrolled.60
Newly arrived migrant families had little choice but to send their children to the
increasingly segregated public schools. One such migrant was Anna Mae Williams, who grew up
in Mississippi and worked in the cotton fields beginning at age six. She faced barriers due to her
own limited education. She recounted her journey to a journalist in 1974:
I left Mississippi in 1955 and. . .[went] to Florida to pick beans and tomatoes because all
we knew how to do was work on a farm. We had no factory skills. . .And I started on the
migrants [sic] thing. I must have come to New York State about 3 times before I finally
wound up in Syracuse. . .I was married. When I first went on the migrants' train my first
husband and I was separated and it was just me and my daughter. And then I met my
second husband. He was a truck driver. He hauled potatoes and beans.61
Once in Syracuse, Williams wanted to work as a nurse’s aide. She recalled that she was told to
“go back South” when she applied. With no high school diploma, she commuted to the suburbs
to clean houses to supplement meager welfare checks.
Williams valued education, but she had dropped out of school at age thirteen due to
economic necessity. She explained that “I was brought up in a family where my grandmother
was the oldest child of slave parents and she had drummed into our heads the importance of an
education.” Williams wanted her daughter to have better educational opportunities. She enrolled
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her daughter in Washington Irving Elementary School and was frustrated by what she witnessed.
“I was upset because she was going to school at 5 years old. . .and they were not doing anything
but draw[ing]. . .and I just could not understand how a school system could keep a kid in school
for a year and a half and not even teach them the alphabet.”62 Frustrated by the failure of the
school system to educate her daughter, Williams began to consider ways to resist the conditions
they faced.
Educational data reflected the deficiencies of both the nation’s segregated Southern
school systems, in which migrants such as Williams received limited education, and Syracuse
schools. Sociologists S. David and Miriam Burney Stamps note that in 1940, the percentage of
Black students attending school slightly exceeded white attendance at the elementary level.63 By
high school, however, economic pressures led many to drop out, resulting in less educational
attainment than their white peers. In 1960, Black Syracusans over the age of twenty-five had
fewer years of education than the city’s population, with a median of 8.7 years and 11.1 years,
respectively. The Black-white educational gap was greater in Syracuse than the state overall,
where Black adults had a median of 9.4 years of education compared to 10.8 years among the
total population. Syracuse, however, compared similarly to other large upstate cities. The median
education level was 8.7 years for Black adults in Buffalo and 8.8 years in Rochester and
Albany.64
One discrepancy between Syracuse and its peers stands out: Syracuse was home to
significantly more college graduates than other upstate cities. In 1960, 4.6% of Black adults in
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the Salt City had completed four years of college, in comparison to 3.4% in Rochester, 2.6% in
Albany, and 2.2% in Buffalo. Black students in the Salt City perhaps had more access to collegeeducated mentors than in these other cities. Relative to these other cities, however, Black
Syracusans were underrepresented in the higher income categories and professional jobs.65 The
dearth of African Americans in professional positions provided few role models for Black
students who wanted to pursue a college education. Many Black youth concluded that
educational attainment did not translate to economic or professional success in the Salt City.
The Syracuse School District did little to retain Black students who had economic
incentives to drop out. In 1960, the district employed no Black administrators and few Black
teachers. Syracuse hired its first Black teacher, Marjorie Carter, in 1950.66 Carter, who was born
in Syracuse and graduated from Central Tech, served in the school district for forty years.
Lorraine Merrick became a fourth-grade teacher at Danforth Elementary in 1959. According to
Liz Page, these women were the only two Black teachers in the school system in the early
1960s.67 Carter and Merrick were beloved and dedicated educators, but they could make only a
limited impact in a school district that served approximately 4,500 Black students.68
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When Black children entered the Syracuse school system, they attended under-resourced
schools where the white teachers had low expectations of their students. During the 1963-1964
school year, Walt Shepperd was a young white English teacher at Madison Junior High who
rejected the attitudes of his colleagues. He recalled challenging his supervisor when she insisted
that the students were incapable of reading Johnny Tremain, a novel that was common to the
ninth-grade curriculum in New York State. “I really, really frustrated her,” Shepperd explained.
“I had to go to another school when they were done with the Johnny Tremain books to get those
books.”69 At the end of the school year, Shepperd’s students told him that Johnny Tremain was
their favorite book.
Confronted with the failures of the school district, the Black community marshalled its
resources to help students navigate the segregated school system. Institutions such as the Dunbar
Community Center, located in the heart of the Fifteenth Ward on South Townsend Street, For
generations of Black children, the Dunbar Center provided a safe and supportive environment
that the public schools did not. African American directors administered Dunbar, but the white
members of the Community Chest controlled the purse strings. Dunbar’s Black leaders struggled
to compel white elected officials to acknowledge the challenges facing Black Syracusans. As
Peggy Wood, a Syracuse social worker and wife of long-time Dunbar executive director Frank
Wood, recalled: “There were attempts, great attempts, being made to have these problems
recognized by the powers that be, the public servants, the legislators on both the city and the
county level, and for those who were in state positions.”70 Despite the paternalistic financial
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arrangement that funded the center and the unresponsiveness of white officials, the staff of the
Dunbar Center promoted the well-being of the neighborhood’s children.71
The Black Dunbar staff served as models and mentors for Black youth. Elizabeth Page
explained that Isaiah Harrison, who joined Dunbar in 1945 and served as executive director
between 1969 and 1971, encouraged students to take college preparatory coursework even when
school counselors tried to channel them into less challenging vocational courses. Harrison
supervised athletic programming for the boys and insisted that they all study, regardless of how
athletically gifted they were. This support allowed athletes such as Manny Breland to gain
acceptance to SU, where he played on the basketball team. Breland went on to become the first
Black coach and administrator for Syracuse schools.72
Figures such as Isaiah Harrison, Marjorie Carter, and Lorraine Merrick touched the lives
of a large proportion of the area’s Black children, a feat that became increasingly challenging as
the Black population continued to grow. Combatting the multiple obstacles inhibiting Black
students from acquiring an education required organized protest. Parents such as Anna Mae
Williams were prepared to take collective action to challenge the Syracuse school system, but
they needed an organizational structure through which to work. One such organization emerged
on the hill where Elizabeth Page attended college.

CORE Confronts the School Board
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Education became the testing ground for a small Congress of Racial Equality chapter that
had formed at Syracuse University in fall 1961. The presence of civil rights veteran Rudolph
(Rudy) Lombard, a graduate student in the Maxwell School for Public Affairs, on campus served
as an inspiration for the new organization. Lombard had staged a lunch-counter sit-in in New
Orleans in 1960 and participated in the Freedom Rides, which challenged bus segregation in the
Deep South, in 1961.73 One member recalled that “[w]hen he would tell the story of the Freedom
Rides people would come from miles around to hear them.”74 As the CORE chapter began to
coalesce, Lombard rejected the idea of a leadership role. The Maxwell graduate students
considered who else they might approach to join their efforts. A dynamic young chemistry
professor, George Wiley, came to mind. Wiley soon became a unifying figure for civil rights
activism in the Salt City.

Figure 6: Dr. George Wiley
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Wiley had rolled into Syracuse in a little red convertible to join the SU faculty in fall
1960—one of only two Black professors on campus. Raised in a predominantly white
community in Rhode Island, as a child he was shielded from the ugliest aspects of racism. His
close-knit family modeled integrity and ambition, and they were respected by their white
neighbors and friends. As a young adult, Wiley broke several racial barriers. He was the first
Black member of his fraternity at Rhode Island State College; the first Black faculty member
hired by the chemistry department at the University of California Berkeley, where he worked
from 1958-1960; and the first African American in the SU chemistry department.75 Although he
had worked on issues of racial justice while fulfilling a six-month military duty in Virginia and
had been active with the NAACP while in Berkeley, he did not anticipate committing his life to
social justice.76 Science was his passion, and his colleagues at SU expected him to earn
recognition for himself and the university as a Nobel laureate.77
Wiley was not at SU long before he was drawn into racial issues on campus. In the fall of
1961, the student newspaper, The Daily Orange, printed an article about racial discrimination in
fraternities and sororities. Wiley, the Greek faculty advisor, was irate and demanded that either
the discrimination in the Greek organizations be addressed immediately or that the fraternities
and sororities be closed.78 This incident inspired the graduate students to approach him about
participating in CORE. Wiley agreed, but his wife, Wretha, was initially more involved.79
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Wretha Whittle, a six-foot-two-inch white woman from Abilene, Texas, came to
Syracuse in 1959 as an English literature graduate student. Trying to distance herself from her
conservative Texas upbringing, she moved into the Fifteenth Ward—an uncharacteristic choice
for a white SU student. Wretha was involved in campus political activism and worked for the
dean of the Maxwell School. Wretha’s friend, Shirley Wiley, gave Wretha’s phone number to
her brother George when he arrived in town in fall 1960.
George took several months to call Wretha, but when he finally did, romance blossomed
quickly. “We met in January [1961] and were married the following June,” Wretha recalled.80
Their pressures of being an interracial couple accelerated the timeline of their relationship.
George had previously proposed marriage to a white girlfriend in California, and she had turned
him down out of fear of her family’s disapproval. When he met Wretha, they discussed the
possibility of marriage just a few weeks after they started dating. Their relationship was also
under scrutiny on campus. Wretha described feeling like she was in “a fishbowl.”81 They got
married in Massachusetts that summer.
As the young couple settled into life together, they were increasingly drawn to civil rights
activism. They hosted Tom Hayden, leader of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), who
described being arrested in Georgia as part of his civil rights work. Soon after Hayden arrived at
the Wiley home, two FBI agents knocked on the door and flashed their badges. They questioned
Hayden until 2:00 am. The meeting with Hayden made an impression on the Wileys. Wretha
described it as “our first exposure to organized civil rights activity. . .This was beginning to look
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like a nationwide network of semi-organized activity. This is my first memory of a sense of a
national movement and participating in a national movement.”82
The CORE chapter formally incorporated in the spring of 1962. George Wiley served as
the founding chairman, with Rudy Lombard as vice-chairman and white female SU students in
the roles of secretary and treasurer. At the time of application, the group had eighteen active
members, twenty associate members, and forty others on their mailing list. CORE met once a
week and had committees on housing, employment, and publicity.83 After tackling campus-based
discrimination in employment, the chapter was ready to expand its activities beyond the
university. It was Wretha Wiley who catalyzed this action by identifying an issue in her own
neighborhood.

Figure 7: Former Wiley Home at 329 Westcott Street in 2022

George and Wretha Wiley had purchased a two-story home on a hill to the east of the
university. Situated near a large park, their neighborhood had once appealed to middle-class
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commuters because an electric trolley rolled down a main thoroughfare and carried workers
downtown. By the early 1960s, however, Wretha explained that “the neighborhood was in
decline. And it was not clear which was going to get to that street first, university expansion or
Black ghetto expansion. It was ideal for us but it was a good, old neighborhood going
downhill.”84 Sumner Elementary School, located across the street from a large city park, was an
asset to the neighborhood. The recently constructed building had opened to students in 1955,
replacing an old and dilapidated school on the same site.
In May 1962, the school board announced plans to redraw the elementary school
boundaries in a way that would increase racial segregation. The stated purpose of the change was
to relieve overcrowding in Sumner Elementary School, but Wretha realized that the effect would
have been to send many white students to another school and to cause Sumner to become
majority Black. Recognizing that this redistricting was a tangible entry point for raising the
broader issue of segregation throughout the school district, Wretha took action.
Although district officials in Syracuse would argue that they had no responsibility to
resolve racial imbalances resulting from residential segregation, the Sumner redistricting belies
their attempt at absolution. Reassigning students so that Sumner Elementary became majority
Black would likely have ensured that the neighborhood became majority Black as well. Unlike
many of Syracuse’s elementary schools, the racial composition of Sumner mirrored the city’s
demographics. Wretha and other parents were determined to maintain its integrated status. In
1962, African Americans represented over 50% of students at two elementary schools, twentyfive schools had over 90% white students, and eight elementary schools had no Black students.85
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In contrast, Sumner’s school population was approximately 20% nonwhite.86 Redistricting would
unsettle this fragile balance and would impact residential segregation as well. As historian
Ansley Erickson argues, “schools and cities construct one another; schools interact powerfully
with the landscapes and economies in which they sit. Thus it is impossible to think of schools as
isolated actors, and it is insufficient to frame schools as simply recipients of the social and
economic forces that surround them.”87 Exposing the numerous state, business, and individual
decisions that created spatialized inequality in their city became Syracuse CORE’s primary task.
The school boundary changes provided an opportunity for the CORE chapter to deploy
its tactic of “confrontation and negotiation” on a city-wide scale.88 The first and most laborintensive step was to gather information and build a case. Before CORE members grabbed picket
signs and demonstrated, they did their homework. Only when they had solid evidence to show
local power brokers did they move onto the confrontation stage. When CORE presented their
case, they gave the challenged party—whether it was a discriminatory landlord, an employer, or
the school district—the opportunity to respond and identify a resolution. If no resolution was
forthcoming, then they escalated to nonviolent direct action. Their goals were both to increase
community awareness and support and to induce their opponents to negotiate and meet their
demands. Wretha Wiley described the process has as “hard, calculating, working out of roles,
poses and perfections. . . On the big projects there is a lot of developmental work. It took you a
long time to get a crisis.”89 When CORE set this process in motion to contest the Salt City’s
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segregated school system, the ambitious organization had advantages in their small but dedicated
force—and also the element of surprise in its use of new tactics.
Dedicated to building a case based on accurate information, Wretha gathered evidence
throughout the month of May. Such data collection was a key step in challenging school
segregation. As Zoë Burkholder notes, after World War II, “[m]any activists worked to
document segregation since northern districts did not officially keep track of students' racial
identities and therefore were able to claim total ignorance about the possibility that schools were
segregated by race.”90 Wretha scrutinized census maps at the city planning office and created
overlays that revealed the relationship between the racial distribution of the neighborhoods and
the proposed district change. This data captured George’s scientific curiosity, and he got
involved for the academic thrill of problem-solving. Wretha recalled that “my data was pretty
raw[,] but as soon as he saw some data he was off and running. He did the projections. He really
loved it.”91 Wretha, however, continued to do the legwork to mount the challenge against the
school district. She rallied the parents in her neighborhood and organized volunteers to stand
outside schools and conduct a rough survey of the student body’s racial composition.
The Wileys’ own neighborhood was the primary source of enthusiasm and strength
during the first stage of the campaign.92 Three existing groups—the Thornden Park
Neighborhood Council, the Sumner School Mothers’ Club, and the Eastside Cooperative
Council—formally opposed the redistricting. The Thornden Park Neighborhood Council
employed a civil rights framework to express its concerns. It issued a statement arguing that the
psychological damage caused by segregated education, as illustrated in Brown v. Board, would
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occur whether the segregation was de jure or de facto.93 On a pragmatic note, it urged the board
of education to leave the Southeast school boundary in place so that students would not
encounter “dangerous street crossings.”94 These arguments—neighborhood transition,
psychological damage, and student safety—portrayed the Salt City’s social and educational
challenges in both spatial and racial terms. Together, they aimed to persuade the school board to
consider social context in the assignment of students to schools.
A new citizens’ group, the “ad hoc Committee for Sumner School,” supported the
Wiley’s campaign but acted out of different motivations. In a statement signed by ten members,
the committee did not frame its argument in terms of civil rights. Instead, it described the
potential negative effects of the boundary change on the neighborhood, stating that “accelerating
the out-migration of whites” could lead to the “deterioration of scholastic standards in the school,
depreciation of property values, blight, and delinquency.”95 Shifting the school district boundary
a few blocks threatened to place white families in the path of an encroaching ghetto. The desire
to preserve their neighborhood seems to have motivated the white committee members rather
than a concern for the educational rights of Black children. As Ansley Erickson and Andrew
Highsmith have demonstrated, “joining” homogenous neighborhoods together to achieve “social
cohesion” was a powerful motivation of educators and citizens who sought to defend the color
line in the twentieth century.96 The ad hoc committee was an unwieldy part of CORE’s coalition.
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The school board—composed of seven white Republicans, only one of whom was
female—responded to the neighborhood organizations by essentially refusing to acknowledge
race as a factor shaping education in their city. During the May 1962 meeting, commissioner
David Jaquith and Superintendent Paul Miller insisted that state law prohibited them from
considering race when drawing district boundaries.97 By taking this position, they weaponized
color-blind rhetoric before it became a de rigueur part of conservative politics. Their assertion
about state law, however, was untrue. In 1962, the State Education Department initiated a racial
census and explicitly approved drawing district boundaries to improve “racial balance.”98 The
school board tabled a vote on the school boundaries for further discussion in the June meeting—
a small victory for CORE. By compelling the board to respond to community concerns, CORE
stalled a boundary change, disrupting “business as usual” for the board.
At the time, Commissioner Jaquith had great disdain for the State Education Department
and the state legislature, and he had no interest in promoting integrated education. An intelligent
and formidable conservative politician, Jaquith shifted his position on integration in subsequent
years. When CORE and its allies began their fight, his opposition to integration appeared
intractable. Wretha Wiley recalled that “Jaquith became so angry in school board meetings as
soon as the business turned to school integration, [he revolved] in his swivel chair[,] turned his
back to the audience and looked out the window and refused to look at anyone.”99 The chief
executive officer of a metal fabrication corporation, Jaquith had served on the school board since
1960.100 In fall 1962, he was an unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate for the new Conservative
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Party, which sought to counter the perceived liberalism of the Republican party under Governor
Nelson A. Rockefeller’s leadership. Jaquith explained that “I was a one-issue candidate—the
level of state spending and taxation. . .There was no racial issue that I was concerned with.”101
The denial that racial inequality was an issue in New York State and in the Salt City was one
major obstacle that CORE and its allies had to overcome as they pursued school integration.
The June school board meeting revealed the contours of the debate that integration
activists had to negotiate. CORE achieved its immediate goal at the school board meeting in
June: the board voted five to two against the changes to the Sumner school district, with Jaquith
and the board president voting for the changes.102 Yet while CORE saw the school boundary
issue as one symptom of a larger crisis in the schools, the school board refused to acknowledge
segregation as a problem. At the meeting, the city’s only Black elected official, Malchester
Reeves, the Fifteenth Ward’s county supervisor, “accused the board of being just as ‘guilty of
segregation as Gov. Faubus of Arkansas.’”103 Only five years earlier, Faubus had triggered a
constitutional crisis by deploying the National Guard to block the federally mandated integration
of a Little Rock high school.104 By drawing an explicit connection between the Salt City and the
massive resistance of the Jim Crow South, Reeves blurred the false distinction between de facto
and de jure segregation. The school board did not accept the validity of the comparison.
Proponents of civil rights had to persuade the board and white citizens that segregation existed in
the Deep North as well as the Deep South.
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At the outset of the struggle for educational equity in the Salt City, a Post-Standard
editorial encapsulated the racial ideology that would constrain activists’ efforts over the next
fifteen years. From the point of view of the newspaper, the school board was doing a
commendable job, noting that “[t]he rapidly increasing Negro youth population is being
absorbed in Syracuse schools with a minimum of friction[,] and in the Madison School area in
particular the Board of Education is developing a special program to benefit these youngsters and
their parents. The commissioners acted wisely in rejecting a plan which might add to their
problems.”105 Although the Post-Standard endorsed the board’s decision, the editorial also used
several rhetorical strategies that undermined any action by the school board to address
integration. First, by highlighting the district’s “problems” (by implication, the increasing
number of Black children in Syracuse schools and activists’ desegregation demands), the
editorial cast Black children as outsiders rather than citizens of the Salt City. Second, the
newspaper used the absence of conflict in the schools, rather than the educational attainment of
Black children, as a measure of success. Finally, the paper endorsed the idea that Black students
would benefit from “a special program” to succeed in Syracuse schools. As Ansley Erickson
notes, such compensatory education programs “conveyed often racialized ideas of difference.”106
These assumptions—that civility is a higher priority than justice and that Black students were
outsiders with educational deficiencies—undermined the case for desegregation from the outset.
Why should white parents participate in integration, a process that would entail “friction” and
potentially inhibit their children’s ability to learn?
Over the course of the summer of 1962, having encountered staunch opponents on the
school board, the need for direct action became increasingly apparent to CORE members.
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Beyond merely stopping a redistricting plan that would have increased racial segregation, CORE
and its allies demanded that the district formally undertake a study of segregation and develop
solutions. In both open board meetings and in CORE’s private consultations with board members
and school administrators, district representatives resisted acknowledging that segregation
existed. In August, the board agreed to participate in a study group on “community interrelations
and tensions,” but only if the mayor chose to convene one.107 With a new school year about to
commence and no acknowledgment that the district had a responsibility in resolving the issue,
the time for negotiation was over. CORE members agreed to move on to direct action. They
began picketing the Board of Education headquarters on August 28, 1962.
Once the school segregation controversy entered the picketing phase, CORE aimed to
compel civic leaders beyond the school board and administration to take a position on their
demands. An Onondaga County Republican dinner on August 29th presented an ideal opportunity
for activists to gain visibility. At the Onondaga County War Memorial, only a few blocks from
the boundary of the Fifteenth Ward, Governor Rockefeller spoke to members of his political
party. A group of fifteen CORE picketers gathered outside. After the dinner, the governor
reportedly acknowledged the picketers and accepted a pamphlet, whereas Syracuse Republican
mayor, William Walsh, ignored them.108
In an interview several days later, Walsh expressed his disapproval of CORE’s actions:
“If these people are sincere, they should take up any alleged problem with the State Commission
on Human Rights. We already have a group of Syracuse citizens working with the commission
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and in my opinion[,] they have done a marvelous job of promoting good intergroup relations.”109
Framing the issue of educational justice as a matter of “intergroup relations” cast the problem as
merely a social, rather than an institutional or structural, one. By maintaining that the state
commission was the proper channel for resolving the school issue and declining to form a study
committee, Walsh clearly hoped to avoid being drawn into a civil rights conflict. He would not
be able to do so for long.
Although picketing the Republican dinner with just over a dozen CORE members
succeeded in catching the attention of the governor, to build on their momentum CORE needed
to mobilize larger numbers of Syracusans. School segregation and educational inequality were
issues that impacted every Black family in the city. This provided an opportunity for CORE to
establish itself as a presence in the community. Connecting with Black residents was an ongoing
challenge for the university-based CORE chapter, as well as other CORE chapters around the
country that had majority-white membership.110 Some overlap between campus and community
did exist. Elizabeth Page, for example, had grown up in the Fifteenth Ward and was an SU
undergraduate student when CORE was founded. To succeed, however, CORE needed to
expand.
Over the course of the spring and summer of 1962, the small Syracuse CORE contingent
had conducted outreach to Black churches in the Fifteenth Ward. During visits to Sunday
services, George Wiley and a fellow CORE member introduced the organization and invited
congregants to join them at their next meeting. When CORE members encountered individuals
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with leadership potential, they encouraged them to join and to take on a public role. Bruce
Thomas was one such recruit. Thomas, who worked in electrical repair at General Electric, had a
criminal record and a reputation for drinking and brawling. He also sang in the church choir on
Sundays, contributing his powerful, booming voice to services—a voice he later used to
captivate and mobilize activists.111 After Thomas heard Wiley speak at Tucker Missionary
Baptist Church about residential and school segregation, he decided to attend a CORE meeting.
Thomas was intrigued by CORE, but he approached the group with a dose of skepticism.
He later recalled that “I went to the first meeting and it scared me very much because there was
nothing there but a bunch of white college kids[,] but I sat and listened and I came back to their
next meeting. . .Because I was interested. There were 3 or 4 other Negroes there[,] but I was the
only one there who was, shall we say, 'grass roots' and I wanted to know what they were going to
do.”112 Disappointed that more African Americans were not participating in CORE, Thomas
dropped out for several months.
Concern for his children’s future motivated Thomas to become actively involved in civil
rights efforts. At the time that CORE took on school segregation, Thomas and his wife, Viola,
had two daughters and were expecting a third child that fall. The family lived in a four-room
apartment on State Street, where large trucks barreled past their home. Fearing for their safety,
Thomas forbade the girls from playing outside and riding their bicycles in the street. He and his
wife wanted to relocate to a different neighborhood with better schools but could not afford a
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larger apartment. They knew that obtaining housing outside of the Fifteenth Ward would be
challenging due to discrimination.
The Thomases saw a clear connection between housing and educational opportunity.
Their eldest, Beverly, was attending Washington Irving, which Thomas described as “over-run
with Negroes. . .and the teachers didn’t care that much about teaching.”113 Recognizing that the
elementary school years were vitally important to a child’s educational future, Thomas wanted
his children to attend better schools to be poised for success. When interviewed in 1964, Thomas
reflected that he wanted his two-year-old son to go to college “if he has it [academic potential],”
or a trade school. Although he was willing to send his daughters to college, he observed that “it
is not as important for girls as it is for boys to go to college.”114 Despite his gendered ideas about
their educational paths, Thomas clearly aspired for his children to obtain more education than he
had. What was obvious to Black parents like Thomas was that the public schools in Syracuse
were not educating their children.
Wretha Wiley persuaded Bruce Thomas to return to CORE. He recognized that CORE
and its coalition were offering concrete ideas to redress educational inequality. Soon Thomas not
only embraced CORE’s philosophy of nonviolence but also became the chapter’s chairperson.115
Pursuing the membership of a formerly incarcerated individual such as Thomas set Syracuse
CORE apart from the major civil rights organizations, which were largely engaged in
respectability politics. By conforming to the middle-class values of white America in their
protests, civil rights groups aimed to demonstrate that African Americans were worthy of full
citizenship. This approach was effective in cultivating the support of white liberals and
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moderates, but it often resulted in the marginalization of poor and working-class participants and
their agendas within the movement.116 Syracuse CORE consistently took a different approach,
supporting Thomas as a spokesperson for the organization and cultivating the leadership of
welfare recipients and public housing tenants.
To mobilize new members, CORE needed to generate results. The organization decided
to escalate the conflict with the school board by calling for a boycott of Washington Irving
Elementary on the first day of the fall 1962 school year. A boycott was a powerful direct-action
strategy, and white leaders in Syracuse were unprepared for this technique to be used in their
city. School boycotts had been deployed in the North even prior to the Brown decision, and, in
conjunction with litigation, were a key tool for challenging segregation. In the midst of World
War II, the NAACP supported a grassroots effort to boycott a segregated school in Hillburn,
New York. The New York Commissioner of Education responded to the boycott by ordering the
segregated school to close, offering early proof that the tactic could yield results.117 In fall 1962,
Syracuse was at the forefront of a new wave of school boycotts. The following school year, in
the wake of the March on Washington, thousands of students engaged in school boycotts in
Chicago, New York City, Boston, and other northern cities.118
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A school boycott could be effective for several reasons. Barriers to participation were low
in comparison to other forms of protest, which entailed travel and the risk of violence or arrest.
By keeping their children home, parents could passively support CORE’s efforts (although
supporting the boycott did entail childcare challenges for working parents). Sociologist Ron
Corwin also noted the economic impact of students boycotting schools: in many states, school
aid was—as it still is in the twenty-first century—determined in part by daily attendance.119 The
school boycott strategy could be used to both support or impede civil rights agendas. As Matt
Delmont demonstrates, white parents often wielded the tools of the civil rights movement to
oppose integration.120 In fall 1976, it would be white parents who boycotted the schools in the
Salt City.
With little visibility or credibility in the Black community, the fledgling CORE chapter
assembled partners that would inspire the confidence of parents. Malchester Reeves, who
represented the Fifteenth Ward as County Supervisor, and Jesse Epps, the leader of the Civil
Rights Committee of the local International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), had spoken out
against segregation at the June school board meeting. In September, they both endorsed the
boycott. Reeves, a twenty-six-year-old engineering student at SU, had become the first Black
elected official in Syracuse in November 1961.121 Unlike Reeves, who grew up in Syracuse,
Epps had been born in Mississippi and had fled with his family, fearing racial violence. When he
went to work for General Electric in the late 1950s, he was the only Black employee at the plant.
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He soon distinguished himself as a labor leader in the IUE local.122 Reeves and Epps joined
CORE at a rally on Sunday, September 9, 1962 to foment enthusiasm for the boycott. The
NAACP co-sponsored the rally.
By publicly supporting the boycott, the local NAACP chapter became a late but crucial
stakeholder in the desegregation efforts. According to George Wiley’s timeline of events, the
NAACP was not an active partner on the issue in the first few months of the school campaign.123
The Syracuse branch of the NAACP had formed in the 1920s. Although it had a sizable
membership, the organization had not executed any large-scale campaigns. The fact that the new
CORE chapter, not the NAACP, initiated action on school segregation speaks to the anemic state
of the NAACP in the city at the time. In other cities, school segregation was a top NAACP
priority. As Thomas Sugrue notes, “[b]y late 1962, the NAACP was assisting challenges to
segregated schools in sixty-nine cities in fifteen northern and western states,” including
Rochester, ninety miles to the west of the Salt City.124 Nonetheless, the endorsement of the
Syracuse NAACP lent credibility to CORE’s boycott.
Following the rally on September 9th, CORE printed a flyer to publicize the boycott. It
proclaimed that “[w]e must protest until the board assumes its responsibility to provide
integrated education. Act Now!!!”125 On the day of the boycott, Reeves and Epps accompanied a
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group of twenty-eight mothers to share this demand with the superintendent, who maintained his
denial that segregation existed in Syracuse schools.126 CORE’s absence from this meeting was a
strategically savvy move that allowed activists with deeper roots in the community to take the
lead.
Parents responded to CORE’s call to action. Approximately nine hundred Washington
Irving students stayed home on the first day of school—more than 80% of the student
population.127 The boycott caught the attention of mothers like Anna Mae Williams, who was
disappointed with the conditions she observed at Washington Irving. With her grandmother’s
words about the importance of education echoing in her mind, Williams kept her daughter
home.128 She went on to become one of CORE’s most devoted members, attending nearly every
rally and marching on every picket line, often with her daughter by her side.
Local media responded to the boycott by amplifying opposition to the boycott and
minimizing the significance of the protest. As Delmont has demonstrated, distorted and selective
media coverage played a large role in shaping the national narrative of school desegregation. In
many cases, the media highlighted white opposition and obscured the experiences and
perspectives of Black children and communities.129 In Syracuse, the media selectively gave
Black opposition to the boycott disproportionate coverage. Local radio and television stations
hosted representatives from the Washington Irving Mother’s Club, who were against the boycott
and even coordinated a telephone campaign to urge parents to send their children to school.130
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These mothers, many or most of whom were presumably Black, had a worthy viewpoint. Given
the high level of participation in the boycott, however, they were in a distinct minority.131
The local newspapers, which did not interview the Mother’s Club, took a slightly
different tack. With the headline “31,000 Pupils Troop to Syracuse Schools,” the Post-Standard
asserted that “[t]he first day of school went smoothly.”132 The article described the picketing and
the parents’ meeting with the superintendent but did not name the boycott or the high rate of
absenteeism at Washington Irving. Mentioning only a few dozen protesters gave the impression
that a small minority was concerned with segregation, when in fact hundreds of parents
participated. The local print media would continue to ignore civil rights demonstrations and
downplay the extent of support over the next few years.
Following the boycott, the Syracuse Area Council of the State Commission for Human
Rights stepped in to mediate the conflict by forming an Education Study Committee. George
Wiley of CORE and Robert Warr, the president of the NAACP, joined, and the school board also
agreed to designate representatives. Participating on the committee was a pragmatic course for
the board. By conceding to a study group, they avoided litigation while also effectively
postponing any action for another school year. At the end of September, CORE, the NAACP,
and the IEU issued a joint statement announcing the end of demonstrations against the school
board.133
The Education Study Committee issued a report ten months later, in July 1963. Although
it was an advisory document and not a legally binding mandate, its conclusions were clear. The
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committee asserted that the pattern of “racial imbalance” in Syracuse schools was “inconsistent
with basic principles of education in a free democratic society.” They held the school board
responsible for remedying the situation and recommended redistricting by the start of the 1964
school year.134 At its July meeting—more than a year after CORE launched the desegregation
battle by challenging the Sumner Elementary School boundary—the school board accepted that
racial imbalance was a problem and that the district should take steps to remedy it.135
CORE’s strategy of protest and negotiation proved effective in the initial stage of the
struggle for school integration. This was the first time the CORE tactics had been deployed
against the city, and they were effective in part because of the element of surprise. Armed with
data to make their case, CORE articulated clear demands for the school board. Members
organized the pickets and school boycott only after negotiations did not yield results. CORE took
the lead, but it did not act alone. A coalition of organizations supported their efforts, and they
successfully mobilized Black parents of Washington Irving students to participate in the boycott,
garnering new CORE members in the process. Additionally, pressure from the state government
helped persuade the local school board to take action. Although only serving an advisory
function, the Education Study Committee operated under the umbrella of the State Commission
on Human Rights, and it reached conclusions similar to what CORE had argued since the
summer of 1962. In June 1963, the State Education Department called on school districts
throughout New York State to resolve “racial imbalance”—one month before the report’s
release.136 The combination of the CORE coalition’s pressure from bellow and state pressure
from above forced the board to commit to desegregation.
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A frontal assault on segregated schools was not the only strategy CORE members
pursued to improved education in Syracuse: they also created new pathways to education
through mentoring and adult education. These initiatives simultaneously benefited individuals
and the CORE chapter. George and Wretha Wiley had a gift for helping those around them
obtain self-knowledge and unlock their self-confidence. George was not a charismatic leader
who mobilized participation through sermon-like speeches. Instead, he expressed a belief in
individuals and inspired their commitment. As Anna Mae Williams said, “George lit the lamp for
me and once he did that he stirred something in me that has continued to burn and I have to be
grateful for it.”137 She also felt a strong admiration for Wretha, who was present in the struggle
in a way that few white women were. “I really loved Wretha. . .I don't think any of us every
thought twice about Wretha being white,” Williams recalled. “[W]e saw her on picket lines and
doing all these things. She just did not come across as a typical white woman to us”138 Beyond
direct action protest, the Wileys and their CORE colleagues supported the goals of individuals.
For many, that meant obtaining education.
George Wiley attempted to disassemble structural barriers that faced Black children, and
he simultaneously provided personal support to students in the hopes that this guidance could set
some young people on a path to success. In the fall of 1962, Youth Opportunities Unlimited, a
local mentorship program, matched Wiley with Cedric “Rickie” Jones, who was a ninth-grade
student at Madison Junior High. Jones lived in Pioneer Homes, a public housing project in the
Fifteenth Ward, with his mother. He struggled both academically and socially. To develop a
bond with Jones, Wiley took him to the circus and an art center and brought him to the chemistry
department at SU. In his notes, Wiley recorded that the pair had “spent [the] afternoon in my lab.
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. .& had lunch at my house. Rickie’s interest span was short; deportment poor (cut up; played
with chemicals w/o permission).”139 Having an energetic young adolescent zipping around his
lab, which contained both dangerous chemicals and expensive equipment, did not deter Wiley.
Wiley mentored Jones until he moved to New York City to join the staff of national CORE in
early 1965.140
Through Jones, George and Wretha Wiley got to know a cohort of junior high and high
school students and helped them organize a student-led group called Youth for Social
Understanding in 1964. The Wileys hosted a meeting for some students at their house and
provided them the encouragement that helped the group coalesce. Jones served as vice-president
of the new group, and his friend Landers Smith became president.141 This is what the Wileys
excelled at: listening to people’s needs, respecting their ideas, and creating space for these ideas
to turn into action. When the adolescents gathered at the Wileys’ house and later the CORE
office, George often facilitated but did not direct their conversations. This environment had a
dramatic impact on the youth. Smith explained that “in our own group we became very strongminded and strong-willed and it was very surprising to see girls who had little to say most of the
time come into a group and have an opinion. Be for or against something and really voice their
opinions and make very relevant points whereas prior to that type of exposure it had never

139

3, WHS.

George Wiley, “Student Information Sheet,” N.D., George A. Wiley Papers, 1949-1975, Box 7, Folder

140

Decades before scholars coined the term “school-to-prison pipeline,” Jones was caught in a system of
institutionalized racism that funneled him away from the classroom and into the criminal justice system. By 1964,
Jones had a record for setting off fireworks, petty larceny involving a bakery truck, shoplifting, and auto theft. Jones
went to the New York State Youth Camp, received three years of probation, and was released to the care of a great
aunt. George Wiley, “Notes on Cedric Jones,” November 1964, George A. Wiley Papers, 1949-1975, Box 7, Folder
2, WHS.
141
Landers Smith, Interview by Nick Kotz, Transcript, N.D., 1, Kotz Papers, Series 1, Box 25,
Landers Smith Folder, WHS.

63

happened.”142 In the Wiley home, the individual and his or her mind and potential took
precedence over gender, race, or class norms.
While Youth for Social Understanding could not remove the structural barriers in
students’ paths, it allowed the adolescents to shift the way they saw themselves. The group
explored career options and met with professionals at the university. In November 1964, assisted
and accompanied by Wretha Wiley, students planned a trip to New York City.143 Through this
process, the members began to imagine new possibilities for their future and were motivated to
stay in school. “This type of exposure and interaction with. . .Dr. Wiley and other people he
brought into the group gave me the curiosity to find out what is out there other than being a
teacher of social worker,” Smith explained.144 He recalled that once the youth group began
meeting at CORE’s headquarters, a controversy arose because the teens had a key to office.
George urged the students to articulate why they had benefited from their experience so far,
compelling them to justify their presence in the CORE building. They rattled off reasons—
encountering new people, going on field trips, identifying and addressing problems—and
afterwards Smith realized that “I know why I am here. . .what I am all about and what this group
is all about.”145 He went on to earn a bachelor’s degree in economics and a Master’s in Public
Administration.
At the same time that the Wileys fostered the Youth for Social Understanding group, the
CORE chapter launched a “Center for Community Education” for adults. During the summer of
1964, George circulated a proposal for the center and solicited feedback from faculty at SU, who
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helped CORE secure a grant.146 Wretha Wiley recalled that the participants were “exceptionally
bright and motivated,” including Bruce Thomas and Anna Mae Williams, who both earned their
high school equivalency degrees.147 By early 1965, the center had ten volunteer teachers, mostly
from SU, and fifty students.148 By this point, however, the CORE chapter was navigating both
internal and external threats to its existence, the foremost being that the Wileys moved to New
York City, where George joined the national CORE organization, leaving a leadership vacuum in
their wake.
After setting in motion the school desegregation challenge, Syracuse CORE became
consumed with other issues and did not invest energy in continuing the school battle. Between
1962 and 1965, the years in which Syracuse CORE was most active, the chapter tackled
education, housing, policing, and employment issues. They were an incredibly dynamic and
innovative organization that planned and researched campaigns while also responding to
opportunities and issues as they arose. Yet after the successful school boycott in fall 1962, they
moved quickly to other direct-action campaigns rather than placing sustained pressure on the
school board. As the school board developed integration plans, a new coalition formed to hold
them accountable.
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Croton School: “Open and Integrated”

Figure 8: Dr. King Elementary, the former Croton Elementary School, in 2022

Despite its promising commitment to educational equality, the school district struggled to
develop and implement a cohesive desegregation plan. Between fall 1963 and fall 1965, the
district engaged in a series of half-measures, shuffling children from school to school and closing
individual buildings. A meager attempt to send white students to a majority Black school met
with fierce backlash. For the 1964-1965 academic year, the district closed Prescott Junior High,
which was majority white, and assigned over two-hundred white students to Madison Junior
High. When white parents voiced their opposition to sending their children to Madison, the board
conceded and introduced a transfer option that allowed parents to choose a different school.149
Ultimately, only twenty white students showed up at Madison for the first day of class in
September 1964. The others took advantage of the open enrollment policy to enroll in other
buildings, left the public school system, or moved out of the district.150 With its response to the
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Prescott parents, the school board illustrated that it would privilege the desires of white parents
as it pursued desegregation.
Despite the backlash it received following the Prescott closure, the school board
expanded its efforts to desegregate. The disappointing results of a compensatory education
program in majority-Black schools convinced some board members that integration was worth
pursuing. Funded by the Ford Foundation, the Madison Area Project provided additional
resources for students at Madison, Washington Irving, and Croton Elementary between 1962 and
1965.151 Although students from the project demonstrated some positive benefits, Black children
who had been reassigned to predominantly white schools made more academic progress than
their peers who received the compensatory education. This evidence persuaded Commissioner
Jaquith, who had been vehemently opposed to addressing segregation, and the rest of the board
to mandate one-way busing in the 1965-1966 school year. The busing plan entailed closing two
of the three Madison Area Project schools and distributing 900 Black elementary and middleschool students to twenty-one predominantly white schools around the city. One-way busing
placed the “burden of desegregation” on the shoulders of the city’s Black youth, leading CORE
and many Black parents to oppose the plan.152 Recalling the Prescott incident, the board insisted
that white parents would flee to the suburbs rather than accept two-way busing.
Commissioner Jaquith’s shift in position exemplifies the ambivalence of the Deep North
on educational civil rights. He moved from a position of denial about the existence of
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discrimination in Syracuse to a recognition of the problem. He even supported state action to
remedy this inequality and came around to whole-heartedly support busing for integration—but
not cross-busing. His transformation stopped short of requiring white Syracusans to play
anything more than a passive role in the process of integration. Instead, Jaquith later blamed
“militant black leadership” for undermining the busing program by insisting on two-way
busing.153 Although he thought that political leaders should be responsive to the needs of Black
citizens, his actions ultimately supported the status quo and inhibited Black Syracusans from
shaping educational policy.
As Commissioner Jaquith reconsidered his position on integration, Superintendent Dr.
Franklyn Barry developed a bold proposal for a long-term solution to integrating the city’s
elementary schools: the campus plan. Appointed by the school board, Barry began his tenure
with the district in July 1963. He declared from the beginning that integration was “the most
important” and “the most far-reaching” problem “facing metropolitan school systems.”154 His
campus plan would replace the city’s thirty-three elementary schools with four complexes, one
on the outskirts of each quadrant of the city. The population of each school would reflect the
demographics of the district. In addition to facilitating desegregation, the campus plan would
improve students’ access to resources such as auditoriums and lunch facilities and allow for
foreign language instruction and other specialized classes.155
Barry’s proposal was part of an educational park trend in the 1960s. Ansley Erickson
describes how an “elite network of predominantly white desegregation advocates” conceived of
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educational parks as a way to navigate the complex political realities of school integration.156
Although most educational parks never came to fruition, Erickson argues that the plans provide
insight into the racialized spatial ideology that shaped desegregation battles in the 1960s.157 She
highlights Syracuse’s campus plan as an example of an antiurban impulse to locate schools on
the outskirts of a city in suburban-like settings. When unveiling the proposal, Barry asserted that
the campus plan would “help change the image of the ‘city school’ of concrete and brick with
little open or green space.”158 More than an aesthetic choice, the valorization of a suburban
setting rejected racialized Black space in the central city as suitable for education. As Erickson
demonstrates, educational parks simultaneously “conveyed faith that the metropolitan landscape
could be manipulated in favor of desegregation” while reflecting the political and ideological
constraints of the time.159
Despite the initial enthusiasm of Mayor Walsh and the school board, after years of
discussion, Syracuse’s campus plan was discarded. Barry’s resignation in September 1969 and
integration opponents’ resistance the campus plan relegated the proposal to the dust bin.160 Even
if the campus plan had progressed on the fastest possible timeline, with construction beginning in
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1967, the $27 million initiative would have taken nearly twenty years to complete. In the
meantime, the third school from the Madison Area Project, Croton Elementary, remained open
and segregated during the 1965-1966 school year. The largest elementary school in the district,
about 90% of its 1,150 students were Black.161
That Croton was a segregated and overcrowded school was no accident. In the late 1950s,
after a plan to locate a new public housing project on the edge of town met fierce resistance from
white residents, the mayor located the project in the Fifteenth Ward to the south of Pioneer
Homes.162 The Central Village project was constructed in 1962 and tenants were predominantly
Black from the beginning. That same year, the school district added twenty-four rooms to Croton
to accommodate children from the new housing project.163 Lacking the capacity to close all three
of the former Madison Area Project schools at once, the school district simply took no action to
integrate Croton students in fall 1965.
In early 1966, the Syracuse school district grasped for a remedy for the segregated and
unequal educational conditions in Croton school. After the Prescott Junior High debacle, the
board refused to consider two-way busing as an option. They instead introduced “Project
Upgrade,” a compensatory education program similar to what had already been attempted with
the Madison Area Project. Integration activists criticized Project Upgrade, which would have no
impact on desegregation. The board next proposed to close Croton by busing out approximately
two-hundred students each year. The students who remained at Croton would receive
compensatory education.164 Unwilling to lose one of the only remaining schools in the Fifteenth
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Ward and have their children scattered throughout the city, Black parents mobilized to demand a
better plan from the school board.
As later chapters will explore, by this time, the Syracuse CORE chapter was greatly
diminished and no longer capable of initiating action. Other organizations, however, carried
CORE’s educational agenda forward. In March 1966 a “Coordinating Committee in Support of
Croton Parents” was formed, which eventually included representatives from all the major civil
rights, antipoverty, and social-justice oriented faith groups in the city. The interracial and crossclass coalition negotiated tensions but held together over the course of the spring. Sociologist
Ron Corwin described the Coordinating Committee meetings as “stormy.” Black residents
clashed with white liberals, who sometimes dominated conversation. Neighborhood
representatives chaired the meetings, however, allowing Black participants to voice their input.
The central question was “what did the neighborhood people want?”165
A contentious school board meeting in late spring helped the Croton committee clarify its
goals and strategy. At the April meeting, Black parents from Croton and white parents from the
South Side of the city asserted opposing and seemingly irreconcilable positions. Whereas Black
parents wanted to achieve integration through cross-busing, white parents wanted to protect
“neighborhood schools.” Attended by four-hundred participants, the meeting became so heated
that at one point the board called a recess.166 Faced with so much dissension, the school board
tabled any action on plans for Croton until the following month.
Although there is no known transcript of the meeting itself, white parents articulated their
views in letters to the editor. One mother, who insisted that she was “no segregationist,” asserted
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that “[w]hen the colored children were sent into our schools, we were given to understand this
would help give them ‘motivation’ but the only apparent reason for busing white children is for
revenge under the guise of integration.”167 This mother seemed to begrudgingly tolerate the fact
that some Black students were bused to majority-white schools on the South Side, but she
maintained a sense of ownership over “our schools.” If the school district were to send her
children were to a predominantly Black school, she would consider it to be a punitive action
against her family rather than a mechanism for achieving educational equity. In another letter,
the vice president of the Parent Teacher’s Association at a South Side school chided the proCroton parents for “ranting and raving” at the school board meeting.168 This sort of tone policing
is a common strategy to close down debate about social issues. It was also an imbalanced view of
the board meeting, where white parents also became heated. According to Ron Corwin, several
Black attendants of the April board meeting “were actively frightened, afraid that the meeting
would produce physical violence when. . .[they] left the school.”169
The white parents’ opposition increased the resolve of the integration activists. In early
May, the Citizens of Pioneer Educational Group, a tenants’ organization based out of the Pioneer
Homes housing project, and other neighborhood groups gathered at the Tucker Missionary
Baptist Church. They discussed not only desegregation plans, but also “library facilities, teaching
staff, learning materials, and pupil progress” at Croton.170 The group settled on the demand that
Croton be “open and integrated” in fall 1966, and that the school district bus white students to
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the school as part of any integration plan.171 They also established a strategy. For the second time
in less than four years, activists voted to protest through a school boycott.
Low-income Black mothers were the motivating force behind the boycott, which was
supported by the Croton committee. New leaders had emerged since CORE’s boycott three-anda-half-years earlier. Veterans such as Anna Mae Williams and Bruce Thomas once again
participated—but no longer as CORE members.172 Due in part to community organizing
facilitated by the War on Poverty, the number of neighborhood residents who were involved in
setting the protest agenda had greatly expanded. One central leader was Gloria Mims, who had
five children enrolled in Croton.
Mims, a member of both Citizens of Pioneer and the Croton Mother’s Club, played a key
role in coordinating the neighborhood and civil rights groups that participated in the boycott.
Born and raised in Harlem, Mims moved to Syracuse in 1956. Although public housing was not
her preference, a unit in Pioneer Homes was the best option for her growing family. In the early
1960s, she was a quiet supporter of CORE’s activism but was reluctant to get involved because
she had young children. When organizers from a War on Poverty program based at Syracuse
University knocked on her door in 1965, however, she joined efforts to press the Housing
Authority to improve conditions in public housing.173 In her study of Baltimore public housing,
historian Rhonda Williams demonstrated that public housing became a pathway to politicization
for Black female tenants, placing them among the “vanguard of community activists in the civil
rights and black power eras.”174 This was the case for Mims as well. She soon became an
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antipoverty leader, and she went on to serve on the board of Crusade for Opportunity, the
county’s Community Action Agency.175
Education was a priority for Mims, who sent a total of eleven children to Syracuse public
schools. Her goal was not integration but quality education. In fall 1966, she related her concerns
about Croton during a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights hearing held in Rochester, New York.
She explained that “[w]e have a lot of first term teachers there in Croton School. We don't have
the library and the books and the same studies that the other schools in the community have.”
Croton was under-resourced and overcrowded. If the school board would not address these
conditions while the student population was majority Black, then Mims felt that integration was
necessary. She said that “I think that the whites' children in Croton School will upgrade it,
because the white community will see that since their children are in Croton that the school will
be brought up to par.”176 She was committed to ensuring that all Black children had an equitable
learning experience, telling the Civil Rights Commission that “I do not object to busing my
children out if it's going to achieve the quality of education for the rest that are left there in
Croton School.”177
Mims’s organizing was successful: the boycott achieved the same remarkable
participation rate as CORE’s 1962 boycott. On May 10, 1966 more than eighty percent of
students were absent from Croton. The parents’ position was clear. In a press release, the Croton
Mother’s Club declared that “[t]he white community must share in the responsibility of
overcoming the segregation it has created. It is clearly discriminatory to place all burdens of
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ending segregation on a minority group. Integration through discrimination is impossible.”178
The parents and their supporters also demonstrated their commitment to education by
establishing an alternative schedule for the boycotting students. Parents had the option to send
their children to one of sixteen “Freedom Schools,” which were hosted by the Dunbar Center and
several area churches while activists picketed outside Croton.179 The “Freedom School” model
had been deployed by school boycotters in New York City and Milwaukee in February and May
1964, respectively, as well as during the Mississippi Freedom Summer later that year.180 The
Post-Standard snapped a picture of “spellbound” children gathered around a chaplain from SU
for story time at a Freedom School near the university’s campus.181 The children’s faces were
beaming, and they appeared eager to learn.
In response to the boycott, the board attempted to forge a middle path between the
demands of Black parents and desegregation opponents. In June, it withdrew its plan to close
Croton.182 Corwin points out that this outcome was exceptional and credits the impact of the
Black parents’ mobilization. Of the 119 proposals Superintendent Barry presented to the school
board between June 1965 and June 1966, the board failed to enact only one: the Croton closure
plan.183 The board did not accompany this passive acquiescence to Black parents, however, with
positive action to integrate Croton. During the summer of 1966, the board hastily introduced
“Project 700,” a call for white and Black parents to volunteer their children to participate in a
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busing plan to achieve integration. When only sixty-eight white students signed up, the district
canceled the project. The following school year, the board launched a gifted program at Croton
in another attempt to attract white students and also a “Croton-on-Campus” initiative, in which
students (almost all of whom were Black) attended classes on the SU campus for half of the
school day.184 The board balked at taking action that would require the active participation of
white parents.
The halting, piece-meal efforts of the Syracuse school district to achieve desegregation
created uncertainty for parents. Some students were shuffled some around while leaving others
languishing in buildings with substandard resources and performance. The school board’s empty
gestures to Black parents did not appease activists like Gloria Mims. Instead of busing students
to achieve integration, the school district offered yet another a compensatory program that
underdelivered. Mims recalled Croton-on-Campus in an oral history interview:
They promised us a lot of stuff on paper and then when it came to deliver they didn't do
it. They gave us a little school in between two buildings which was a portable school. .
.We never got the use of the University that they said they would give us. We were
supposed to have the use of the University buildings, where our kids could eat lunch on
the campus to get the spirit of a higher institution learning so our kids would get
motivated into wanting to go to college.185
The school board’s intransigence violated the constitutional rights of Mims’s children to an equal
education.

As divisions over desegregation continued to permeate educational conversations in the
Salt City, Black Syracusans saw an opportunity to reshape education via the ballot box.
Beginning in 1965, the emergence of competitive Black Democratic candidates in school board
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elections marked a small but significant shift in political power in the city. That November,
Robert Warr, past president of the local NAACP, attempted to become the first Black member of
the school board. Warr had belonged to the education committee of the Mayor’s Commission on
Human Rights and had been active on civil rights as well as educational issues in the city. A
well-respected civic leader and engineer at General Electric, Warr was a solid Democratic
candidate who aspired to chip away at the complete Republican control of the board. He lost a
close race, but he positioned himself to run again the following year by continuing to attend
board meetings as a member of the public.
In 1966, a few months after the Croton boycott, the top two candidates in an electoral
competition were both African American. For the first time in the Salt City’s history, an open
seat on the school board would go to a Black candidate. Helen Murphy, an African American
Republican, broke the color barrier earlier that year when Mayor Walsh appointed her to fill a
vacancy on the school board. She ran for the seat in November 1966, with Warr running as a
Democratic challenger. Murphy, the wife of a popular Black minister, was active in the religious
community and belonged to both the Urban League and the NAACP. The Post-Standard
endorsed Murphy but acknowledged that Warr was “well-qualified.”186 Both Murphy and Warr
agreed that the school district should continue to actively seek solutions for integration, although
Warr speculated that his opponent did not have a solid plan.187 In reality, they had few
substantive differences on educational issues. When Warr emerged victorious on election day,
however, he was not beholden to City Hall for his seat. After years of frustration, Warr’s election
provided hope to Black parents that there was a voice for change on the school board. How long
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he would serve on the board remained to be seen: Elected to a seat with only one year remaining
in its term, Warr faced the prospect of yet another campaign the following year.
During the 1967 election cycle, Anna Mae Williams, a longtime CORE stalwart and
antipoverty organizer, threw her hat into the ring for commissioner of education. She believed
that electing African Americans to the school board would give Black citizens a stronger voice in
school governance. She may not have held high hopes for her own candidacy on the Liberal
party ticket, but she was willing to serve as a foil to Warr. Of the election, Williams later recalled
that “[w]e played politics. We played the man’s game. The man’s game was that I’d go in, I’d
make my spiel and Mr. Warr would make his spiel. In most of the meetings. . . [the audience]
became very angry with me therefore I knew that they would go [vote] for him before they
would me.”188 Warr won the election, beating Williams and a white opponent. Williams’s
strategic candidacy was significant for her individually and for the city. Five years after she
joined CORE’s picket lines to protest the board of education, Williams appeared on the ballot
herself. She used this platform to voice her opinions, regardless of the reactions she received.189
Any controversy she generated furthered the goal of securing Black representation by making
Warr more appealing. By running for office, Williams claimed full citizenship and articulated
her vision of equality.
Black representation on the school board was not consistent and did not have an
immediate impact on school policy. During Warr’s brief tenure, the campus plan floundered. In
1969, he resigned from the school board to fill the vacant city council seat left by Democrat Lee
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Alexander, a white man who won the mayoral election that year. No Black representative would
hold a seat on the school board for the next four years. As the decade came to a close, the
Syracuse school district was less segregated but not fully integrated.

Conclusion
In 1968, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights praised the Salt City for taking “atypical
steps” to desegregate its schools. Yet the progress that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
celebrated had in fact resulted in disruption and frustration for Black children and their parents.
Syracuse provides a lens for understanding why school desegregation led to such protracted
battles. Syracuse CORE made an initial burst of progress in 1962 when it forced the school board
to consider the problem of “racial imbalance” in the Syracuse schools. The district acknowledged
racial inequity, studied the issue, but then designed desegregation plans to accommodate white
interests. Black activists and their white allies negotiated this intransigence by staging a second
boycott in 1966. They also obtained a voice in school policymaking by obtaining representation
on the school board. Yet as national conversations about desegregation became increasingly
acrimonious, it became clear that the Salt City had missed its window of opportunity to
meaningfully integrate its schools.
By the late 1960s increasing residential segregation—both within cities and between the
urban core and the suburbs—in Syracuse and elsewhere in the North became increasingly
intractable and further inhibited the possibility of school integration. At the outset, activists were
aware of the interlocking nature of discrimination in education and housing. Wretha Wiley raised
the Sumner school redistricting issue because of its implications for the demographic
composition of the neighborhood. Bruce Thomas and his wife wanted to find a place to live
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outside of the Fifteenth Ward so that their children could attend better schools. Yet by the end of
the decade, residential segregation slipped out of community conversations. In the absence of a
commitment to including all school children in comprehensive integration plans, residential
patterns consigned Black children to either segregated schools or to be bused to majority white
schools. This outcome was not inevitable, and in the spring of 1963 CORE members and their
allies were optimistic that they could tackle housing segregation even as the educational
challenge unfolded. Salt City’s largest civil rights demonstrations soon erupted, making the
hypocrisy of the Deep North legible to a larger portion of the community. Chapter Two explores
these protests in detail.
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Chapter Two
Residential Segregation, Urban Renewal, and Public Housing: Contesting Discourses of
Progress

In the early 1960s, Liz Page was an undergraduate at Syracuse University when city
officials deployed federally funded bulldozers to raze the Fifteenth Ward. Houses, businesses,
churches, and synagogues disappeared from the landscape in the name of urban renewal. Page
witnessed the obliteration of the community that had supported her journey to young adulthood.
Five decades after the demolition was complete, the loss of her childhood neighborhood evoked
painful memories. She vividly recalled how friends and neighbors had scattered throughout the
city and to which church congregations they had shifted. Describing a bus tour she took with
former Fifteenth Ward residents in 2009, Page shared:
“[We] were driving around, pointing out, remember this, remember that. Every single
place that I remembered growing up has been torn down, has been rebuilt. So you got
[Interstate] 81, you got 550 Harrison, you got all the Upstate [Medical University]
properties, you got part of the hospital complexes that came down to Renwick Avenue.
When they wiped that out, the Blacks were moved. They had to scatter, anybody that
lived in the area, because the highway was coming, and [they] did not get the best prices
for their properties. With the East side, a lot of these Jewish families moved out as we
moved in. And some folks went to the South Side and the Near West Side, near
Southwest Community Center.”190
Page had a mental map of the transformation of the Salt City’s physical and social geography
etched in her memory.
Page was not, however, a passive witness to the destruction. As a member of Syracuse
CORE, she demonstrated against urban renewal and housing discrimination. The CORE chapter
launched its largest direct-action campaign in fall 1963, coordinating acts of civil disobedience
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that resulted in ninety-eight arrests. They demanded that the mayor guarantee displaced Black
families would not be re-segregated in an expanded ghetto. Rather than merely resisting the
destruction of the Fifteenth Ward, they articulated an alternative vision for the city in which the
rights and goals of Black citizens informed decision making. In doing so, they engaged in a
symbolic contest over the future of the Salt City.

Figure 9: Condemned Structures in the Fifteenth Ward, ca. 1960

In the mid-twentieth century, federal policymakers and city leaders justified slum
clearance, redevelopment, and highway construction as universally beneficial projects. They
hoped these initiatives would provide the means to revive urban cores that were struggling to
compete in the context of suburbanization. In practice, urban renewal disproportionately
benefited economic and political elites while negatively impacting many low-income minority
communities.191 A set of physical interventions in urban spaces, urban renewal also constituted a
set of cultural narratives about this space and who it is for. Scholar Samuel Zipp argues that
postwar cities were the sites of symbolic struggles that “amounted to a fight for the right to give
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imaginative shape to the city—to describe the character and nature of urban life.”192 Likewise,
historian N.D.B. Connolly has argued that “urban renewal in the United States was, on the one
hand, a narrowly defined federal program. . .On the other hand, urban renewal functioned as a
discourse of progress, greatly preceding and far outliving the formal parameters of the
program.”193
As manifested in Syracuse between 1955 and 1975, the discourse of progress fuses
together a set of four assumptions that recurred in the statements of city leaders and were
contested by activists, particularly CORE. First, the discourse of progress connects blight to
African American migrants who, as outsiders, were unworthy of the social, economic, and politic
benefits of full citizenship. As historian Robert Self explains, this created a double bind for
African Americans who had to “to assert both that neighborhood self-determination was a right
and that blighted conditions were not a product of self-determination. . .within a 1950s culture of
race dominated by white assumptions that the continued migration of southern African
Americans to northern cities was a cause of urban decline.”194 Second, the discourse of progress
prioritized economic development over the desires and fates of neighborhood residents, in
particular public housing tenants.
Third, the discourse of progress employed what Angela Davis has described as the
“tyranny of the universal.” Davis explains that “[m]ore often than not universal categories have
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been clandestinely racialized. . .For most of our history the very category ‘human’ has not
embraced Black people and people of color. Its abstractness has been colored white and
gendered male.”195 When officials said that urban renewal would benefit the city of Syracuse, the
beneficiaries were implicitly understood to be white and middle- or upper-class. Finally, because
urban renewal and similar interventions constituted a universally beneficial reordering of urban
space, it rendered opposition disorderly and unacceptable. The discourse of progress therefore
not only justified the destruction of the Fifteenth Ward but also portrayed it as an act of
benevolence. The discourse of progress constrained opportunities for resistance by casting those
who opposed it as selfish actors who were inhibiting the growth of the city.
Using the discourse of progress as a framing concept, this chapter highlights the
resistance that Black activists and their allies mounted as the twin processes of urban renewal
and highway construction physically remade the city. Syracuse CORE could not stop the
destruction. They did, however, articulate an alternative way for these processes to be
implemented, one that took seriously the concerns and visions of Black citizens. By documenting
the strategies that grassroots actors in the Salt City deployed to challenge the physical
marginalization of Black Syracusans, this chapter traces the contours of debates around urban
renewal and housing. CORE contested the creation of an expanded ghetto. In doing so, it
undermined the notion that the consequences of urban renewal were unforeseen or unintentional.
This chapter therefore highlights the contingency of the processes that resulted in
hypersegregation in Syracuse and argues that this outcome was not inevitable.196
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The Syracuse case study provides a fuller understanding of the connections of urban
renewal to the Black freedom struggles of the mid-twentieth century.197 The specific issues that
activists took on, and the chronology of these challenges, varied according to local context.
Although hundreds of cities implemented federally funded urban renewal projects between 1954
and 1974, not every city experienced large-scale demonstrations. In some cases, Black leaders
supported urban renewal, particularly in the earlier years of the program.198 Scholars of interstate
highways have similarly documented the resistance anti-highway activists mounted in cities such
as Boston, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., where they contested the prioritization of traffic
flow over citizens’ desires. As Karilyn Crockett writes of Boston, the “antihighway movement
rejected the land-gobbling agenda of federal highway building and, instead, advanced a new
vision of urban development based on progressive politics and the concerns of local citizens.”199
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Activists deployed a similar logic against urban renewal in Syracuse years before the Boston
antihighway movement gained momentum. Recovering CORE’s urban renewal campaign and
subsequent housing activism underscores the centrality of resistance to spatial segregation to
civil rights agendas. The failure to gain traction against residential segregation inhibited progress
in other key areas such as education, policing, and employment.

Displacement, Discrimination, and Community in the Fifteenth Ward
Government intervention to reshape the built environment in and around the Fifteenth
Ward began two decades before urban renewal. In her study of environmental justice in
Syracuse, K. Animashaun Ducre documents how African Americans in Syracuse experienced
“cycles of disruption and dislocation” that extended from the twentieth into the twenty-first
century.200 The city first displaced Black Syracusans through a slum clearance project in the
Ninth Ward, near the old Erie Canal, in 1935.201 Many of these citizens moved to the Fifteenth
Ward, where the city soon initiated a slum clearance and public housing project: Pioneer Homes.
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Federal policymakers and urban planners who conceived of and implemented slum
clearance and public housing projects did so in pursuit of what geographers Stephen Graham and
Simon Marvin have described as the “modern ideal of urban cohesion.”202 According to this
ideal, physical infrastructure such as streets and sewers should produce a unified city that
functions as an efficient machine, one that is inclusive of and accessible to all citizens. As Gail
Radford has demonstrated, the modernist ideal also informed federal public housing policy.203 In
practice, this ideal did not produce democratic cities with universal accessibility but replicated
economic, racial, and gender inequalities. The Syracusans who were displaced by the
construction of Pioneer Homes understood this all too well.
Constructed between 1938 and 1940, Pioneer Homes was one of the first five federally
funded public housing projects approved under the Housing Act of 1937, and the first in New
York State.204 Pioneer Homes construction displaced 481 families, approximately a third of
whom were Black, and few of whom met the requirements for residency in public housing.205
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Covering a seven-block area, Pioneer Homes consisted of clusters of red brick buildings and
boasted a park in the middle of the south end. In order to accommodate different family sizes, the
678 units were a mix of town homes, two story flats, and three-story apartment buildings.206

Figure 10: Pioneer Homes in 2022

Pioneer Homes represents both the optimism and the tensions inherent in the discourse of
progress. At a time when the nation was suffering from the effects of the Great Depression,
Pioneer Homes generated construction jobs and addressed Syracuse’s shortage of low-income
housing. Designed with white, working-class nuclear families in mind, Pioneer Homes accepted
African American tenants, but they were confined to the southwest corner of the project.207
Despite the policy of racial segregation, which lasted through World War II, the Pioneer Homes
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were desirable and appealing to white and Black families, including Liz Page’s family. When
Page was born in 1943, her family lived in a third-story, west-facing apartment in Radisson
Court.208 The construction of Pioneer Homes, however, did not resolve the area’s shortage of
affordable housing.
By the 1950s, the housing shortage combined with rapid demographic changes and
housing discrimination to fuel a crisis in the Fifteenth Ward neighborhood that bordered Pioneer
Homes. The in-migration of Black families, many of whom initially came to upstate New York
as agricultural workers, transformed the city. Over the course of the 1950s, African Americans
rose from 2.1% to 5.2% of the population, an increase of 144.4%.209 The newcomers packed into
the Fifteenth Ward. Black families of all income levels faced discrimination from banks, realtors,
homeowners, and landlords.210 This meant that the city’s only Black doctor resided near the other
93% of African Americans in Syracuse who lived in the Fifteenth Ward.211 Landlords, including
a handful of Black landlords, accommodated new arrivals by subdividing apartments, charging
high rents for crowded and unsanitary units.212 While a select few made a profit, many Black

208

Circuitous migration journeys from Georgia and Mississippi—her paternal grandfather arrived in the
city shortly after the Civil War, whereas her maternal grandfather came in the 1930s—brought both sides of her
family to the Salt City. When Page’s parents married during the Great Depression, they lived above a Jewish bakery
in the Fifteenth Ward. Many of their neighbors were Jewish, and Page’s father, a mechanic, learned to speak some
Yiddish. Her stable nuclear family successfully applied to live in Pioneer Homes. Elizabeth Ann Page, Interview by
Author, Digital Recording, 14 October 2014.
209
Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics On Population Totals By Race, 1790 to
1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For Large Cities And Other Urban Places In The United States,”
Population Division Working Paper No. 76 (Washington, D.C.: United States Census Bureau, 2005), Table 33.
210
Like cities across the nation, Syracuse had a history of redlining—the practice of labeling Black
neighborhoods had undesirable by both private insurance companies and the federal Home Owners Loan
Corporation—and restrictive covenants—legal instruments that dictated a home could not be sold to a certain
purchaser, frequently defined as African American, Jewish, or Asian buyers. Ducre, A Place We Call Home, 31-33;
Stamps and Stamps, Salt City and Its Black Community, 56, 66.
211
In 1954, African Americans did not constitute a majority of the population in any census tract. Walter
Carroll, “Negroes Lack of Housing Gives City 15th Ward Keg of Dynamite: Modern Ghetto Threat to Peace and
Progress, Race Riot Looms as Result of Evils Nurtured in Slums,” The Post-Standard, 21 January 1954.
212
Walter Carroll, “Landlord Discrimination Nearly Universal in City,” The Post-Standard, 24 January
1954, sec. III. As Historian N.D.B. Connolly has demonstrated, some African American landlords benefited from
and supported racial segregation. Connolly, A World More Concrete, 9.

89

families battled cockroaches and even inhabited condemned homes with no running water. The
Black population, one journalist observed, was growing “with each bean and potato crop, and it
has no place to grow to.”213

Figure 11: Newspaper Map Depicting Racial Demographics

The poor housing conditions were not the only salient feature of the Fifteenth Ward;
those who lived in the neighborhood valued their community and their institutions.214 The
novelist John A. Williams, who was born in Mississippi in 1925 and grew up in Syracuse,
remembered the neighborliness of the Fifteenth Ward in his youth. Williams served in the Navy
during World War II and returned to the Salt City to attend Syracuse University. After
graduating in 1950, he worked for the Onondaga County Welfare Department before moving to
New York City in 1955. His experiences in Syracuse informed his fiction, and his 1963 novel
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Sissie is set in the city.215 In a 1964 essay about his “Old Home Town,” he captured the texture
of the Fifteenth Ward:
When I was a child, people, Negro or white, in our neighborhood always spoke. It was as
though they were glad to have survived the Great War and the Depression, and glad that
someone else had survived with them. If both parents were away at work or shopping,
you could bet your life that some old biddy or old man whittling on a stick had their eyes
on you. If you misbehaved, the folks had the report as soon as their feet hit the steps.
Ours was a community, despite everything else, in which survival of the other fellow or
his children meant survival for you.216
In Williams’s youth, the neighborhood was full of residences, businesses, and places of worship.
Legendary jazz musicians and nightclubs contributed to a vibrant cultural scene.217 The Fifteenth
Ward was multicultural and multiracial. Williams observed that “[t]here were a lot of Eastern
European Jews there, a few Polish families, a few Indians, Italians, and Irish. We had one
binding thing in common: we were all poor.”218 As noted above, due to discrimination there was
more socioeconomic diversity in the Fifteenth Ward than Williams acknowledged.
Reverend Charles Brady, a Catholic priest who directed the Bishop Foery Foundation,
wanted to raise awareness among the broader community about the poor housing conditions in
the Fifteenth Ward. He gave journalist Walter Carroll a tour of the Fifteenth Ward. Carroll went
on to publish an eleven-part series about the Fifteenth Ward in the Syracuse Post-Standard. The
incisive series, which garnered Carroll a Pulitzer Prize nomination, detailed the neighborhood’s
dilapidated housing and the discrimination faced by Black residents who wanted to move out of
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the area. In January 1954, as state legislation banning housing discrimination wound its way
toward passage in Albany, Carroll warned of “a possible race riot” if the city did not take action
to ameliorate the neighborhood’s slum conditions.219
This series catalyzed the East Side Cooperative Council, which had formed in 1952, to
make recommendations to city leaders. By 1954, the Council counted about thirty organizations
as members, including the Dunbar Center, the NAACP, the Bishop Foery Foundation, and Grace
Episcopal Church. The coalition urged the mayor’s office to establish a human relations group to
assume the mantle of this work, but the mayor did not do so at the time.220 Within weeks of the
publication of Carroll’s newspaper series, the East Side Cooperative Council presented a tenpoint plan to the mayor with suggestions for improving the “slum area,” including rent control,
the construction of affordable housing, and a housing court to handle violations.221 Their
proposed solutions did not reckon with racial discrimination, but they represented an important
attempt to persuade the city government to consider the needs of low-income and Black citizens.
Nationally, civil rights organizations had made some progress in demonstrating the power
and necessity of government action to remedy structural and institutional racism. By the mid1950s, legal activism by the NAACP had yielded some key victories from the U.S. Supreme
Court. The court had struck down racial restrictive covenants, the legal instruments which
inscribed segregation in housing deeds, with Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948. It then brought an end
to the “separate but equal” doctrine with Brown v. Board in 1954.222 These cases bolstered
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grassroots challenges to racial discrimination. In Montgomery, Alabama, a Black member of the
Women’s Political Council wrote to the mayor four days after the Brown decision, threatening a
boycott of the bus system if treatment of Black riders did not improve.223 In December, the arrest
of Rosa Parks led to the 381-day Montgomery bus boycott, which culminated in the integration
of the city’s buses.
In Syracuse, civic and faith leaders who recognized the role that racism played in
trapping Black households in substandard housing, often framed the housing crisis in moral
terms. Imbued with postwar racial liberalism, they frequently focused on individual
transformation as the key to solving racial inequality. In November 1956, while in Alabama the
Montgomery Bus Boycott reached its final days, the Syracuse Ministers Association convened a
program about the housing dilemma facing local Black families. Reverend Walter Welsh, a
priest at the Grace Episcopal Church located a few blocks north of Syracuse University, stated
that “[r]eal estate agents are blamed, but they need our sympathy. Fear is quite a barrier; they
have to choose between doing what they know ought to be done, and losing their wallets. Our
failure is a failure of the church. Most of the people responsible have been baptized, but they
have never been converted.”224 Welsh’s statement not only gave credence to assumptions about
the negative financial effects of residential integration, but also to the idea that realtors were
relatively blameless actors. William McGarry of the Syracuse Housing Authority drove home the
moral mandate for integration, admonishing the ministers that “[y]ou have the Book. It’s high
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time its truth was driven home so that people can’t mistake it.”225 Whatever white Christian
Syracusans may have heard from their ministers on Sunday, sermons proved insufficient to
persuade more people to rent or sell to Black families. In the meantime, city officials identified a
solution for the “blighted area” of the Fifteenth Ward: they would bulldoze it.

Urban Renewal
Urban renewal represented both a specific set of federal policies and a cultural priority
shift in the Cold War context. Beginning in 1954, cities throughout the nation carried out
federally funded urban renewal projects to clear slums and redevelop the land with new
residential and commercial construction.226 The federal government simultaneously subsidized
white, suburban homeownership and interstate highway construction, which drained population
from downtown areas.227 Corporations joined the exodus from the cities, with many moving first
to the suburbs, then from the North to the Sun Belt, and ultimately overseas.228 As local
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governmental administrations faced an existential threat to their cities, urban renewal offered, as
Samuel Zipp observes, the “best hope to return the central city to its former glory.”229 Given the
racial politics of the mid-twentieth century, this entailed displacing Black populations to extract
more value from real estate in the central city.
The federal policies that supported urban renewal left key decisions to local officials,
allowing for urban renewal to be weaponized against communities of color. As Arnold Hirsch
has argued, urban renewal functioned as a form of racial containment on the domestic front
during the Cold War. Hirsch documented the critics from within the federal government who
warned of the implications of renewal and housing policy during the 1950s. He asserts that “[t]he
presence of even ineffectual opposition. . .undermine[s] the contention that the results of federal
housing policy were unintended, unforeseen, or merely the result of ‘good intentions gone
bad.’”230 The Syracuse case study expands on Hirsch’s thesis by elucidating grassroots resistance
to urban renewal’s pernicious impact on Black communities.231
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Figure 12: Map Depicting the Near East Side Urban Renewal Project

In the Salt City, federally funded urban renewal added a new pressure to an already
discriminatory situation and fractured the Black community. Unveiled in 1957, the Near East
Side urban renewal project designated 101 acres in the Fifteenth Ward as “blighted” and slated
all buildings in the renewal area for demolition.232 It ultimately displaced 746 families and 557
individuals (the majority of whom were African American) and a number of businesses, schools,
and churches.233 The city selected the site because of the substandard housing conditions and
“the pattern of mixed uses” in the area made it “unsuited for continued residential occupancy.”234
Acquiring land in the area through urban renewal also had the potential to facilitate the
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construction of a projected arterial highway—what would ultimately become Interstate-81—
although the highway’s path had not been finalized by the state government at the time.235
Salt City’s urban renewal plans explicitly favored business interests and disregarded the
twin crises of affordable housing and discrimination. The same page of the Post-Standard that
announced the Near East Side project described an ill-fated bill proposed by Syracuse
Republicans John A. Hughes, a state senator, and Charles A. Shoeneck, an assemblymember.
They had endeavored for several years to pass a bill that would allow cities to redirect funds
earmarked for public housing to urban renewal projects. Revealing New York State’s partisan
and regional fault lines, Senator Hughes lamented that tax dollars from Syracuse supported
public housing projects in New York City, but upstate communities “had indicated they didn’t
want any more public housing, but did need funds for slum clearance.” New York’s Democratic
governor vetoed the bill repeatedly, arguing that it would lead to a reduction of affordable
housing in the state.236 For Hughes and Shoeneck, the discourse of progress that justified renewal
left out low-income Syracusans. The Syracuse Housing Authority and The Post-Standard agreed,
advocating against locating any public housing units in the redeveloped Near East Side. In an
editorial, the newspaper argued that the acreage should be reserved for private housing, which
would generate tax revenue.237
A slowly unfolding disaster, urban renewal moved forward with no comprehensive
relocation or low-income housing program. The city took years to develop plans, acquire the
properties within the site. Once a site was transferred to the city, families had anywhere from
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three months to a year to move. Under pressure from civic and religious groups, the city
established an under-resourced Relocation Office. The office was headed by William Chiles, a
mild-mannered Black man who had lived in Syracuse for four decades. Author John Williams
counted Chiles as a teacher and mentor. He noted that “[i]n a city where too many people avoid
the responsibility of leadership, Bill Chiles, without searching for it, has come to be a leader.”238
With a staff of six and the assistance of a twelve-member Citizens’ Relocation Committee, the
Relocation Office offered advice and information—but no financial aid—to displaced
families.239 For the most part, civic and religious groups were left to assume the burden of
assisting displaced families in identifying somewhere to go.
Journalist Eleanor Rosebrugh detailed the disruption caused by urban renewal in a sixpart Post-Standard series in November 1961. She noted that “[w]hile non-white families have
the greatest difficulty, prejudice does not stop here, the record shows. In varying degrees and
different localities it is hard for Jews, handicapped and elderly persons, and here and there
Catholic and Irish families to obtain the homes they want and can afford.”240 Anticipating the
displacement of hundreds of families, faith leaders and residents in neighborhoods near the
renewal area organized new groups to respond to changing neighborhood dynamics. The South
Side Neighbors and the Thornden Park Neighborhood Council, on the east side of the city, both
formed in 1960 and were invested in “the conservation and improvement of residential
neighborhoods.”241 The South Side Neighbors hoped that new residents could be accommodated
in an “integrated pattern” and felt that “a heavy concentration of any single racial, ethnic, or
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religious group would be a mistake.”242 Although this statement expresses the desirability of
“integration,” it also manifests the racial anxieties of white Syracusans who feared that too many
Black families would trigger white flight from the neighborhood.
As Syracusans and residents of the suburbs began to at least pay lip service to the idea of
fair housing, faith groups led the way. The Syracuse Area Council of Churches, Bishop Foery
Foundation, and the Rabbinical Council of Syracuse established an Interfaith Committee on
Open Occupancy in 1960. They published a “statement on open occupancy” in the newspapers
that boasted 3,400 signatories.243 Few Syracusans, however, worshipped in an interracial setting.
At the beginning of the 1960s, only two area churches were fully integrated: Walter Welsh’s
Grace Episcopal Church, located just to the east of the renewal area, and, on the South Side, the
All-Saints Episcopal Church.244 After the Episcopal Diocese closed St. Philips Church, an almost
all-Black congregation in the Fifteenth Ward, in 1957, Reverend Welsh welcomed the displaced
parishioners to Grace Church with the full knowledge that some of the upper-class white
congregants would leave.245 His daughter recalled that some “people flocked out. . .The people
that stayed were people that had good hearts and open minds.”246 Welsh would continue to take
an active stance on integration as urban renewal reshaped his neighborhood.
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By the early 1960s, the Fifteenth Ward was in crisis. Syracuse CORE members, who had
meticulously studied the census data that Wretha Wiley assembled for the school segregation
battle in 1962, recognized the process that was underway: without substantial government
assistance, Black families displaced from the renewal area would be resegregated in an expanded
ghetto. To be sure, a handful of Black professionals succeeded in purchasing homes and lived
“happily on a block with white neighbors.”247 A few even moved to the suburbs. For example,
John Jackson and his wife moved to Manlius, about twelve miles to the southeast of the Salt
City, in 1959. According to Eleanor Rosebrugh, the Jacksons overcame their neighbors’
prejudices and made “many good friends in the village.”248 The glacial rate of integration,
however, could not keep up with the pace of displacement resulting from urban renewal. African
Americans who did not have the financial means to purchase a house in the East Side of
Syracuse or to move to the suburbs were mostly relocating to the South Side neighborhood,
which had aging housing stock similar to the Fifteenth Ward.249
In the last spring of 1963, Syracuse CORE began researching housing issues, and they
realized that urban renewal presented a concrete opportunity to protest the housing conditions
experienced by Black families. Representing a massive infusion of federal dollars into the city—
$33.7 million for the Near East Side project alone—urban renewal was an unstoppable force.
Although the funds would be spread out over years, the investment was equal to 87% of the
city’s entire budget for 1962.250 No one could deny that the urban renewal project
disproportionately affected African Americans: Of the 746 families displaced, 80% were
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nonwhite; of the 557 individuals, 63% were nonwhite.251 CORE could not stop the project, but it
could demand that the city ensure that displaced Black families were not re-segregated. The
chapter began preparing a proposal for desegregating the Salt City. CORE did not necessarily
intend to launch a large-scale direct-action campaign in conjunction with the issue. Over the
course of the late spring and summer, a combination of factors pushed the organization toward
demonstrations.

Momentum Builds
As the national civil rights movement gained increasing visibility and sympathy during
the spring and summer of 1963, Salt City’s news media drew connections to local civil rights
issues. Fueled by the dramatic protests in Birmingham, Alabama that spring, where police
unleashed German shepherds and firehoses on Black children, large-scale, direct-action
demonstrations spread around the country.252 As Sugrue points out, “[o]ver the summer of 1963,
the U.S. Department of Justice catalogued a total of 1412 separate civil rights demonstrations
around the country. It was the most sustained wave of protests for black equality ever.”253
The Syracuse newspapers expressed support for the goals of civil rights activists while
criticizing their tactics. In June, following an address by President Kennedy in which he called
for civil rights legislation, The Post-Standard praised the president and also admonished that
“[v]iolence and organized demonstrations on behalf of anti-discrimination bills will serve only to
solidify the segregationist bloc, and it is hoped that such unwise activity will be avoided.”254 The
newspaper equated violence with nonviolent protest and declared both to be equally

251

“17 Percent of City Land in Renewal Projects,” Syracuse Metropolitan Review, 3.
Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, 290-291.
253
Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, 302.
254
“An Appeal to Fairness: We Need It in Syracuse Too,” The Post-Standard, 12 June 1963, Editorial.
252

101

objectionable. A few days later, the newspaper published an editorial with the headline,
“Syracuse Can Show the Way: It's Much Easier to Work Together.” The newspaper praised “a
powerful inter-faith group, including bishops, rabbis, priests and ministers of all denominations”
for “working earnestly to improve race relations in Syracuse.”255 The message was that the type
of direct-action demonstrations favored by CORE were not an acceptable method for achieving
change. Any disruption to the discourse of progress was anathema.
The interfaith group that the Post-Standard lauded was the Interfaith Committee on
Religion and Race (ICRR), which Syracuse faith leaders formed to assert their commitment to
promoting racial equality and civil rights. The ICRR evolved out of a National Conference on
Religion and Race held in Chicago in January 1963 to commemorate the centennial of the
Emancipation Proclamation. Three representatives from Syracuse traveled to the Windy City for
the conference: Relocation Director William Chiles, who served on the board of directors of the
National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice; Monsignor Charles Brady, who led the local
chapter of the Catholic Interracial Council; and a Presbyterian minister.256 Many of the faith
leaders that circulated the open housing petition three years earlier joined the ICRR. The group
met with Mayor William F. Walsh at the end of June to discuss the importance of school
integration, open housing, and employment opportunities.257
Syracuse CORE also knocked on the mayor’s door during the last week of June. Walsh,
Salt City’s Irish Catholic and Republican mayor, had begun his first term in 1962. The County
Republican Party had recruited him to run in the hopes that he could restore the party’s
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reputation, which had been tarnished in a corruption and sex scandal.258 Occupied with
restructuring the police department and chasing federal dollars, Walsh had only been
peripherally engaged with CORE’s campaign to compel the school board to address racial
segregation.259 The urban renewal issue was the first real test of Walsh’s willingness to respond
to the demands of Syracuse CORE.
CORE was uncertain what sort of opponent Walsh would be, but his professional and
academic background indicated that he might support CORE’s mission. Prior to becoming
mayor, Walsh had served as the director of the local division of the State Commission against
Discrimination for ten years.260 He became the head of the County Welfare Department in
1959.261 With a master’s degree in sociology and doctoral coursework at Syracuse University,
Walsh was committed to a life of public service. He was also committed to urban renewal. Walsh
had leveraged the discourse of progress in his 1961 mayoral campaign, vowing to revitalize
downtown by securing federal funds for additional renewal projects.262 When CORE members
met with Walsh at the end of June, they presented him with a plan to achieve residential
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integration that contained a clear critique of urban renewal. Walsh was not receptive to any
challenge to his signature initiative.
CORE’s nine-point plan, with the curiously cheery title “Let’s Desegregate Syracuse,”
was a comprehensive challenge to the city, county, realtors, and banks, as well as to individuals,
to take collective action to end residential segregation.263 The first point called for local leaders
to “pledge to personally intercede in behalf of Negroes encountering housing discrimination.”
The remaining points, however, focused on structural change. The plan demanded the passage of
a local ordinance that allowed for injunctions against discriminatory landlords, scattered-site
public housing, housing code enforcement, and a rental assistance program for those displaced
from the urban renewal area. CORE called on realtors and banks to actively solicit Black
customers and recruit Black employees. Additionally, the plan suggested that the County Board
of Realtors provide leadership in assisting families displaced by urban renewal to locate outside
of the immediate vicinity.264 The proposals were in many ways pragmatic and actionable, but
they would require leaders to overcome their deference to white homeowners in order to actively
promote integration.
The crux of CORE’s plan was the second point, which directly contested the discourse of
progress. It read: “The urban renewal-relocation program should have residential desegregation
as a major objective. No Negroes should be relocated within the segregated portion of the city or
in any block having more than 30% Negro residents, unless they specifically request to be
relocated in such areas.” As Robert Self has demonstrated, urban renewal entailed “a massive
redistribution of property and people in the name of saving downtown” and “increasing property
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values.” In Syracuse, as in Oakland, officials “neglected to explain (or take responsibility for the
fact) that at the heart of the plan was. . .a redistribution of poor and middling homeowners and
renters from one slum to another.”265 CORE challenged this process by arguing that urban
renewal should explicitly strive to achieve desegregation. Moreover, they offered a tangible
objective for measuring integration: avoiding the creation of blocks with more than 30% Black
residents. Given that the Black population was barely more than 5% of the city’s overall
population, the 30% threshold allowed for a concentration of Black residents that exceeded the
proportion in the city itself. The CORE records do not contain any details about Walsh’s
response to the civil rights organizations’ June visit to his office. He seemed to communicate his
disdain for the plan by ignoring it. CORE would not allow him to do so for long.
In mid-July, around the same time that the Education Study Committee released its report
on segregation in the Syracuse schools, CORE moved into an office in the heart of the Fifteenth
Ward. Ironically, their landlord was the urban renewal office. The property, 608 East Adams
Street, was scheduled for demolition as part of the Near East Side project. To get closer to the
Black community, CORE had to become part of the neighborhood that was about to be
demolished. As the bulldozers revved their engines that summer, CORE could not stop urban
renewal, but they were determined to contest the process.
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Figure 13: Fifteenth Ward Looking East, August 1963

As the housing integration efforts coalesced, Wretha Wiley marshalled her organizational
and interpersonal skills to help CORE continue its evolution from a tightly knit cohort of
university members to a more grassroots organization. The fall 1962 school boycott had helped
establish CORE as a leading civil rights organization in the city but did result in a large infusion
of new members. This began to change the following year. Motivated by the Birmingham
demonstrations, about 100 new members joined CORE over the course of the summer.266
Wiley’s enthusiasm sprang off the paper of a letter to the national CORE office in which she
requested additional Freedom Now buttons. “We think we’re beginning to roll,” she noted, and
the buttons “seem to be effective in announcing our presence on the Syracuse scene.”267 Nearly
150 people attended CORE’s first meeting in their new office. The chapter also mounted new

266

Wretha Wiley, “Wretha Wiley to Jim [National CORE?],” 17 July 1963, CORE, Series 5, Box 56,
Folder 11, WHS.
267
The letter is addressed to Jim, which may have been CORE’s director, James Farmer. Wretha Wiley,
“Wretha Wiley to Jim [National CORE?],” 17 July 1963. CORE, Series 5, Box 56, Folder 11, WHS.

106

protests, including a demonstration in early August where picketers marched through the Hotel
Syracuse to protest employment discrimination. This demonstration attracted a new volunteer,
Byron Rushing, whose talent Wiley was determined to tap.
Wretha Wiley knew that to increase CORE’s capacity, the chapter needed a paid
employee, and so she persuaded Rushing to work for CORE. Rushing’s family had moved to
Syracuse from the Bronx when he was in elementary school. His mother, a seamstress from
Jamaica, did alterations at a downtown clothing store.268 Her full-time job gave the family a
newfound degree of economic security, and they purchased a home on Almond Street. The
federal government later purchased and demolished their home for the construction of the
interstate. After graduating from Central Technical High School, Rushing went to college at
Harvard University. At a time when few Black students in the Salt City graduated from high
school, Rushing’s academic trajectory was highly unusual.
Like George Wiley, Rushing’s class and educational background gave him a degree of
insulation from the issues facing most African Americans at the time. He recognized the
precarity and contingency of his position, explaining that “[t]he only reason I had escaped was
luck. The distinctions made by the white community about who you discriminate against and
who you dont [sic] are very superficial. If this is the way you win your freedom, by wearing a
white shirt and getting a Harvard degree in your wallet—that is until you make a mistake,
walking down a dark street without wearing your white shirt or your degree.”269 Rushing
dropped out of college after his junior year to work on civil rights. He had been accepted to a
CORE project in Louisiana and was home in Syracuse for the summer to work and save some
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money for the trip South. Wretha Wiley called the national CORE office to get permission for
him to stay in Syracuse. National CORE agreed, but they did not provide any funding. The
chapter had to fundraise to provide Rushing a meager salary.270
Through her organizational leadership, Wretha Wiley carved out a space for action within
the civil rights movement. She was exceptionally skilled at navigating the movement’s racial and
gender politics and forged strong connections with CORE members from all backgrounds.271 As
a white woman, Wiley recognized that her place was not as a spokesperson or organizational
figurehead. Her labor, however, supported the organization’s ability to become the leading civil
rights organization in the Salt City. She collected the data that CORE leveraged to prove that
schools were in fact segregated; increased member engagement, persuading Bruce Thomas to
stay involved with CORE and drawing Byron Rushing away from the Louisiana project; and
secured marketing materials to raise CORE’s visibility. She did this all with an infant at home
and a second child on the way. When her husband’s career took the family first to New York
City and later Washington, D.C., Wretha Wiley managed the family and took jobs that supported
them. She did so while operating within the gendered constraints of the era.272
As the summer of 1963 progressed, the desire of some CORE members to take bigger
and bolder action increased. In August, citizens in Syracuse and throughout the nation
anticipated the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, the legendary demonstration held at

270

Author.

Byron Rushing, Interview by Author, Digital Recording, Boston, MA, 8 July 2015, Possession of the

271

Wretha Wiley’s ability to navigate the racial and gender politics of the civil rights movement was
exceptional, if not unique. For example, Wini Breines begins her exploration of why an interracial feminist
movement failed to emerge in the U.S. with a chapter on interracial organizing during the Mississippi Freedom
Summer. The presence of white, Northern, female volunteers helped call attention to the Southern civil rights
struggle. Some white volunteers, however, were oblivious to their privilege, foreshadowing problems that would
emerge in Second Wave feminism. Wini Breines, The Trouble between Us: An Uneasy History of White and Black
Women in the Feminist Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 19-21.
272
Kotz and Kotz, A Passion for Equality, 185-186.

108

the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. on August 28, 1963. With national attention focused
on civil rights, Syracuse CORE seized the chance to connect the local problem of racial
segregation to the national movement for racial justice. On August 26, Syracuse CORE, the
NAACP, and the Civil Rights Committee of the local chapter of the International Union of
Electrical Workers (IUE)—the same coalition that organized the school boycott the previous
year—sponsored a Fair Housing March. A group of 350 activists assembled at a local Baptist
church and marched to the county courthouse. In the lead were two individuals carrying an
orange banner that posed the question “Where Shall We Move?” At the courthouse, George
Wiley served as the master of ceremonies.273
The Fair Housing March represents a moment when the city’s political and business
leaders acknowledged the goals of civil rights activists. It also exposed the points of division that
quickly devolved into open hostilities and a breakdown in communication. Mayor Walsh, the
Onondaga County executive, the local Democratic Party chairman, and the president of the local
Board of Realtors all spoke to the assembly. The mayor read the preamble of his newly minted
“Syracuse Code of Human Rights,” which stated, in carefully phrased passive tense, that “it is
essential that the blight of discrimination be guarded against and that equal opportunity for all be
advanced.” He also hastened to point out that the government had limited power to direct
desegregation and that desegregation needed a “moral and religious foundation.”274 Similarly,
the director of the board of realtors insisted that “the board cannot regulate individual realtors,”
but it would do its best to help displaced families purchase homes. Although neither man
disputed the existence of racial segregation and discrimination in Syracuse, they both resisted
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assuming responsibility for remedying the problem. Nevertheless, by addressing the rally, they
acknowledged the legitimacy of the marchers’ position. At the end of the ceremonies, Walsh
declared that Wednesday, August 28th would be “Jobs and Freedom” day in the city and
throughout Onondaga County.275
On Tuesday, three-hundred Syracusans piled onto buses heading for the nation’s capital.
CORE, the NAACP, the ICRR, the Syracuse Council of Churches, and the Committee on Race
and Religion of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom all supported the
March on Washington.276 Several CORE members, however, chose to remain behind. George
and Wretha Wiley and a handful of others felt that the march was a distraction from Syracuse’s
problems.277 Their immediate objective was to elicit a response from the Mayor regarding
CORE’s proposed housing integration program.
Somewhat spontaneously, the group decided to demonstrate at an urban renewal site on
August 28th. Byron Rushing recalled that “the chapter was not incredibly disciplined. A bunch of
us just sit around and say, let’s do this.”278 Rushing’s frustration with the impromptu nature of
the protest was apparent. But ultimately CORE deployed both spontaneous and highly
orchestrated demonstrations.279 During the summer of 1963, the influx of new members and new
energy impacted CORE’s strategic choices. The impulse to “do something” overwhelmed their
planning instinct. In contrast to the picketing of the Board of Education and the Washington
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Irving School boycott, which were carefully planned and implemented in partnership with other
activist organizations, in this instance a subset of CORE members took unilateral action to
initiate a demonstration.
The following day, the CORE members went in search of a protest site. Wretha Wiley
recalled that she and George; Rushing; Bruce Thomas, and Deborah Neimand, the daughter of a
Syracuse rabbi, were present.280 No houses were being torn down that day, so the group
demonstrated at the site of a gas station that was almost completely cleared. Rushing described
how the demonstration unfolded:
Of course, what you’d expect happens. The contractor gets pissed, they call the cops, the
cops come. The cops call the urban renewal authority. They can’t get anybody because
the top staff of the urban renewal authority in Syracuse, New York, had gone to the
March on Washington, because they’re liberals. They stop. They just send the contractors
home. We were out there, I guess, maybe two or three hours. And that was that. No one
got arrested. The whole thing stops.281
There was deep irony in the fact that the urban renewal officials had gone to Washington, D.C.
while CORE called attention to the fact that urban renewal would in fact reinscribe and
potentially increase racial inequality in the Syracuse.
For Bruce Thomas, the demonstration became his initiation into the practice of
nonviolent protest. He climbed into the booth of a crane, which incensed a white construction
worker. The construction worker grabbed an iron pipe. Thomas explained that the worker “said
‘Get that black nigger off my crane or I am going to break his head.’” Thomas, who had learned
to fight while incarcerated as a young man, did not react to the verbal assault. The worker tossed
aside the pipe and punched Thomas in the face. Police, who had to that point observed the
altercation without intervening, finally asked the man to stop beating Thomas. According to
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Thomas, the moment was transformative: “I felt very good,” he remembered. “I felt bigger than
he could ever be. If I wanted to[,] I could have wasted the guy just like that[,] and I have been
non-violent since. I can say it and really mean it.”282 While a quarter of a million gathered
peacefully in D.C., Thomas endured an act of racist violence in the Deep North. Although
demonstrations in the North were typically less violent than in the South, civil rights activists in
the Salt City were nonetheless putting their bodies on the line to fight for racial justice.
With the contractors gone, the ragtag CORE group put up a shelter from the sun and flew
a little flag in the middle of the lot. Wretha Wiley remembered that the site “looked like a spot on
the desert.”283 The CORE chapter had temporarily paused urban renewal through a successful act
of civil disobedience. With little planning or discussion, the group that skipped the March on
Washington had committed the chapter to demonstrating against urban renewal. Rushing recalled
that a fight ensued when the other members returned from Washington, D.C.284 After everyone
had vented their annoyance, they began to absorb the fact that the organization, with its single
employee and meager bank account, had to prepare for large-scale demonstrations.
After its unilateral action at the urban renewal site, CORE engaged the NAACP and the
IEU to plan next steps. On September 4, Wiley and Robert Warr, president of the NAACP, met
with Walsh to go over CORE’s proposal. Unsatisfied with the outcome of the meeting, the
triumvirate of civil rights organizations developed a protest strategy. Unlike the orderly Fair
Housing March, these demonstrations would include acts of civil disobedience intended to
provoke arrests. In a letter to Walsh, Bruce Thomas, announced that CORE planned to disrupt
urban renewal unless the mayor assured the group that displaced families would not be moved
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into segregated blocks. Thomas reiterated the formula outlined in “Let’s Desegregate Syracuse”:
CORE considered any block with a Black population of thirty percent or more to be
segregated.285
Walsh responded to CORE’s escalation of its desegregation campaign by deflecting
responsibility and delaying action. First, Walsh attempted to undermine the validity of CORE’s
plan by attacking their tactics. For Walsh, the prospect of demonstrations represented a threat to
his authority and an assault on law and order in the city. He asserted that “I cannot and will not
accept an ultimatum from any group.”286 Yet only the threat of demonstrations had elicited a
response from the mayor to CORE’s nine-point plan, which they had delivered to Walsh’s office
nearly three months earlier. Second, Walsh denied that he was the appropriate target for CORE’s
concerns. He deployed the “tyranny of the universal,” arguing that as mayor he had “to consider
what is best for all citizens.” Instead, CORE should take their plan to the ICRR or the New York
State Commission for Human Rights. Walsh also announced plans to ask the city council to
create a “Citizens’ Committee for Intergroup Relations” that month. In other words, Walsh
proposed to form yet another entity to study racial inequality and delay action. Finally, the mayor
chided CORE’s attempt to accelerate the pace of change as “evidence of bad faith.”
Walsh rejected most of CORE’s specific calls to action and maintained that urban
renewal was “a unique opportunity to eliminate slums. . .and to integrate housing.” In response
to point two, which demanded that the city not re-segregate displaced families, he insisted that
“no Negroes are located in areas unless they desire to go there.”287 This obscured the fact that
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African Americans faced obstacles that dramatically constrained their housing choices. William
Chiles’s relocation office could do little more than offer advice to families seeking housing.288
On a point regarding an ordinance that would permit the city to issue an injunction against an
owner or landlord who discriminated, Walsh promised to investigate whether state law allowed
this local action. Similarly, he did not know of a law that would enable the city to pay a rentdifferential for families who faced higher rents if they moved outside a segregated area.
Regarding housing code enforcement, Walsh assured CORE that he would address the issue once
he filled the current vacancy for the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Building. Finally, Walsh
explained that the last three points in CORE’s plan involved bankers and realtors and so were not
issues that he, as the mayor, could directly influence. The negotiations and disagreements that
unfolded over the next three weeks all centered on CORE’s nine points.
Mayor Walsh’s intransigence compelled CORE to follow through on its promise of
direct-action demonstrations, and to do so CORE activated a largely untapped resource:
university students. CORE knew that the sight of hundreds of students coming down off “the
hill” to protest the city administration alongside Black residents of the Fifteenth Ward would be
visually compelling. It would attract the attention of the news media, which, as the Birmingham
campaign had demonstrated, was crucial to success. Syracuse University was not, however, a
particularly politically engaged campus. Ron Corwin, a graduate student and CORE member
who came to SU from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, characterized the campus as
“sleepy,” “indifferent,” and “party-oriented.”289 Wretha Wiley described the political climate as a
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decade behind the times.290 Many, although certainly not all, of the undergraduates came from
privileged families that could afford the high tuition. A small but growing number of students
and faculty, however, wanted change in both the university and society.
Pockets of innovative faculty members and radical students existed across campus. SU
had a homegrown version of Students for a Democratic Society: the Syracuse University
Committee on Equality (SUCE). SUCE took on racial discrimination in campus Greek life as
well as athletics.291 In the Maxwell School of Public Affairs as well as the School of Social
Work, faculty members theorized ways to transform society. Maxwell hosted visiting faculty
members such as Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique as well as African students who came from
countries struggling for independence, or recently liberated from, colonial powers.292 In fact,
CORE’s first housing action was to help secure rental units for African students from Rhodesia
(present-day Zimbabwe) and Mozambique.293 Interaction with individuals who were engaged
with anticolonial efforts inspired students and faculty alike to combat the racism on their own
campus and community.294 As James H. Meriwether notes, “[a] decolonizing Africa helped
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propel the Black freedom struggle in the United States and around the world. . .It forced the
nation to confront the realities of diversity abroad in ways that intertwined with the fight over
how to do so at home.”295 Drawing on multiple sources of inspiration, a growing number of SU
students and professors were eager to put their principles into practice on the picket line. Urban
renewal became the issue that impelled many of them to bridge the divide between the university
and the broader community.
On Thursday, September 12, a few hours after the mayor refused CORE’s “ultimatum,”
CORE held a rally and announced that demonstrations would commence the following day. The
next morning, picketers gathered at a demolition site at the intersection of South Townsend and
Madison Streets. Wretha Wiley, pregnant with her second child, joined the picket line.296 Wretha
and several hundred fellow demonstrators marched peacefully on the sidewalk. A select few,
however, committed acts of civil disobedience. By the end of the day, fourteen protesters were
arrested for “willful trespass,” including Bruce Thomas who, along with two others, climbed on
a crane. Eight of the fourteen arrested were SU students. While the demonstrations occurred,
Mayor Walsh met with twenty representatives from CORE, the NAACP, and the ICRR.297 No
compromise was reached.
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Figure 14: A Young Participant in the Fifteenth Ward Urban Renewal Demonstrations

Both Wileys spent the weekend coordinating demonstrations for the following week.
Their work was interrupted on Sunday afternoon when they learned that the detonation of a
bomb at the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, had claimed the lives of
four young girls. The racist attack simultaneously galvanized the activists’ determination to
achieve justice for African Americans and made some question the benefits of nonviolent
protest.298 On Monday, the headline “Birmingham Shocked by Church Explosion” dominated the
front page of the Post-Standard.299 National media coverage of the terrorist violence focused on
several features: the fact that the victims were young, innocent girls, and that they died in a
house of worship.300 For many in Syracuse, the violent South remained a world apart from racial
segregation and discrimination in the Salt City. On Sunday, as many mourned the tragedy in
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Birmingham, the Syracuse Police Department leadership had a closed-door meeting in order “to
go over plans covering the possibility of further racial demonstrations in the 15th Ward.”301
The following week was punctuated by demonstrations, arrests, and unproductive
negotiations. On Monday, September 16, ten more protesters were hauled to the Willow Street
Jail. The arrest of Charles Presley, a young Black man, was particularly dramatic. Presley
scrambled onto the roof of a home on Harrison Street that workers were in the process of
demolishing. He stayed on the rooftop until a fire truck appeared to remove him from the
building. Presley attempted to flee, but police spotted him running across the street from the
demolition site. Police officers wrestled him to the ground. Incensed by the rough treatment of
the young man, protesters shouted and threatened the police with wooden sticks. In the end,
Presley was arrested, and the police were not assaulted. Another protester succeeded in climbing
on the building’s roof before it was finally demolished.302 The activists vowed to continue
demonstrations in defiance of the mayor, who had pleaded that they suspend their civil
disobedience tactics.
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Figure 15: CORE Protesters in front of a Condemned Home, September 1963

Tuesday, September 17, marked the largest day of demonstrations yet. Hundreds of
picketers, waving signs and singing songs, marched on the sidewalk around a Harrison Street
construction site. A detail of police officers observed the peaceful protesters. The scene was
orderly and calm. Then, George Wiley circumvented the police, ran to the middle of the
construction site—an act of trespass—and shouted, “Remember Birmingham!” Police responded
quickly. A scuffle ensued in which the officers painfully twisted Wiley’s arm.303 As police
handcuffed him, Wiley allegedly shouted that, “[t]hey can handcuff my hands, but they can't take
away my freedom.”304 By the end of the day, a sociology-anthropology professor, eight
university students, a leader from the local chapter of the NAACP, and three others had also been
taken to the Willow Street Jail. Appalled at what they felt were brutal and inhumane conditions
in the jail, Wiley and six others later filed complaints and demanded an investigation.305
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Among the eight students arrested on Tuesday was Jan Raymond (née Strauss), a junior
from Darien, Connecticut.306 As a Jewish woman, she had personal experience with prejudice
and housing discrimination. When she was in elementary school, her father, an avid sailor,
moved the family to Darien to be near the ocean. They were one of the first Jewish families to
purchase a home in the town. To do so, they bypassed realtors and bought directly from a British
family that was willing to violate the town’s “gentlemen’s agreement.” The yacht club initially
denied her father’s application for membership due to his religion, and Raymond experienced
antisemitism at school and in extracurricular activities. At a time when many institutions of
higher education had maximum quotas for Jewish students, Syracuse University did not
discriminate. Raymond was relieved to be in the company of other Jewish students on campus.
Raymond’s family instilled in her an orientation toward justice, and so she soon found
herself on CORE’s picket lines. During the urban renewal demonstrations, Raymond decided to
volunteer to get arrested. She wanted to put her principles into action, and she also recognized
her own privileged position. Using social justice terminology of the twenty-first century, she
explained that “in my mind white privilege is something you can spend. . .You spend it, but it
doesn't in any way diminish your net worth.” Raymond wanted to show up alongside Black
protestors who risked their jobs and even their lives by demonstrating.307
After nearly sixty years, Raymond still vividly recalled the day of her arrest. She dressed
neatly in “a wine-colored wrap around skirt from Talbot's and a flowered blouse.” When police
put her in a paddy wagon, she remembered looking out the window and seeing CORE organizer
Ron Corwin. Corwin had trained CORE volunteers on what to do when they got arrested. As the
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paddy wagon pulled away, he assured the students that everything was going to be okay.
Raymond called her parents from jail. Her father told her that “it's about time you do something
worthwhile with your life.” He paid for a lawyer to represent her so that neither CORE nor the
ACLU would have to use limited defense funds on her case. After spending the night in jail,
Raymond was released, and she never faced any charges. She was, however, disciplined for
violating the university’s curfew for female students.308
At that point, Raymond and thirty-seven other protesters had been arrested, and the
demonstrations were succeeding in generating conversation in a city that for so long had denied
its racial problems. The civil disobedience made Walsh furious. Livid at the activists’ unyielding
attitude, Walsh cut off contact with CORE, explaining that the city would not “negotiate
indefinitely with a group which persists, despite repeated requests, in a pattern of lawlessness.”
He would meet with the Interfaith Committee on Religion and Race instead.309
On Wednesday morning, the newspapers were peppered with emotional statements from
city officials, activists, and community members. Some commentators reacted to the content of
CORE’s nine-point plan, some dwelled on the activists’ behavior, and a few addressed both. In a
letter to the editor, one man commended the mayor for his handling of the demonstrations and
concluded that “I do not believe the course threatened by CORE is going to help the great
progress already made here in interracial relations, and I hope these people will take your advice
and allow these problems to be settled in a sane and orderly manner.”310 The idea that African
Americans should be content with the progress that had been achieved and not agitate for change
was a frequent refrain of opponents of the civil rights movement. Referring to activists as “these
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people” was also a rhetorical strategy that set the protesters outside of the bounds of the
community.
Syracuse’s assistant district attorney, J. Richard Sardino, resented the release of a number
of protesters without bail. He told the Daily Orange that “these people are creating a public
disorder and the people of this community also have a right to peace and order.”311 The clear
message was that white citizens’ right to “peace and order” superseded African Americans’ right
to housing. The notion that protesters were not community members is inaccurate. Surely
university professors and students could claim a legitimate interest in the city where they lived,
worked, and studied, particularly when urban renewal occurred within sight of the campus. Such
thinking also discounts the Black protesters who marched peacefully on the sidewalks as well as
those, such as Bruce Thomas and Charles Presley, who got arrested. The statements of Sardino
and others did not acknowledge the disorder that the state imposed on Black Syracusans by
bulldozing their neighborhood. The subtext was that African Americans, many of whom were
recent migrants from the South, simply did not belong in Salt City.
The attitude that Black Syracusans were outsiders or second-class citizens allowed white
citizens to rationalize the injustices of urban renewal. At the same time, they were offering
similar rationalizations for opposing school desegregation or placing the burden of school
desegregation on Black families. A letter to the editor from a member of the Citizens Council on
Urban Renewal illustrates this point: “One of the basic tenets of democracy is that Government
should serve the best interests of the greatest number. Unfortunately, all too often this cannot be
accomplished without adversely affecting some people. In the case of Urban Renewal, though
clearance has raised severe problems for. . .the relocating Negroes, there seems little question of
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its long run benefit to the whole city.”312 On the same page of the newspaper, the Post-Standard
editorialized that, in contrast to situations where civil disobedience might be understandable,
“here we have the strange phenomenon of an attempt being made to block community efforts to
remove racial ghettos and to improve living conditions of Negroes. It just doesn't make sense.”313
The newspaper had once again deployed the discourse of progress to deny the lived reality of
Black Syracusans. Those who watched the government demolish their homes knew better;
among African Americans, “urban renewal” soon earned the nickname “Negro removal.”314
Once the newspaper printed these opinions, CORE members and other activists had the
opportunity to contest them.
The Fifteenth Ward demonstrations garnered Syracuse national attention, connecting
local issues to the broader conversations about civil rights. When, on September 18, the New
York Times noted the arrest of George Wiley and thirteen others in Syracuse, the article appeared
alongside news about demonstrations in Tallahassee, Florida, and Selma, Alabama; racial
violence in Miami, Florida; and fair housing protests in Ann Arbor, Michigan.315 Despite the
ample evidence that Syracuse was not an oasis of racial harmony, the Post-Standard refused to
relinquish this fantasy. In an editorial criticizing the protests, the newspaper asserted that the
state and national press coverage gave “the impression that Syracuse was a hotbed of great racial
strife and unrest, whereas it has actually taken greater steps toward better housing, better
education, and better relations with its Negro population than almost any city in the country.”316
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Rather than viewing the demonstrations as a local expression of national dissatisfaction with
racial inequality, the newspaper maintained that those who were arrested were “high-intentioned
university people” who wanted to stir up trouble rather than effect change. The newspaper did
not prove its point so much as reveal the difficulties CORE leaders faced in shaking Syracuse out
of its complacency.
On Wednesday, September 19th, feelings of uncertainty and confusion hung over the city.
Wiley appeared in court, his injured arm in a sling, alongside his fellow demonstrators. The
judge set bail at $500 for Wiley and a student, paroling the remaining eleven to their attorney.317
Meanwhile, picketers continued to march outside demolition sites in the Fifteenth Ward. None
were arrested. Perhaps because the demonstrations that day were orderly, in the evening the
mayor reestablished communication with CORE. He agreed to meet with Wiley, Robert Warr of
the NAACP, and Jesse Epps of the IUE’s Civil Rights Committee on Thursday morning. In
return, they promised that no acts of civil disobedience would occur until after the meeting. The
calm did not last long.
Mayor Walsh shrewdly seized control of the focus of negotiations on Thursday when he
issued a press release announcing the formation of the Mayor’s Commission for Human Rights
(MCHR). Walsh had been working on the concept for a few months, and it marked a reversal of
his position from the previous year. During the school desegregation controversy, Walsh rejected
the idea of creating a committee to investigate school segregation because the local chapter of
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the State Commission on Human Rights could fulfill that role.318 Yet the evolving national
climate of civil rights fervor necessitated the appearance of action on the part of elected officials.
In fact, Governor Rockefeller had circulated a letter to municipalities in June urging the creation
of local rights commissions.319 Advocating for the creation of the commission in the midst of
civil rights demonstrations created the illusion that Walsh was responding to the protestors’
concerns. Initially mentioned on September 12th, the day before CORE’s protests began, as the
“Citizen’s Committee on Intergroup Relations,” Walsh soon renamed the proposed group the
“Mayor’s Commission.” This reframing connected the initiative more directly to his
administration’s agenda and to his own political future. It also echoed the “Mayor’s Commission
for Youth,” which he had formed as part of a federally funded anti-juvenile delinquency
initiative the previous year.
CORE and other civil rights activists were in the midst of a five-hour negotiation with the
mayor when they received word of the press release. Walsh had neither consulted with nor
informed the civil rights coalition about his plan to move forward with the commission. The civil
rights activists stormed out of the meeting. Once this information reached the protesters in the
Fifteenth Ward, chaos erupted. Designated picketers trespassed onto a construction site on South
State Street, laying or sitting down in front of the heavy machinery in order to disrupt the
work.320 Two demonstrators climbed onto a crane. Police, who were prepared for more civil

318
“Reeves Raps City Schools, Charges Segregation,” Syracuse Herald-American, 5 September 1962,
CORE, Series 5, Box 56, Folder 10, WHS.
319
Millicent Allewelt, “Rights Commission: An Educational Program,” Event: A Journal of Public Affairs
5, no. 1 (Fall 1964): 7.
320
CORE carefully organized arrests. They kept lists of individuals willing to be arrested and selected the
protesters who would be arrested each day.

125

disobedience, began detaining the trespassers. In total, the police arrested twenty-three
demonstrators on Thursday and an additional eighteen the following day.321
Demonstrations and negotiations continued the following week but did not produce a
satisfying resolution for CORE leaders. On Monday, September 23, the activists agreed to
suspend civil disobedience but maintain peaceful picketing. The mayor and the activists
scheduled a standing meeting from 4:30 to 6:30 pm for every day that week.322 Throughout the
frustrating negotiations, civil rights leaders largely failed to squeeze any concrete commitments
out of the mayor. Instead, the mayor skillfully promoted the MCHR to the public as a panacea
for the city’s racial problems. Over the objections of CORE, the NAACP, and the IUE, the
mayor asked the city council to vote on the ordinance to establish the commission on Monday,
September 30. The council broke precedent and allowed members of the audience to voice their
opinions before their vote, but the outcome was a foregone conclusion. The council unanimously
passed the ordinance, creating a commission with no enforcement powers and without the
powers of injunction or subpoena. Soon after the vote, a furious Wiley terminated the meetings
with the mayor.323
The MCHR promised to reassert the primacy of what N.D.B. Connolly describes the
“conference table approach” to race reform. City elites carefully regulated who gained a seat at
the conference table. According to Connolly, this approach “gave a very small range of property
owners and politicians tremendous power in shaping interracial governance and metropolitan
development.”324 In the case of Syracuse, Mayor Walsh had the ability to hand-select the sixteen
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members of his new commission, and he carefully chose middle-class, educated, and moderate
participants. Peggy Wood, a respected Black woman who worked for the Syracuse Health
Department, received a three-year term. Several faith leaders—including two rabbis, a priest
from a Black church, and the Protestant chair of the ICRR—also received appointments.
Additionally, there were representatives from the Onondaga County Bar Association, the
Syracuse Savings Bank, the Citizens’ Council on Urban Renewal, and the SU College of Law.325
Although CORE, the NAACP, and the IUE had proposed that half of the seats of the commission
go to representatives from their organizations, none received an invitation.326
The creation of the MCHR caused the commitment of CORE’s allies to direct-action
protests to waver. Moderate civil rights proponents had to balance their support of CORE’s
agenda with their discomfort with CORE’s tactics. The ICRR and the Dunbar Center board, of
which 40% of the members were Black, both supported the creation of the Mayor’s
Commission.327 The Catholic Interracial Council had urged CORE to cease acts of civil
disobedience, but a few weeks later they issued a statement acknowledging that “[t]he relocation
program being carried out in connection with Urban Renewal is only broadening the Negro
ghetto in nearby neighborhoods. It does not solve segregation; it merely moves it.”328 Ultimately,
these groups were more comfortable with conference table negotiations than more
confrontational strategies to achieving change. On October 1st, even the NAACP and the IUE
committed to picketing separately from CORE.329
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CORE persisted with direct-action for a few more days but ultimately decided not to
continue without the support of the NAACP and the IUE.330 CORE’s commitment to coalition
action constrained its ability to pursue a campaign once the coalition fell apart. A final batch of
arrests occurred when Walsh himself was the object of demonstrations. On Tuesday, October 1,
peaceful CORE members and supporters marched outside City Hall. That afternoon, fifteen
individuals were arrested for obstructing the doorway to the mayor’s office. Among those
arrested were Wretha Wiley, two SU faculty members, five SU graduate students, two State
College of Medicine instructors, and Malchester Reeves, the Fifteenth Ward supervisor.331 An
additional five were arrested the following day. On Tuesday evening, protesters marched into an
auditorium where a meeting on a new amendment to state housing law was being held. They
sang quietly and briefly disrupted the speaker in order to demonstrate their disapproval of the
MCHR.332 After the meeting, Wiley informed the press that CORE was not going to hold any
more protest demonstrations at urban renewal sites. Instead, the organization would shift its
strategy to focus on activity against the private sector, such as landlords, banks, and realtors.333
Syracuse’s largest direct-action campaign, which had resulted in ninety-eight arrests, was
over.334
The activists had extracted few concessions from the mayor. Walsh agreed to three of
CORE’s demands: “that Negroes not be relocated in areas that are more than 30 per cent Negroes
that scattered site housing be explored, and that there be more vigorous enforcement of the
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housing code.”335 The scattered site public housing never materialized, and the city government
took little action to promote integration. CORE agreed to drop the demands that the city provide
temporary monetary assistance to Black renters who moved to more expensive neighborhoods
and that the MCHR have injunctive powers. Follow-through on these issues would have been an
unwieldy task for the small chapter to achieve. In sum, CORE’s vision for urban renewal
remained an unrealized possibility.
Although the mayor did not adopt CORE’s desegregation plan, the urban renewal
demonstrations made legible the racial tension that had been submerged by a discourse of
progress. The Post-Standard, although far from sympathetic to CORE, provided ample coverage
of the historic protest campaign. Between September 13 and October 3, the Post-Standard
published daily coverage of the demonstrations and negotiations with the mayor, and the
campaign garnered front page recognition fifteen times. Likewise, city leaders could no longer
hide from the subject of the racial inequality inherent in urban renewal. Even as the protests were
occurring, other segments of the community were discussing residential integration and urban
renewal. For example, on September 20, residents from three Syracuse suburbs participated in a
discussion sponsored by a group with the cumbersome title “Inter-Church Committee of
Concerned Members of Congregations West of Syracuse,” which involved fifteen Catholic and
Protestant churches.336 The following week, the University Methodist Church held a panel on
urban renewal that was heavily attended by SU students.337 In an assessment of the

335

Charles B. Camp, “Rights Groups Plan to Offer 'Compromise,’” The Post-Standard, 30 Sept. 1963.
Robert, R Haggart, “200 Discuss Integration Issue,” The Post-Standard, 20 September 1963.
337
“Panel Urges Lawful Action on Racial Strife,” The Post-Standard, 26 September 1963.
336

129

demonstrations in fall 1964, George Wiley noted that “[t]he most significant achievements of the
action was aroused community interest in racial problems here.”338
Following the urban renewal demonstrations, CORE pivoted to a new strategy. Rather
than pushing against the implementation of federally funded urban renewal, they began to use
existing legal remedies to combat housing discrimination and to highlight the impotence of the
MCHR. By mobilizing what Elizabeth Page described as “salt and pepper teams,” CORE
documented discriminatory behavior by Salt City landlords and realtors.339 The time was
opportune to challenge landlords: An amendment to New York’s fair housing law, which had
been passed in the spring and took effect in September, prohibited discrimination in ninety
percent of the housing in the state. The law also gave the State Commission on Human Rights
new enforcement powers.340
During a testing campaign in early November, CORE sent teams of Black and white
volunteers to forty-six apartments and identified discrimination against Black applicants in 65%
of the cases. Jan Raymond volunteered to be part of a white testing team. She remembered going
to blue-collar neighborhoods and finding that apartments that were not available to Black team
members were in fact available when she knocked on the door ninety minutes later.341 Landlords
used various tactics to inhibit Black applicants, including simply not answering the door,
rejecting applicants because of opposition from neighbors, rejecting applicants because of family
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size, and quoting a higher rent.342 All these actions were illegal according to state law, but the
burden lay on the prospective renter to challenge landlords’ behavior.
CORE presented the results of its rental testing to representatives of the State
Commission for Human Rights and the MCHR in early November. The CORE chapter hosted
twenty commission members and forty CORE members at their storefront office.343 The testing
campaign exposed once again the overlapping jurisdictions of the local and state commissions.
The MCHR advised CORE to submit the discrimination cases directly to the state. CORE’s
newsletter posed the question: “Precisely what, then, is the function of the Mayor’s
Commission?” CORE concluded that “the city administration’s so-called ‘action program’ has
shown itself to be enttirely [sic] ineffective.”344
African Americans of all income levels encountered housing discrimination, and CORE
also documented the difficulties of Black families who wanted to purchase homes in the
Syracuse suburbs. CORE’s February 1964 newsletter summarized three cases it had filed with
the State Commission. In one case, a real-estate agent told a Black client that there were no
houses in her desired price range in the suburb of Dewitt. The agent attempted to steer the client
to neighborhoods in Syracuse where Black families lived. According to CORE’s research, nearly
two dozen houses in Dewitt were listed in the client’s price range at the time. An agent for
another realty company told their client that houses in the suburbs of Fayetteville and Manlius
started at $25,000—above the client’s budget of $22,000. In fact, over fifty houses were listed
for around $22,000.345 Even for Black families with considerable financial means, navigating
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discriminatory real estate practices required time and energy. They faced constant reminders that
many white citizens valued private property rights over a fair and open housing market.
CORE’s strategy of testing the fair housing law and filing cases with the State
Commission for Human Rights was likely more successful than its direct-action protests against
urban renewal. Although CORE’s records do not document the outcomes of the cases it filed, the
State Commission for Human Rights frequently decided in favor of Black complainants from
Syracuse.346 Independently of CORE, Captain James Anderson, an African American army
doctor, successfully filed a complaint against a Syracuse landlord in 1963. The State
Commission for Human Rights determined that the landlord was in violation of the state’s fair
housing law, and in November 1963 the State Supreme Court upheld this finding. Eight months
after Anderson filed his complaint, the ruling did not directly benefit his family. By that time, he
had secured housing in “a predominantly white neighborhood in Syracuse.”347
CORE was aware that using state law to challenge interpersonal discrimination could
yield court victories. These decisions had little impact, however, on the hundreds of Black
families forced to search for housing as a result of displacement. A CORE study found that the
Near East Side urban renewal project, along with the construction of I-81 and the Upstate
Medical Center, would result in the removal of 2,000 rental units from the market.348 This
exacerbated an already dire affordable housing shortage that disproportionately impacted Black
families. Unfortunately, besides presenting data to city officials and proposing potential
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solutions, CORE had a limited ability to solve the housing shortage. In 1964, the nimble CORE
chapter pivoted once again. The civil rights organization organized Black citizens who were not
displaced by urban renewal but whose lives were no less impacted by the destruction of the
Fifteenth Ward: Pioneer Homes tenants.

Citizens of Pioneer
As the clearance of the Near East Side renewal area proceeded, Pioneer Homes tenants,
formerly part of a residential neighborhood, found themselves living next to a construction site
destined to be redeveloped with a psychiatric hospital, an art museum, and a Public Safety
building. Additionally, the construction of Interstate 81 necessitated the demolition of forty-four
units of Pioneer Homes and hundreds of units of private housing.349 When finally completed in
1969, the elevated highway physically divided most of the project from the hospitals, the
university, and even a row of Pioneer Homes housing units on the hill to the east. These changes
disrupted the rhythm of daily life in the project and generated increased traffic, noise, and
pollution. Once again, however, urban renewal provided a concrete issue around which African
Americans could mobilize and contest their marginalization.
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Figure 16: Pioneer Homes viewed from beneath the elevated highway in 2022

The urban renewal demonstrations were undoubtedly still fresh on the minds of elected
officials and Pioneer Homes tenants when a controversy erupted over the relocation of the
Greyhound bus terminal in June 1964. The existing terminal, located at the intersection of
Montgomery and Harrison Streets, was slotted for demolition as part of the Near East Side urban
renewal project. Greyhound planned to build a new, multi-million-dollar depot in or near the
renewal area but needed a temporary location. The city and the company agreed on a site on East
Adams Street across from Pioneer Homes for the temporary terminal.350 This was a double blow
to residents of the housing project: The site had formerly been occupied by Loblaws, the
Fifteenth Ward’s only grocery store. Displaced by urban renewal, Loblaws moved to a new
location in the suburbs, creating what is now known as a food desert.351 Pioneer Homes stood
isolated near construction sites with no grocery store. The city’s plan to add bus traffic and

350

“Cleveland Meeting: Group to Protest Bus Terminal Site,” The Post-Standard, 15 July 1964.
Loblaws initially planned to close in June 1963 and kept the store open an additional year in response to
resident concerns. The store permanently closed in June 1964. It had the right of first refusal for a lease at the new
shopping center, but the company did not return to the area. Joseph V. Ganley, “Elderly Will Get Grocery: To
Reopen in Renewal Area,” Syracuse Herald-Journal, 13 June 1963, Pioneer Homes Folder, OHA; Maurice D. Lee,
“Supermarket in UR Area to Close: Building Eyed for Bus Line,” The Post-Standard, 3 June 1964.
351

134

pollution to the environment infuriated the residents. George Wiley urged CORE member Inez
Heard, who lived in the project, to mobilize tenants in opposition to the bus station.
Heard, a dynamic thirty-two-year-old mother of three, already had experience with civic
engagement. Born in Montgomery Alabama, she came to Syracuse with her parents and seven
siblings around 1950.352 She moved into Pioneer Homes with her children in the early 1960s.
Her commitment to her children motivated her to become civically engaged. Frustrated by the
lack of recreational opportunities for youth at Pioneer Homes, she obtained craft supplies from
the Dunbar Center and offered craft lessons to children who lived in the housing project.353 As
the vice president of a neighborhood group, she succeeded in persuading the city to assign a
traffic officer to a dangerous intersection.354 She appreciated CORE’s work fighting for quality
education for Black children and soon joined the chapter, gaining a reputation as “Mrs. CORE.”
CORE’s embrace of the bus station issue marked a new direction for the organization. It
was not a civil rights issue, per se, but it was a pressing concern for some CORE members and
the residents of the neighborhood in which CORE was operating. It was also an opportunity to
foster grassroots, and in particular female, leadership. As Heard recalled in an interview,
“George could have put together that protest against the bus terminal, but he thought it would be
more meaningful if we did it; after all, it was our children who were going to be run over by the
buses.”355 Heeding Wiley’s advice, Heard formed a tenants’ organization called Citizens of
Pioneer (COP).
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To launch COP, Heard drew on not only what she had learned in CORE but also on her
experiences as a Black mother living in a government subsidized apartment. As Historian
Rhonda Williams has demonstrated, public housing tenancy required women to navigate
government bureaucracy and to educate themselves about their rights, making it became a
training ground for political activism.356 Representing the new group, Heard canvassed Pioneer
Homes to mobilize parents and residents to oppose the bus station. With the help of Byron
Rushing, CORE’s only paid employee, COP circulated a petition opposing the Adams Street
location, gathered 479 signatures, and delivered the petition to Mayor Walsh. COP argued that
the proposed bus terminal would harm the quality of life in their neighborhood and that the
increased traffic would endanger the safety of children who crossed Adams Street to walk to
school and nearby parks.
Mayor Walsh did not take the tenants’ concerns seriously, and his response to the petition
revealed that he remained firm in his adherence to the discourse of progress.357 He justified his
selection of the Adams Street location in terms of the benefit to the city at large, asserting that
“[t]o object to this temporary solution, is to oppose our city's growth and progress.”358 He
paternalistically explained to COP that “[w]hat we are shooting for in Syracuse is to get new
business, industry and jobs for your city. One way is to have companies like Greyhound invest in
the city's future.”359 This framing of the issue left no room for dissent. Walsh had the authority to
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make decisions for the city without consulting the citizens who were immediately and directly
impacted. By promoting the narrative that urban renewal promised long-run benefits to all
Syracusans, Walsh was in effect attempting to make marginalized citizens complicit in their own
oppression. Much to Walsh’s consternation, COP rejected his logic.
The creation and naming of COP constituted a counter-hegemonic action that challenged
Walsh’s discourse of progress. The inclusion of “citizens” in the name of the tenants’
organization is significant. Inez Heard and the other founders could have referred to themselves
as “tenants” or “mothers.” Instead, they highlighted their citizenship status as the most relevant
aspect of their identities, subverting middle-class and elite stereotypes that framed public
housing tenants and welfare recipients as undeserving consumers of taxpayer dollars. COP
members understood themselves as citizens in a democratic system where the government had an
obligation to guarantee their safety and well-being. By opposing the bus terminal, they asserted
their citizenship and argued that the government should not implement a project that harmed
them. In contrast to the mayor’s universal language, COP’s petition and protests made visible to
the larger community the fact that urban renewal did not impact all citizens equally.
Walsh agreed to discuss the possibility of routing buses away from East Adams Street,
but he made no commitment to reconsidering the location itself. In response to the mayor’s
ambivalence, COP escalated its tactics by organizing a children’s march. Heard went door-todoor securing permission from parents and recruiting children to join the action. On the evening
of June 14th, 1964, several hundred children departed from Tyler Court and marched through the
area. Supervised by Inez Heard and two other women, the older children were “orderly” and held
the hands of toddlers who were also eager to join the protest.360 The women of COP must have
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felt immense pride as they marched. In a few short weeks, they had successfully formed an
organization through which they could pressure the city government to protect their children.
When public housing tenants such as Heard mobilized as a collective, they succeeded in
gaining the mayor’s attention. A few days after the children’s march, COP and CORE members
began picketing at the proposed bus terminal site. They knew that they had to continue their
direct-action protests, creating an embarrassing situation for Walsh, or else the mayor would
disregard their concerns. They picketed every evening for over two weeks. Because CORE
already had organizational name recognition in the city, its support was undoubtedly critical.
CORE’s position within a national network also facilitated the campaign. The Salt City chapter
coordinated with Cleveland CORE, the location of Greyhound’s regional headquarters, to picket
there as well.361 When picketing failed to provoke a resolution to the issue, a coalition of
delegates from numerous community organizations formed and traveled to meet with executives
in Cleveland.
COP activated the coalition that had supported the urban renewal demonstrations in fall
1963 in order to achieve success. The alliance that went to Cleveland included three women from
COP as well as representatives from CORE, the NAACP, the IUE, the Catholic Interracial
Council, the Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity, the reverend of the People’s AME
Zion Church, as well as the Fifteenth Ward supervisor.362 Together, the coalition pressured the
city government and Greyhound executives to consider the well-being of public housing
residents in their decision-making process. The strategy worked, and COP emerged victorious.
Following negotiations in Cleveland, and with the looming threat of a march to Chicago to
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protest at the national headquarters if the company did not cooperate, Greyhound committed to
finding an alternative site for the bus depot.363
Through the Citizens of Pioneer, a group of marginalized citizens challenged the status
quo in a city where business elites and a Republican political machine—albeit a crumbling one—
dominated decision making. By maintaining that the government had an obligation to guarantee
their safety and well-being, they subverted the logic of the mayor. The public housing mothers
rejected the mayor’s universal language and made visible to the larger community the fact that
urban renewal did not impact all citizens equally. Moreover, by thwarting the intentions of the
mayor and a large corporation, COP demonstrated to other tenants that organizing could be
effective. Although COP did not significantly transform power relations, for a brief time, the
voices of COP members resonated in the Salt City.”364
In fall 1964, CORE’s focus pivoted to a campaign against the Niagara Mohawk Power
Corporation, which discriminated against Black employees. CORE did not continue its
involvement with COP, perhaps due to the fact that Byron Rushing returned to Massachusetts.
The following year, however, a new Syracuse University initiative funded by the War on Poverty
leveraged the tenant organizing that CORE had fostered. The Community Action Training
Center, which instructed a cohort of university and non-enrolled students in the techniques of
community organizing, triggered strong resistance from city officials, leading to a conflict that
garnered the Salt City national attention as a contested site of social change.
The Training Center organizers did not focus exclusively on public housing projects, but
the projects were ideal starting places for trainees to gain experience. Organizers aimed to help
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the poor identify and solve their own problems. Community organizing assumed the inevitability
of conflict in the process of addressing these problems. In order to gain power, new
organizations had to identify issues that could mobilize a neighborhood, provoke a conflict, and
result in a tangible victory. COP had done just this with the Greyhound Bus Terminal issue.
Because public housing residents shared the same landlord—the Syracuse Housing Authority—
tenants and organizers quickly identified an array of problems that resulted from residency in the
poorly maintained public housing projects. These included the need for new appliances,
apartment repairs, a reduction in excessive rents, and a more transparent rental procedure.
The common struggles of public housing residents made an inter-project alliance a
logical step. Indeed, Pioneer Homes residents shared as many problems with residents in other
public housing units as they did with other residents of their neighborhood. COP worked with the
Training Center organizers, giving the trainees an organizational base from which to grow and
expand. By the spring of 1965, tenants’ organizations existed at the Pioneer Homes, Central
Village, James Geddes, and Salt City projects. This endeavor by low-income citizens was
interracial. At the time, these projects ranged from approximately 70% Black (Pioneer Homes) to
89% white (James Geddes).365 Together, tenants who had previously been excluded from the
decision-making processes that affected their lives now had the means to pressure the Housing
Authority to implement change.
The organization of tenants threatened the hegemony of Housing Authority officials.
Syracuse Housing Authority’s executive director, William McGarry, vehemently protested the
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presence of organizers in the public housing projects and charged the Training Center with
fomenting class warfare. He asserted that the Training Center “follows all the old patterns of
class distinction and hate, so easily identified with Marxism.”366 Whereas in 1956 McGarry had
sanctimoniously admonished Syracuse faith leaders to promote integration, when Black tenants
demanded that he respond to their concerns, he appealed to the federal government to shut down
a War on Poverty program.
Officials frequently attacked the Training Center organizers rather than the tenants
themselves. The Syracuse Housing Authority and other members of the dominant class in
Syracuse made the paternalistic assumption that public housing residents’ marginalized status
rendered them incapable of solving their own problems.367 Any attempt at collective action
consequently implied the manipulation of tenants by community organizers. As a result, the
Training Center received a barrage of criticism from the press and city leaders, who sought ways
to thwart the Training Center’s capacity to operate.
As the conflict between the Housing Authority, the Training Center, and the tenants’
groups escalated, city officials called on the federal government to intervene. In April 1965—a
month after Alabama state troopers unleashed violence on voting rights protesters in Selma, and
days after CORE protesters chained themselves beneath cars in downtown Syracuse to protest
employment discrimination—the Housing Authority commissioner wrote a letter to President
Johnson complaining about Training Center efforts to organize Syracuse’s public housing
projects. The commissioner held tenants themselves responsible for the substandard conditions in
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the project, writing that “conditions in the Pioneer Homes are as good as the tenants will permit
them to be.”368 This derogatory comment aligns with a strain of twentieth-century poverty
thought that viewed low-income citizens as morally and socially deficient.369 The commissioner
was unwilling to recognize that by organizing tenants were in fact attempting improve conditions
that had been imposed on them by the government. In response, a federal War on Poverty official
visited Syracuse and made a confidential report to the director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, the agency responsible for administering War on Poverty programs.370
The public housing controversy highlights the multiple scales of government activated by
the War on Poverty. Angered at the Housing Authority’s accusations, the public housing tenants
wrote their own letter to the president. They demanded that Johnson investigate the Housing
Authority “which administers federal funds and is not answering the needs of the tenants in
doing so.” 371 Public housing residents framed their demands in the context of citizenship. They
highlighted the responsibility of public housing officials to ensure a decent standard of living for
the citizens who lived in their projects. Because both the Training Center and the Housing
Authority received federal funding, housing officials and tenants alike appealed to the president
to arbitrate what was essentially a local conflict. For the tenants, the connection to the federal
War on Poverty gave them leverage in a conflict where they otherwise would have been at a
disadvantage. For housing officials who were accustomed to administering the housing projects
in an autocratic fashion, the fact that they felt compelled to appeal to the president revealed the
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threat that the Training Center and organized tenants posed to configurations of power in the
city.
The appeals did not result in any immediate action on the part of the federal government.
Throughout the late spring and early summer, tenants’ groups separately formulated proposals
regarding ways to improve the housing projects and presented them to Director McGarry. They
achieved positive results. After a sit-in outside McGarry’s office, residents of Pioneer Homes
acquired six hundred new refrigerators to replace their twenty-five-year-old ice boxes.372 After a
group of male residents at the Salt City Homes formed an ad hoc security patrol, the Housing
Authority agreed to hire a security officer to protect the project at night.373 Although the tenants
squeezed some concessions out of the beleaguered director, the Housing Authority refused to
acknowledge the validity of the residents’ organizations.
Although project-based requests to the Housing Authority yielded some results, the
residents decided to escalate the conflict by forming a cross-project coalition, the Joint Action
Committee of Public Housing Tenants. At least three tenants’ organizations—representing
Pioneer Homes, James Geddes Homes, and Central Village—joined the committee. The three
groups compiled and published “The Tenants’ Report: Public Housing, Syracuse ‘Style’” in July
1965. The report served as a scathing condemnation of conditions in the Salt City’s public
housing projects. Residents compared the projects to prison or concentration camps. One
observed that Housing Authority employees “don’t treat you with any kind of respect like any
kind of human being deserves.”374 An unidentified tenants’ group explained that they organized
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“so that we might have a voice in decisions which effect us [sic] and our community life, as
citizens, regardless of our economic status, or of our tenancy in Public Housing.”375 The
residents effectively situated their demands within the framework of citizenship and human
rights. They also included a list of specific recommendations for improving both conditions in
the housing projects and relations between the tenants and the Housing Authority. These were
reasonable, if potentially costly, changes. Among them were more equitable rent levels that
would permit families to save money and transition out of public housing; regular property
maintenance and landscaping; a decentralized management structure; tenant input on interior
paint colors; and the inclusion of a resident from each project on the Housing Authority board.376
The language of rights and citizenship succeeded in prompting the MCHR to step in and
mediate the tenants’ conflict with the Housing Authority. Rather than encouraging immediate
action based on the tenants’ report, the commission instead launched a four-month investigation
of Syracuse’s public housing projects. During this time, the Training Center lost its War on
Poverty funding due to the backlash surrounding the organization’s activities in the Salt City.
The substance of the organizers’ work received validation when the MCHR released its findings
in January 1966. Remarkably, the commission supported the tenants’ conclusions and adopted
some of their recommendations.377 Yet the report failed to credit the Joint Committee of Public
Housing Tenants for originally identifying the shortcomings of the Housing Authority. The
tenants had been erased from the narrative as agents of change. Moreover, conspicuously absent
from the recommendations was the tenants’ request that a resident from each housing project
serve on the board of the Housing Authority. The middle-class, well-educated members of the

375

“The Tenants ‘Report,’” Join Action Committee of Public Housing Tenants, 5.
“The Tenants ‘Report,’” Joint Committee of Public Housing Tenants, 1-15.
377
A. Brohmann Roth, “Housing Authority Lax,” Syracuse Herald-Journal, 19 January 1966.
376

144

MCHR were apparently unprepared to acknowledge tenants’ potential to administer a public
housing program or to cede any power to them. Like so many reports, city officials and the press
read and discussed the MCHR’s findings, filed the document away, and the Housing Authority
continued with business as usual. That the tenants did not achieve all their goals does not detract
from the fact that their actions, recognized or not, had impelled a city commission to criticize the
powerful Housing Authority.

Conclusion
Urban renewal and highway construction constituted massive federal interventions that
transformed the Salt City’s physical, social, and political geography in the mid-twentieth
century. The displacement of hundreds of Black families for these projects highlighted the twin
crises of housing discrimination and affordable housing. Syracuse CORE launched a large directaction campaign to shake the Salt City out of its complacency and to force community leaders to
acknowledge the racial system of the Deep North. CORE activists and public housing tenants
challenged the discourse of progress with a discourse of citizenship, arguing that the city
government and private corporations had obligations to those impacted by the demolition of the
Fifteenth Ward.
Racial segregation, however, remained an intractable problem, and CORE’s prediction
came true: rather than eliminating racial segregation, urban renewal, highway construction—in
concert with ongoing white flight and deindustrialization—led to hypersegregation in an
expanded swath of the city. Nonetheless, the small CORE chapter persisted in its multipronged
assault on racial discrimination in Syracuse. The arrest and imprisonment of activists during the
urban renewal demonstrations had highlighted another issue that impacted African Americans in
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the Salt City: racialized policing. As Chapter Three demonstrates, the issue brought Syracuse to
the brink of a violent uprising.
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Chapter Three
Law Enforcement and Resistance

In June 1965, a group of ten men assembled on a warm summer’s evening. Wearing
helmets and brandishing night sticks, they set out to patrol the Salt City Homes public housing
project on the East Side of Syracuse. Crime had recently increased at the housing project, and the
Housing Authority and City Hall had ignored the tenants’ pleas for additional security guards on
the premises. The security patrol, an interracial group of low-income tenants, proclaimed they
would “continue policing our own area” until the government fulfilled its responsibility to
protect its citizens.378
This chapter builds on a body of scholarship that has placed added emphasis on the
importance of local contexts in understanding the evolution of policing and the carceral state in
the twentieth century.379 It does so by exploring the range of responses Syracusans considered or
pursued to address the intractable problem of racialized policing in the 1960s. This chapter
focuses on CORE’s initiatives, which constituted the most cohesive and organized activity
378
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during this time period. The strategies employed in Syracuse ranged from legal challenges to
tenant security patrols. Informed by their local context, Syracuse activists proposed alternative
visions of policing and community safety that sought to reframe the relationship between Black
Syracusans and the state. Meanwhile, those who viewed racialized policing and racial inequality
as intractable debated the use of violence to achieve change.380 Recovering the visions of
activists in the Salt City demonstrates that, when federal law enforcement and criminal justice
took a punitive turn in response to the urban uprisings of the 1960s and early 1970s,
policymakers ignored a robust set of alternatives that were proposed at the grassroots level.
Over the past decade, scholars have revealed how both liberal and conservative officials
drew on a discourse of law and order to expand the role and impact of the federal government on
law enforcement.381 In a valuable recent addition to the historiography, Elizabeth Hinton argues
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that the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968 was a rupture in
which the federal government responded to urban rebellions through an expansion of policing
rather than pursuing structural change. I agree with Hinton that this response “was not a foregone
conclusion.”382 Hinton also argues that “[i]n the immediate post-civil rights period, many Black
leaders used both the threat and reality of collective violence to make demands for structural
change, and to advocate for community control of resources in Black communities.”383 In rich
detail, Hinton uncovers stories from the hundreds of rebellions that took place throughout
primarily the North and West between 1969 and 1972, acts of collective political violence that
have both faded from public memory and received insufficient attention from scholars.
Although there was an undeniable increase in frequency in collective violence during the
late 1960s and early 1970s, I argue that these later rebellions are best understood within the
context of the long civil rights movement rather than as a post-civil rights era phenomenon. In
the Salt City, nuanced debates over policing and the role of violence in effecting structural
change were already taking place in 1964, a year prior to the federal initiation of the War on
Crime. This chapter highlights the racially biased treatment Black Syracusans received from
police, the civil rights response, and the resistance of the press and public officials to any
encroachment on police authority. It sheds light on the challenges confronting the Northern civil
rights movement even as the classic phase of the movement reached its zenith. Ultimately,
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although activists struggled to gain traction, they challenged the prerogative of the police to
surveil but not protect Black Syracusans, a contest that is ongoing in the twenty-first century.384
African Americans & The Salt City Police
In the early 1960s, activists across the country grappled with a firmly entrenched
discourse of Black criminality in order to highlight police brutality. Khalil Gibran Muhammad
has demonstrated how social scientists and Progressive Era reformers linked race and crime in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.385 Social scientists continued to pathologize
Black crime into the mid-twentieth century. The discourse of criminality had a devastating
impact on Black communities. Encounters with law enforcement, which could lead to
incarceration or even death at the hands of police, were a quotidian ordeal for Black Syracusans
and an omnipresent threat to community life.
Police surveillance of Black Syracusans enforced existing racial hierarchies in a city with
rapidly shifting racial demographics. The city’s Black population had more than doubled
between 1950 and 1960, but African Americans still only made up 5.2% of the overall
population.386 Due to housing discrimination, the majority of Black Syracusans lived in the
Fifteenth Ward—where, not coincidentally, police had also long enabled a vice district to
flourish in return for bribes and gifts.387 A constitutive feature of the racial system in the Deep
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North, law enforcement was spatialized as well as racialized. Police surveilled predominantly
Black neighborhoods and protected white neighborhoods. A Syracuse police chief was candid
about the racialized tactics of his department, telling an audience in 1963 that “policemen often
perpetuated crime and ‘racial injustice’ by employing in Negro neighborhoods standards
different from those used in white areas. ‘Fine, law-abiding Negro citizens,’ he said, ‘are entitled
to the same caliber of police protection afforded other citizens.’”388 In practice, policing was a
central means of containing and disciplining a Black population that white officials often viewed
as outsiders.389
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Black community and its allies quietly observed and
resisted the police treatment of Black Syracusans but did not mount a public campaign for
change. Father Charles Brady, a white priest who worked to expose the poor housing conditions
in the Fifteenth Ward, was a frequent presence at the Willow Street Jail, where he assisted Black
citizens who were arrested on spurious grounds. A Black man described an incident that
occurred in 1957 when he was cruising around town in a new Chevy. The man experienced
police harassment after he made a stop to flirt with women and get a snack. The implication was
that the police targeted the Black man for owning a new vehicle, and the fact that they harassed
him while he was flirting with women added to his humiliation. Police arrested him for
intoxication and disorderly conduct, and Father Brady visited him in jail. The man was released
after paying a modest $25 fine, but not all police encounters ended so well.390 In 1961, the
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NAACP issued a statement after an incident in which a police officer shot an African American
teenager who was fleeing through a dark alley. The teen survived the encounter. The NAACP
asserted that the lack of “discretion displayed by the detective is fairly indicative of the whole
department.”391
The abuse of young people was of particular concern to Black Syracusans, and it took on
a new sense of urgency in the early 1960s as the Black youth population continued to grow. The
median age for Black Syracusans was significantly lower than the statewide median: In 1960, the
median age for Black men in New York State was 26.9 years, compared to Syracuse, where the
median was 22.8 years. This was a full five years less than the local median age for native-born
whites. Black women in Syracuse had a median age of 21.5, more than ten years less than white
women. This meant that police surveilled a juvenile population that was disproportionately
Black, setting the stage for community-police tension even aside from racially discriminatory
policing practices.392
In 1962, an increase in street crime and juvenile delinquency caused a crisis of legitimacy
for the Syracuse Police Department. The local newspapers called attention to—and likely
fueled—public concern about a “crime wave” in the Salt City. In late November, the PostStandard published an article titled “Police to Act on Muggings,” which explained that “officers
were ordered to step up their check of suspicious characters or activities.”393 That same day, a
purse-snatch robbery ended in murder when Irma Snyder, a sixty-five-year-old white woman,
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was pushed to the ground, hit her head on the sidewalk, and died soon after. Snyder’s assailant
fled down an alley and disappeared.
Under pressure to respond to Snyder’s tragic death, police swiftly implemented a “gettough” policy and searched for her killer—responses that led to the further abrogation of Black
citizens’ rights. The police chief vowed that “[t]here will be no more kid-glove handling of
smart-aleck juveniles,” and he bristled at the criticisms of his department.394 The chief and his
officers felt that the youthful offenders they arrested were treated too leniently or released on
technicalities by the courts. Additionally, the 345-member police force was in need of over thirty
more officers. An officer explained that “the police force has not increased in proportion to the
rise in population” in the county.395 In an editorial, The Post-Standard was not satisfied with the
police department’s excuses. The newspaper demanded that the mayor initiate “a crusade for
public safety” and ominously asserted that “[w]hat we need now is tighter discipline in a strict
military-type organization.”396 The term crusade—which Mayor Walsh would later apply to a
local War on Poverty program—connoted a call for heroism in the context of a holy war. Under
this intense scrutiny, the police department searched for a suspect in Snyder’s murder,
questioning “youths with records” of snatching purses.
While police struggled to solve the Irma Snyder case, a State Crime Commission hearing
threatened to expose deeply ingrained corruption among the ranks of the Syracuse police.
Corruption within both the local police department and the Republican Party had been under
inquiry since, in May 1960, state police busted a numbers racket (an illegal lottery) in the
394
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Fifteenth Ward.397 Percy and Alice Harris, a Black couple, had operated the racket with impunity
for nearly three decades. In addition to his lucrative illicit activities, Percy Harris, who divided
his time between Syracuse and Harlem, loomed large in the life of the Fifteenth Ward. Harris
supported the Dunbar Center and other Black social and civic causes, and he also donated to the
Republican Party, purchased Black votes for Republican candidates, and controlled African
Americans’ access to municipal jobs.398 The December 1961 hearings, at which both Percy and
Alice Harris testified in exchange for immunity, revealed the extent of the role of the police in
enabling vice in the Salt City.399 As the Post-Standard summarized, “some officers received payoffs, protection money and favors, in return for which they allowed prostitution, gambling and
narcotics-pushing to flourish.”400 Racialized policing meant selectively allowing some forms of
crime in the majority-Black Fifteenth Ward while cracking down on street crime that disrupted
white citizens’ lives in the city.
As the State Crime Commission prepared for its hearing in Syracuse, police arrested
fifteen-year-old Ralph Dennis, a Black youth who lived in the Fifteenth Ward, in connection
with the death of Irma Snyder. They intended to charge Dennis with first degree murder. After
holding him for three days and without allowing him to contact his parents or any other adult,
police elicited a confession from the frightened teenager. While local newspapers convicted him
in the press, Dennis’s family was desperate to establish the teenager’s innocence and to highlight
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the treatment he had received at the hands of police. They turned to CORE for assistance, and the
civil rights organization took on the young man’s defense.
George Wiley quickly mobilized CORE’s resources, such as they were, to assist with the
Dennis case. By December 1962, CORE had successfully compelled the Syracuse school district
to investigate segregation, but the small university-based organization had no office and no paid
staff. CORE members did, however, have important social connections through their university
networks. Aware of CORE’s need for skilled legal counsel in the Dennis case, an SU law student
recommended local attorney Faith Seidenberg. George Wiley invited Seidenberg to a meeting at
the Wiley house to discuss the case.401 At the time, Seidenberg, a determined woman with curly
brown hair, was a veteran public defender with experience representing civil rights activists in
the South. She had graduated from the Syracuse University School of Law in 1954, one of only
two women in her class.402 By the end of the evening, Seidenberg agreed to take the case. The
momentous meeting marked the beginning of an intimate friendship and professional
collaboration between Wiley and Seidenberg that helped fuel social change across the country.403
To tackle the Dennis case, CORE members educated themselves on criminal law, and
Seidenberg swiftly developed a strategy to expose the Syracuse Police Department’s racist and
unconstitutional practices.
Seidenberg and Wiley met with Ralph Dennis’s mother in her home, and the police
department’s disregard for the rights of Black youth became starkly apparent. In a gentle but
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clear voice, Dennis’s mother described her son’s arrest. She was at work when police took
Dennis into custody for probation violation. Dennis, who was home sick from school, had been
supervising his sister’s two small children at the time that the law enforcement officials showed
up. The police left the children with a neighbor whom the Dennis family did not know and took
Dennis to the Hillbrook Detention Center. His mother was unable to make contact with him for
seven days, and she did not know why her son was being held. Desperate for information, Mrs.
Dennis frantically contacted her son’s probation officer, the District Attorney’s office, and the
police at the Willow Street Jail. Three days after he was taken into custody—and before his
parents got to speak with him—Ralph confessed to the crime.404
The Dennis family endured extreme stress throughout the ordeal. On Friday, November
30th—the day that Ralph confessed—police broke into the Dennis house when no one was home.
Mr. Dennis, who was separated from his wife but lived in the area, arrived to witness the police
tearing up the house to collect evidence. The police did not show him a warrant. The distressed
parents received no information from officials about their son, instead following the local media
for updates about the case. Mrs. Dennis also began to receive threatening phone calls at home,
ten to twelve calls a day for three days, which she reported to the police. On Monday, December
3rd, George Wiley accompanied Mrs. Dennis to Hillbrook, and she was finally able to see her
son.405
To counter the biased media coverage of Dennis’s arrest, in early December Faith
Seidenberg held a press conference—an unprecedented move for a Syracuse lawyer.406 During
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the conference she revealed additional information about the violation of Dennis’s rights. She
asserted that a police officer punched Dennis in the face during his arrest. Police did not have
any physical evidence that linked Dennis to the crime, and he had an alibi that placed him
elsewhere at the time of the robbery. After being arrested on a Tuesday afternoon, police refused
to let him call his parents and interrogated Dennis for long hours in order to elicit a confession.
According to Seidenberg, Dennis confessed after the police told him that “his mother and sister
would suffer” if he did not.407
The newspaper coverage on the day of the press conference illustrates the uphill
challenge CORE faced not only in securing justice for Dennis, but also in shifting the discourse
from Black criminality to anti-Black policing. The headline for Section III of The Post-Standard
read “Young Hoodlums Breathe Air of Defiance.” In the sensationalistic article, journalist Peter
Gaffney made sweeping generalizations against “the teenage criminal.” The article asserted that
Dennis belonged to a gang and smeared the teenagers who went to the police station to help
establish an alibi for Dennis, referring to one young man as “a swarthy little hood” and “a
greasy-haired punk.”408 The second page of the article invoked infamous FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover referring to youthful offenders as “beastly punks.”409 This dehumanizing language had
racial connotations. It also aligned with the fear-driven rhetoric about juvenile delinquency that
had arisen in the 1950s and even led the Kennedy administration to establish a commission on
the subject.410 For the journalist and Hoover, young people who committed crimes were morally
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depraved and seemingly beyond the possibility of rehabilitation or redemption. Gaffney
concluded that youth crime “is a frightening phenomenon that policemen believe must be met
with severe methods of law enforcement.” This statement appeared without irony alongside
Police Chief Harold Kelly’s letter of resignation due to the corruption in the department.411
As the Dennis case proceeded, CORE was in communication with other civil rights and
church groups that had a shared concern about the racialized crime coverage and related policy
proposals. The Dennis case provided an opportunity for cooperation among these disparate
groups. In March 1963, George Wiley co-signed a letter to The Post-Standard alongside nine
other Black community leaders, including the NAACP president; several ministers; and one
woman, Adele McRae of the Syracuse Progressive Beauticians’ Unit. The group explained that
Black Syracusans “are as often victims of crime as are whites, and they have the same need and
desire for a strong and effective police force.” They noted that the press fomented fear and anger
about juvenile delinquency while responding to police corruption with “restraint.”
The civil rights coalition also identified its own agenda and solutions. “Rather than a ‘get
tough’ policy,” the letter asserted, “we support such solutions as a more competent and
adequately paid police force[,] increased street lighting in areas where the crimes of violence
occur, more and better youth services. We further recommend a more vigorous effort to
eliminate all discriminatory practices from the community.”412 The ten signatures belonged to
respected leaders who, with the exception of Wiley, were not at that point agitating for change in
the streets. This elicited a conciliatory response from The Post-Standard, which asserted that “we
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stand with them in defense of civil rights for all, and we thank them for their appeal.”413 Had
CORE submitted a letter under its own auspices, the newspaper likely would have responded
differently.
The letter to the Post-Standard was the most cohesive Black political response to
community concerns about policing to that point. It was part of a long tradition of Northern
resistance to police practices, which gained momentum after World War II, particularly in New
York City.414 Although the writers contested the police department’s “get tough” policy, which
threatened Black civil rights and reinforced notions of Black criminality, they were not anti-law
enforcement. The writers endorsed the role of the police to ensure public safety, and they also
argued that African Americans were entitled to protection. Their solutions were pragmatic and
holistic. Because the police could not solve social problems, the authors called for expanded
youth services and broad efforts to address the range of discrimination that existed in the Salt
City. The civic leaders did not directly connect police corruption to the treatment of Black
communities, although presumably higher pay for police officers would mitigate against the
impulse to accept bribes and gifts. A system that overpoliced and underprotected Black
communities would not be easy to reform, but the letter to the Post-Standard was a tentative step
forward.
Seidenberg indefatigably worked on the Dennis case over the course of the next year and
finally achieved justice for her client. She had to get two convictions overturned. First, Dennis
was convicted of probation violation and sentenced to up to three years in juvenile detention.
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This decision was overturned in May 1963.415 Second, Dennis was convicted of juvenile
delinquency in connection with the theft of the purse and the death of Irma Snyder. The appellate
court of the New York Supreme Court in Rochester overturned this conviction in December
1963. The court ruled that Dennis’s constitutional rights had been violated and that “no
explanation can justify an unreasonable detention for the period involved here.” The decision
also determined that “the use of the confession as obtained was improper” and that the Family
Court had failed to hold a disposition, or fact-finding, hearing.416 Dennis spent a year of his
youth in detention before his convictions were overturned. Neither the newspapers nor the CORE
records reveal what became of Dennis or his family after the case was resolved.
Although a significant victory, CORE did not publicize its involvement with the Dennis
case. George Wiley described the initiation of a defense fund for Dennis during a television
interview, but CORE held no public meetings or demonstrations in conjunction with the trials
and appeals.417 Furthermore, the December 1963 issue of the CORE newsletter describes Faith
Seidenberg’s victory but not CORE’s role in initiating the teen’s defense. An article titled “The
Dennis Case: A Christmas Story” asserts that Dennis had been “the community’s scapegoat” in
response to “hysterical” reporting by the local media.418 The silence about CORE’s involvement
in securing justice for Dennis may have been by design. The small cadre of activists was
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juggling initiatives related to education, housing, and employment. They did not have the
bandwidth to launch a direct-action campaign related to the Dennis case and policing. Perhaps
Seidenberg was confident in her legal strategy. Perhaps CORE leaders felt that a more visible
involvement could harm the case.
Although the Dennis case did not build CORE’s visibility within the broader community,
it did transform the organization’s credibility among Black Syracusans. Whether or not it was
reported in the newspapers, residents of the Fifteenth Ward were aware of CORE’s swift action
in identifying an attorney and visiting Mrs. Dennis to record her story. African Americans knew
all too well that Dennis’s situation was representative of the treatment Black citizens faced in the
city. As CORE member Anna Mae Williams explained, “[u]ntil George Wiley started doing
something about it, this happened every day to our kids. We never knew when they would be
grabbed out of school or home or off the street.”419 Wretha Wiley also felt that the case altered
the organization’s relationship with Black Syracusans. The Dennis case “really struck people in a
different way than anti-discrimination campaigns” because “that was something everyone related
to in a basic fundamental way.”420 The success in the Dennis case did not, however, result in a
decrease in racialized policing. On the contrary, law enforcement officials continued to
perpetrate violence against Black citizens and disregard their civil rights.

CORE and the Salt City Police
In addition to the regularized violence and abuse that the Syracuse Police Department
committed against the Black community, the police functioned as an engine to disrupt civil rights
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organizing in the city. The police had the authority to arrest demonstrators, and activists risked
abuse while being taken into custody, during transportation, and while in jail. In addition to
monitoring protest actions, however, law enforcement officials also surveilled and harassed
activists off the picket line. Over the course of 1963, as CORE protested employment
discrimination and housing segregation, CORE members’ increased contact with the police
shaped their responses to the issue of racialized policing.
During the urban renewal protests in September 1963, police arrested ninety-eight
protestors, many of whom were university students or professors, and took them to the Willow
Street Jail, where the demonstrators experienced appalling conditions. This treatment prompted
CORE to take a more active and visible role on the issues of law enforcement and criminal
justice in the Salt City. George Wiley had been tackled by police while trespassing on a
construction lot, resulting in a sprained arm. He was arrested and spent the night in police
custody. The jail detention deeply affected him. Wretha Wiley later recalled the emotional rally
where her husband spoke after being released: “It is a combination home-coming, coronation, an
extremely emotional moment. George is in terrible shape. It was cold and damp in the jail. He
wasn't given any blankets. He had caught a cold. He was exhausted and he was very wrought up
by what he had been through in the jail. That jail experience was such a psychological shock.”
For the first time, George Wiley connected in a personal way to the experiences of African
Americans in the Fifteenth Ward.421
In early 1964, CORE filed a seven-point complaint about conditions in the Willow Street
Jail with the Mayor’s Commission on Human Rights (MCHR). Among the thirty-one signatories,
all of whom had been arrested in September 1963, were CORE members Rudy Lombard, Byron
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Rushing, Bruce Thomas, and George Wiley, as well as three SU professors. Because the jail
lacked adequate bedding, food, reading materials, and recreational facilities, CORE asserted that
it was unsuitable for an extended period of detainment. CORE concluded that “prisoners at
Willow Street Jail are being punished before they are even found guilty by a court of law.”422
CORE demanded that the MCHR “organize a citizens’ committee that would investigate the
conditions at Willow Street Jail, review the plans for the new city jail, investigate to what degree
the rights of those persons who are arrested are respected, [and] issue a public report of
findings.”423 The mayor and the MCHR were unresponsive, and CORE continued to raise the
issue over the next several months.
CORE members believed that the police strategically targeted activists for surveillance
and intimidation. Attorney Faith Seidenberg recalled being stopped by police at gunpoint during
a demonstration, where she was present in her capacity as CORE’s attorney, not as a protestor.
“They kept me in a police car for an hour. I was frightened but also very angry. They took my
license away from me which was illegal. I went to the Police Chief and he handed my license to
me and he told me it would never happen again. They saw me as the enemy.”424 CORE members
and picketers risked harassment outside of demonstrations as well. Byron Rushing described
CORE’s concern with police treatment of activists, explaining that “they would have arrested
everybody associated with CORE that had a record to discredit us.”425 The archival sources
consulted for this dissertation do not definitively establish that the police carried out a strategic
campaign of deterrence against CORE. The perception that the police department sought to
422
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intimidate CORE and diffuse its influence certainly, however, eroded what little trust the
members may have had in the police. CORE nonetheless continued to document and expose
police misconduct.
In early 1964, CORE supporter Charles Presley, a twenty-three-year-old African
American man, experienced police brutality. Presley had previously been arrested during
CORE’s urban renewal demonstrations in September 1963. At that time, he had climbed onto the
roof of a house scheduled for demolition and the police chased and restrained him. Onlookers,
enraged by the rough treatment of Presley, had threatened the police with wooden sticks.426 He
had been charged with trespassing and resisting arrest, and those charges were still pending
when, in late November 1963, he was arrested and charged with robbery and grand larceny.
Police held Presley in the Willow Street Jail, which was intended as an overnight lockup,
for three weeks, and he was denied legal counsel for fifty-six days. In mid-January 1964, after
finally meeting his court-appointed defense attorney and appearing before a judge, Presley
destroyed his jail cell in a fit of rage. He alleged that five officers restrained him, bound him by
his arms and feet, and beat him. Presley received a broken nose, a black eye, and minor cuts
during the struggle. Despite these undisputed injuries, the police department maintained that
officers had used appropriate force in subduing him. Over fifty years later, Byron Rushing
recalled the incident: “When we look back on it, he [Presley] clearly got arrested because this
was a good strategy for them [the police]. I don’t know exactly what happened, but he gets in jail
and they beat the shit out of him.”427 CORE demanded an investigation.428
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Public discourse framed Presley as someone unworthy of the protections guaranteed a
full citizen. For example, the newspaper described Presley’s destruction of his cell as a
“tantrum,” an infantilizing word generally applied to toddlers. Alternatively, Presley’s outburst
might have been an understandable response to a system that he recognized was not designed to
work for him. At a program called “Equal Rights before the Law,” held at Syracuse University in
April, the District Attorney declared that he could not understand “why a group such as CORE
should champion a man with his [Presley’s] background.” The audience booed his callous
comment. The District Attorney, who was responsible for fairly applying the law, apparently
deemed men with criminal records unworthy of justice.429
Despite the District Attorney’s criticism, civil rights groups felt that they should have the
ability to raise concerns about the treatment of individuals in police custody. As the president of
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom wrote in a letter to the editor, “[t]he
just treatment of accused persons is a hallmark of a free society. We cannot afford to brush this
matter aside.”430 In order to hold the system accountable, they wanted transparency and a fair
investigation. CORE and its allies succeeded in compelling local leaders to conduct multiple
investigations into the Presley case. Four groups reviewed the incident: the police department,
the District Attorney’s office, the Civil Rights Committee of the Onondaga County Bar
Association (created specifically for the investigation), and the MCHR.
In the midst of the Presley case, Syracuse CORE hosted an Upstate CORE Conference,
which brought representatives of the Buffalo, Niagara Falls, Rochester, Utica, and Binghamton
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chapters to the Salt City from February 28th to March 1st.431 Civil rights leader Bayard Rustin,
fresh from coordinating 450,000 participants in the New York City school boycott a few weeks
earlier, was a conference speaker.432 On the second day of the conference, Syracuse CORE
seized the opportunity to hold a demonstration about local issues. Around 150 demonstrators
gathered at the AME Zion Church and marched to City Hall. They streamed singing down
Fayette Street, led by Rustin and escorted by police officers on motorcycles.433 At City Hall,
Bruce Thomas and Faith Seidenberg presented a letter to Deputy Chief John Holihan, and
protesters tacked signs on the doors. The crowd demanded the release of the Presley
investigations and the creation of a Citizens’ Committee to investigate jail conditions.434
The conclusions of the investigations were not released until April. As has been
demonstrated in previous chapters, creating commissions and committees to investigate a
problem are hallmark responses to racial injustice in the Deep North. Three of the four groups
that reviewed the Presley case reported that police had acted appropriately in restraining Presley
in his jail cell. The MCHR determined that the police were justified in restraining Presley but
conceded that officers used “unreasonable force” in doing so.435 Regarding the issue of whether
his rights were abridged due to the delay in assigning Presley a lawyer, the District Attorney’s
office concluded that they were not, but the Bar Association differed. It pointed to “human error”
and confusion as the cause of the delay—not unequal treatment on the basis of race. Civic
leaders had expressed concern for a Black citizen and concluded that no discrimination or
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wrongdoing had in fact occurred. This preserved the appearance that the justice system was, in
fact, just while maintaining the status quo. Presley was convicted and sentenced from ten to
twenty years in the notorious Attica state prison.436 CORE had never disputed his guilt.
A third case study illustrates how the police, the legal system, and city officials
collectively acted to hinder CORE’s challenges to police authority. On Saturday, February 29th,
less than twelve hours after CORE’s demonstration at the Willow Street Jail, Joseph Brooks, a
Black Marine Corps Private who was home on leave, claimed he was beaten by a police officer
after departing a bar. Not in uniform at the time, Brooks asserted that the officer pulled him into
the patrol car, assaulted him, and hurled racial epithets at him. The implication was that Brooks
had been targeted because he was a Black man, alone on the street and possibly inebriated. His
service to his country did not shield him from police abuse—in fact, African Americans had long
connected military service to demands for full citizenship, and there was an equally long history
of white retaliation against Black veterans who threatened to destabilize the white supremacist
order.437 After the attack, the officer left Brooks on the sidewalk and drove off. Officers in
another patrol car discovered him a short time later and arrested him for public intoxication.
Brooks received medical treatment for a concussion and a broken nose before police took him to
jail.438
Brooks’s family immediately reached out to CORE for assistance and retained
Seidenberg as their attorney. CORE activated its experience with the Dennis and Presley cases to
identify the irregularities in the treatment of the young Marine. On the afternoon of March 1,
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George Wiley, Bruce Thomas, and Faith Seidenberg—an efficient trio—met with Brooks’s
family to gather facts. A CORE report on the case noted that they were “a very stable and
cohesive family with deep religious convictions.”439 Unlike Dennis and Presley, Brooks had no
criminal history and an exemplary record in the service. CORE did not predicate its assistance on
adherence to respectability politics, but the CORE team surely recognized that the upstanding
nature of Brooks and his family could help mitigate against character assassination by the press
and the District Attorney’s office. On the morning of March 2nd, Brooks pleaded not-guilty at his
arraignment, and Seidenberg demanded an investigation of her client’s police brutality claim. In
an unusual move, an Assistant District Attorney required Brooks to make a statement under oath.
From the arraignment, Seidenberg went directly to the Police Chief Patrick V. Murphy’s office
to schedule a meeting. When the secretary refused to make an appointment, Seidenberg
announced that she would return at 2:00 pm that afternoon.
Chief Murphy had taken the helm of the department in January 1963 after his predecessor
resigned as a result of the corruption revelations. Mayor Walsh selected Murphy, a veteran of the
New York City police force, because he had a reputation for integrity. When Murphy came to the
Salt City, he brought William Smith with him as his deputy.440 Chief Murphy was dedicated to
reining in the corruption that had embarrassed the city over the past few years. He and others
within the department, however, were resistant to reckoning with CORE’s charges of police
brutality.
Apparently anticipating the police department’s intransigence, Seidenberg returned to
Murphy’s office in the afternoon on March 2nd with about twenty allies from CORE, the
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NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Citizens Community
Organization.441 The group gathered in Chief Murphy’s waiting room. After ignoring the crowd
for several hours, he finally agreed to speak with them at 5:00 pm. CORE demanded that the
police hold a line-up of officers so that Brooks could identify the officer who attacked him.442
Police did schedule the line-up but miscommunicated the time to Seidenberg. When the attorney
and client showed up twenty minutes late to the line-up, Murphy had already sent the officers
back to work. He refused to reschedule the line-up.
As quickly as CORE mobilized a defense for Brooks, Syracuse officials launched a
multifaceted effort to punish Brooks and thwart CORE’s ability to press claims of police
brutality. Mayor Walsh signed an ordinance prohibiting “loitering in a public building” that was
almost immediately used to arrest CORE members attempting to meet with Chief Murphy.
Walsh also encouraged the Police Benevolent Association to consider suing CORE for libel and
slander.443 Meanwhile, police officers harassed Brooks and his family at their home throughout
the week. The day before his trial, Brooks was presented with new charges: four counts of
perjury in connection with the statement he had given at his arraignment. The following day,
Brooks was convicted of public intoxication, fined $10, and received a suspended one-month
prison sentence.444 CORE decided not to appeal this case in the hopes that the city would stop
harassing Brooks and his family.445 Angered by the claims of police brutality, the District
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Attorney pursued the perjury charges. The case dragged on into the fall, with Brooks facing up to
twenty years in prison.
As Syracuse CORE set the agenda and drove the action in Brooks’s defense, they drew
on the city’s infrastructure of faith and civic leaders for support. Faith leaders played a largely
behind-the-scenes role, mediating between CORE and city officials. Unnoted by the press, the
Syracuse Area Council of Churches got involved. In October 1964, Reverend Walter Welsh
contacted Willis Sargent, a respected and fair-minded attorney, and asked Sargent to review
Faith Seidenberg’s file on the case. Sargent agreed and took the assignment seriously, not only
reviewing Seidenberg’s materials but also materials he obtained from William Smith, who
became police chief in July 1964, and the District Attorney, as well as a witness who had seen
Brooks on the night of his arrest.
Sargent detailed his findings in a letter to Reverend John Sanborn, the president of the
Syracuse Area Council of Churches, and circulated copies to both the prosecution and the
defense. Sargent concluded that it was nearly impossible to determine how Brooks obtained his
injuries on February 29, 1964. In his neutral letter, he noted that “there is diametrically opposite
testimony already on record.”446 To CORE, this logically meant that Brooks did not perjure
himself but merely offered testimony that conflicted with the prosecution’s case—something that
commonly occurs in court proceedings.
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When a county court judge dismissed the charges against Brooks in December, it was not
a clear-cut victory for CORE. Seidenberg argued that Brooks’s constitutional rights had been
violated and petitioned to have the case removed to federal court. A U.S. District Court judge
denied the request.447 Remanded to the county court, the judge tossed the case out. CORE had
succeeded in stopping a twenty-year prison sentence for Brooks, but the threat of reprisal surely
had a chilling effect on others who considered raising the issue of police brutality.448
The Dennis, Presley, and Brooks cases yielded mixed success. CORE and Faith
Seidenberg secured some justice for Dennis and Brooks, getting Dennis’s convictions
overturned, Brooks’s case dismissed, and avoiding lengthy prison sentences for both. In none of
the three cases, however, did the Syracuse Police Department accept responsibility for any police
misconduct, and therefore no police officers faced consequences for their actions. Instead, CORE
faced recrimination from the mayor, the police chief, the District Attorney, and the press for
injecting racialized policing into the local discourse. Once CORE raised the issue, however, city
elites lost and never fully regained control of the conversation. As they had done with housing,
CORE’s actions mobilized other rights organizations to press for change.
In the spring of 1964, the Central New York chapter of the ACLU leveraged CORE’s
work on police brutality to lobby the city to establish a Civilian Review Board. The ACLU
submitted a proposal to the mayor, the police chief, and the MCHR with the intention of
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following up with a lengthier report.449 In the proposal and in meetings with the commission,
ACLU representatives used the Ralph Dennis and Charles Presley cases as examples to justify
the need for citizen oversight of the police.450 At that time, Philadelphia and Rochester were
among the few cities that had citizen review boards, but there were increasing demands to
establish them around the country.451 Mayor Walsh and Police Chief Murphy adamantly opposed
a review board, and their peers around the nation shared their opposition.
Although CORE did not initiate the demand, it was a vocal proponent of a review board.
Having the ACLU, with its national reputation and legal expertise, make a demand on City Hall
and the Police Department provided a strategic benefit: perhaps Mayor Walsh would ignore
CORE’s agenda but compromise on a proposal that originated from the ACLU. The Syracuse
Area Council on Churches also got involved in the conversation, and Attorney Willis Sargent
offered his assistance.452 Walsh, however, was unmoved by all appeals related to a review board.
Faith Seidenberg later recalled that George Wiley engaged the mayor in an uncharacteristically
heated argument over the issue. Walsh “saw the whole thing as an assault on his running the city
and he started to really scream at George and the two of them got to their feet and were standing
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about nose to nose[,] and I really thought that George was going to hit him.”453 Instead of hitting
the mayor, Wiley took Seidenberg by the arm and left the meeting. The other CORE members
present left as well. Despite sustained activist demands for a review board, the city did not create
one until 1993.454
The police abuse that CORE documented in the Dennis, Presley, and Brooks cases was
the linchpin of racism in the Deep North. In contrast to the Deep South, where Jim Crow laws
constituted an explicit framework for maintaining white supremacy, the Deep North employed
sophisticated strategies to create and preserve a racial system that marginalized African
Americans in all aspects of social, political, and economic life. As Brian Purnell and Jeanne
Theoharis observed, “In the liberal North, legal systems supported, and hid, practices of racial
segregation. Robust fights against racism unfolded. People who dissented against the racial
system were dismissed, disparaged, patronized, and punished.”455 Syracuse CORE encountered
this type of backlash when it challenged police brutality and the treatment of prisoners at the jail.
Through these cases and members’ encounters with the police, CORE began to articulate its own
agenda and vision for law enforcement and criminal justice. CORE incorporated this content into
Project 101, a report with comprehensive proposals to address racial inequality that the
organization planned on unveiling in August 1964. This work was disrupted at the end of July,
when CORE’s influence in the Salt City was put to the test.
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Long Hot Summer
A series of uprisings in 1964 marked the beginning of a string of long, hot summers
across the nation that continued into the early 1970s.456 Although tensions with law enforcement
formed a common thread among them, unique conditions, demographic composition, and
leadership structures in each city shaped the specific concerns of African Americans and the
nature of the response to the unrest. In most cases, law enforcement reacted with a display of
force. The media often depicted the uprisings as spontaneous acts of rage and characterized the
destruction of property and violence as rioting by criminally deviant individuals who rejected all
norms of society.
Scholars have reframed our understanding of these explosive events. Elizabeth Hinton
maintains that we should understand the urban unrest of the 1960s and early 1970s “not as a
wave of criminality, but as a period of sustained political violence.”457 In her work, Hinton
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characterizes these events as “rebellions.” I fully agree with Hinton that “collective action should
be understood as political if it is intended to shape the interests of government.”458 Following
Thomas Sugrue’s definition, however, in this chapter I employ the term “uprising” rather than
“rebellion.” According to Sugrue, an uprising describes “a spontaneous upsurge of protest or
violent expression of discontent, something with political content, but short of a full-fledged
revolutionary act.”459
The uprisings began in Harlem a mere two weeks after President Johnson signed the
landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.460 On the morning of Thursday, July 16th, a police lieutenant
shot and killed fifteen-year-old James Powell near the junior high school where Powell attended
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summer classes.461 Two days later a rally and protest over Powell’s death devolved into looting
and violence.462 The unrest soon moved to the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood in Brooklyn,
where a rally hosted by the local CORE chapter attracted one thousand demonstrators, some of
whom began smashing store windows. This in turn prompted police to charge into the crowd
wielding nightsticks. According to Brian Purnell, “CORE members worked with police to restore
order,” and no one died that night. The uprising continued in the neighborhood for three days.463
During and after the violence, civil rights leaders in New York City struggled to compel Mayor
Robert F. Wagner to listen to their demands. On July 20th, “sixty-nine civil rights, Black
nationalist, business, social and religious groups” formed a coalition and demanded that the city
create a civilian board to review police practices. Wagner remained steadfastly opposed to a
review board, but his successor, John Lindsay, established one in 1966.464
If Harlem and Brooklyn were predictable loci for urban unrest, Rochester, New York,
stunned the nation by following suit. Unlike New York City, with its well-established Black
population and long tradition of race-based organizing and agitation, Rochester had experienced
a dramatic population transformation largely in the absence of a grassroots civil rights
movement.465 White civic leaders believed that Rochester’s philanthropy distinguished it as a
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particularly progressive city. Prior to the uprising, they ignored reports of the problems facing
African Americans, and no sustained direct-action protest movement existed to make civil rights
part of the city’s discourse. An Associated Press article was also baffled by the eruption of urban
unrest, observing, “Rochester had a reputation as a serene city with high employment at good
pay and a community of home owners living in quiet and contented respectability along shady
streets.” When the uprising began around midnight on the night of Friday July 24th, the white
citizens of Rochester were stunned.466
The immediate cause of the unrest in Syracuse’s metropolitan neighbor was an attempt
by police to arrest a young Black man at a street dance. Other youths came to his defense and,
just as in New York City, the gathered crowd began throwing objects, breaking store windows,
and looting. The local police force was unable to contain the violence. As the uprising spread,
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller first ordered the state police and then the National Guard to the
city. City and county officials took immediate steps to “smash the rebellion,” but none to address
its causes. The mayor refused to discuss a list of proposals prepared by the local chapter of the
NAACP, which condemned the uprising, until after the violence ended. Monroe County banned
liquor sales, and the city declared both a state of emergency and a curfew. Despite these
measures, the uprising continued for three nights. In the end, local businesses suffered millions
of dollars of damage, over 1,000 individuals had been arrested, hundreds were injured, and four
people were dead.
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Ninety miles to the east, residents of the Salt City followed news of the Rochester
uprising with apprehension. The Post-Standard announced that the state and local police were
“confident that the riots here last week will be repeated in Buffalo, Syracuse, Utica and
Binghamton.”467 With vivid imagery, the newspaper described how the “police used tear gas and
fire hoses to break up one crowd of hundreds of shouting Negroes,” and “in another incident,
police fired warning shots at a housing project where Molotov cocktails were being hurled.”
Finally, newspaper evoked the image of “steel-helmeted National Guardsmen” who carried
“bayonet-tipped rifles,” as they marched through the streets of Rochester.468 Syracuse readers
who followed the heavy-handed response of law-enforcement may have expected similar scenes
imminently to unfold in their city.
On Saturday, July 25th, Syracuse CORE issued a statement condemning the violence in
Rochester and Harlem—as well as Mississippi. The statement asserted that “responsibility for
violent outbreaks must be shared by total communities and city administrations” and detailed the
nature of racial injustice in Syracuse.469 CORE identified racialized policing as a primary
concern that “permitted and encouraged police activity presumably designed to ‘protect’ some
segments of the community by brutalizing and denying the rights of Negroes.” CORE went on to
list school segregation, residential segregation, high Black unemployment, and resistance to
social welfare programs as evidence of persistent violence against Black Syracusans that laid the
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groundwork for violent uprisings. The choice for the community was stark: “The refusal of city
administrations and the public to deal with non-violent civil rights groups. . .leaves a frightening
vacuum which begs victimized people to find other means of expression.”
Fully cognizant of the unstable atmosphere in the Salt City, CORE took preemptive
action to mediate between Black Syracusans and the police. On Saturday evening, Wiley and
other CORE members met with William Smith, the newly minted police chief. Smith had been
appointed to the position in June after the former chief, Patrick Murphy, returned to New York
City to accept a promotion. Less than a week after officially taking command of the department,
Smith faced the prospect of an uprising.470 CORE’s meeting with the head law-enforcement
official yielded results. Wiley credited Smith with issuing “explicit instructions to [patrol officers
to] refrain from attempting to break up normal street corner gatherings and in general to stay in
their cars and keep moving unless other conduct was absolutely required.”471 Despite the
frequently acrimonious relationship between the police department and CORE, that evening they
shared a common goal: to avoid violence.
The potential for trouble existed in different areas of the city throughout the night. A
group of African American men stashed bottles and pipes in their trunks before attending a dance
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on the city’s West Side. At least one man had a shotgun in his truck and a pistol in the back
pocket of his pants. Following CORE’s urgent advice, however, the police did not make their
usual appearance to monitor the dance. Later in the night, crowds gathered outside the pool
rooms and bars in the Fifteenth Ward.
Tensions were high as a small group of CORE members, including the Wileys and Bruce
Thomas, circulated through the streets. CORE’s August newsletter captured what CORE heard
from community members that evening: “They told of the subtle, pervasive violence
continuously acted upon them by society. . .[T]he conversations all ended on the same note: a
crushing sense of powerlessness and cynicism, and finally some talk of the feasibility of
arming.”472 Some of the men from the West Side dance arrived and scuffled with the teenagers.
After midnight, the police entered the Ward to investigate a stabbing near Ben’s Kitchen. As
teenagers cursed and shouted at the police, George Wiley took quick action to diffuse the
tension. He dashed to a pay phone, called William Smith, and insisted that the chief remove his
men from the Fifteenth Ward. Smith complied. They had averted an uprising, but the simmering
anger over the city’s racial inequality remained.473
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CORE played a decisive role in preventing violence that evening, marking a particularly
impactful moment for the civil rights organization. By persuading the police to minimize their
presence, they deprived the armed men of the pretext for violence. Chief Smith did not have to
listen to George Wiley’s advice. In fact, the accepted strategy was to quell unrest with a show of
force, as the police did in Rochester. Many Syracusans would have supported Smith if he had
responded in the same manner in the Salt City. Likewise, the effect of CORE’s presence in the
crowd, where CORE members listened to the viewpoints of the agitated citizens, cannot be
overstated. CORE activated the credibility it had established in the Fifteenth Ward over the past
two years by taking on the education system and defending Ralph Dennis. During potentially
explosive situations such as existed on the night of July 25th, CORE’s dedicated community
engagement shaped the course of events in an immeasurable but tangible way.
The “near-uprising” lays bare the contested responses to racialized policing and the
ambivalence that even CORE activists felt about the best way to achieve racial justice. CORE
offered a collective channel for improving conditions for African Americans in Syracuse, but
participants in the near-uprising rejected CORE’s approach to generating change. The week
following the near-uprising, Bruce Thomas and the Wileys—the same trio that had been in the
streets on the night of the 25th—met with “Ray,” one of the men who had been armed at the
dance on the city’s West Side. The group recorded the conversation, preserving a unique piece of
historical evidence.474 This source, which, to my knowledge, has not been cited elsewhere,
provides a glimpse into the anger that brought an immediacy and urgency CORE’s work, and it
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demonstrates why some Syracusans explored violence as an alternative to civil rights organizing.
Ray represents a group of working-class Black men whose perspectives are rarely captured in
archival material. He was a political actor with a theory of change that did not align with
CORE’s. The source has clear limitations: it would be hard to justify generalizing based on the
remarks of one, unidentified man in Syracuse. Nonetheless, this source sheds light on the
challenges confronting the Northern civil rights movement in the mid-1960s.

Figure 17: Bruce Thomas, CORE Chairperson

Bruce Thomas and Ray were men with similar backgrounds who reached different
conclusions about the means by which they wanted to pursue change. In 1964, both were in their
early thirties and married with children. Thomas worked at General Electric; Ray, a local steel
mill. Ray was a high school graduate, but Thomas had dropped out after completing ninth grade.
Thomas was born in Westchester County and moved to New York City before migrating to
Syracuse in the mid-1950s. Ray did not state where he was born, but he mentioned a
grandmother in Mississippi whom he wanted to visit. That he had also migrated to Syracuse in
the 1950s seems likely. Both men regularly engaged in barroom brawls and street-fighting. In
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fact, according to Wiley’s biographers, “Thomas had a reputation as the toughest man in the
Syracuse ghetto.”475 Thomas and Ray diverged, however, in their responses to the racial injustice
they experienced in the Salt City. Thomas became a civil rights activist committed to
nonviolence. In contrast, Ray, who was unaffiliated with an activist organization, saw violence
as necessary for change.476
As Elizabeth Hinton has argued, both policymakers and scholars “have been reluctant to
take seriously the political nature of midcentury Black uprisings.”477 Rather, scholars often
identify the structural causes of participants’ discontent but do not see the use of violence as a
form of “direct political action.”478 Participants in urban uprisings are often represented as an
aggregate rather than as individuals. This lack of nuanced analysis implies that participants acted
out of an inchoate rage in response to intolerable conditions. Rather than acts of criminality or
pathology, uprisings constituted a form of collective action. Ray was a political actor with a
concrete reason for wanting to start an uprising, although he did not ultimately act on his plan.
As he told Thomas:
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When I say that I want to start shooting, this is something I want: I want to create
all the disturbance in the world. I want a national emergency. . .Then we put the
whole country in jeopardy. Then everybody’s in jeopardy. . .And then you’re
[referring specifically to white moderates] going to sit down, and you’re going to
talk. You’re going to get this thing straightened out. That’s the only reason why. I
don’t want to kill anybody.
This response clearly indicates that Ray had goals beyond retaliating against the police. He
theorized that most white Americans would not support change unless urban violence affected
them personally.479
Ray and Thomas began their conversation by discussing the police, and both men shared
stories of the police harassment they personally experienced on a regular basis. They specifically
complained about Sergeant Thomas Sardino, who would go on to serve as Syracuse’s police
chief from 1970 to 1985.480 Ray described the sergeant as “Fat Sardino,” and Thomas
disparagingly referred to him as “that joker.”481 Thomas recounted an encounter where Sardino
accosted him while he was at a bar with his wife. Sardino took Thomas outside and ordered him
to get in a squad car with two officers. Thomas complied, and the police officers drove to a gas
station on the corner of Harrison and State Streets. Thomas recalled:
Sgt. Sardino said, ‘you don't like the officers do you’ and I said ‘you are no different than
anybody else’ and he told the other two officers to arrest me. He got out of the car. The
two officers were in the front seat and one of them said, ‘What are we going to arrest him
for?’ one of them said, ‘Being drunk on the corners of Adams and State Street’ and I said,
‘Well, that's a lie’ and he told me to shut up. They took me in and booked me. My wife
came down about a half hour later and bailed me out.482
Thomas hired a lawyer, who recommended he plead guilty. He paid a $10 fine and $50 to the
lawyer. Thomas joined CORE in part to challenge these conditions.
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In their analysis of the nature and causes of racial inequality in the Salt City, the two men
were in agreement on many points. They concurred that police brutality was a primary concern.
Furthermore, they agreed that African Americans throughout the country received inadequate
education and that public schools neglected Black history. Ray purchased books through Ebony
magazine in order to learn this history, and he wanted his son to understand what it meant to be
Black. Thomas agreed, saying, “You’re right. I went to school in New York [City]. They made
me ashamed in school that I was a Negro.”
Thomas pointed out how various forms of discrimination reinforced one another and
inhibited African Americans from improving their lives. For example, he knew that Black
Syracusans struggled to obtain decent housing not only because of limited financial resources,
but also because of discrimination in the private housing market. Job discrimination further
limited the ability of African Americans to achieve a decent standard of living. Ray steadfastly
disagreed with Thomas that discrimination created significant obstacles for African Americans.
He maintained that many African Americans were clannish, uneducated, and wasted their money
on cars and frivolous items instead of saving to purchase a home. Emphasizing his own
discipline and economic achievement, Ray rattled off his assets: “I have a small bank account,
which I won’t divulge. It will take care of me. I got a ‘62 Cadillac I owe $800 on. Alright. I got a
$700 piano paid for. I got a $600 Magnivox Hi-Fi paid for. I got a color television set paid for.”
When Thomas observed that other African Americans could not afford such items, Ray retorted
that they “should’ve worked for it like I did.”
Ray’s self-representation as a competent worker who could provide for his family
indicates that his personal identity was at stake in the near-uprising. By simultaneously
proclaiming the necessity of a national emergency to effect change and yet asserting that he had
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succeeded in a racist society, Ray caught himself in a contradiction. George Wiley, who was
present for at least part of the conversation, called him out on this, proclaiming with
exasperation: “The only thing I don’t understand is why go out and then lay down your life? . .
.You’re satisfied!” Ray did not have an adequate answer.
Thomas and Ray disagreed on the necessary degree of change to achieve racial justice.
Their diverging viewpoints are illustrated in the following exchange:
Thomas: There has to be a change in the system.
Ray: The system is about as perfect as it can be. But let’s say this much, have the
system enforced.
Thomas: You have to be rich and white to make it, baby. The system is wrong.
Ray: Have the system enforced. [pause] You don’t have to be rich and white.
Thomas: Oh yes you do. And educated. . .I know Negroes with college educations
who can’t even be a foreman at GE.
Later, Ray asserted that “You’re talking communism—or something else—if you’re going to
change the system.” Ray echoed a strain of Cold War rhetoric that associated efforts to transform
American society with communism.483 Despite Ray’s red-baiting, Thomas was confident that
CORE’s nonviolent approach could succeed in transforming the city if enough African
Americans participated. Ray disagreed.
The Salt City lacked organizational options for men like Ray who rejected nonviolent
protest as a means to achieve change. CORE had succeeded in exposing the city’s racial
inequality, but too many white elites either continued to deny the existence of discrimination or
made minimal changes while leaving the overall system intact. In this climate of gradualism and
delay, CORE’s nonviolent protest strategies seemed inadequate to Ray and his friends. There
were few available alternatives. Although Black nationalist ideas circulated in the Salt City,
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given the relatively small Black population, groups such as the Nation of Islam (NOI) did not
have a strong presence.484 Ray indicated that he read Muhammad Speaks, the NOI’s monthly
newspaper, which was distributed in Syracuse. The NOI, originally founded in Detroit in 1930,
adapted Islamic theology and blended it with Black nationalist politics, preaching race pride,
racial separation, and self-determination. Thomas and Ray both embraced the concept of race
pride, but they did not agree with all of the teachings of the NOI. Ray insisted that “the
separation of the races will never be. You just can’t even hope for that. . .You’re here together,
and you’ve got to live together. Or one of us has got to go.”
Two years before the term became popularized by Stokely Carmichael, Ray articulated a
pragmatic approach to Black Power that reflected the demographic realities of the Salt City. In
Syracuse, African Americans represented less than ten percent of the population. As Patrick D.
Jones argues in his study of civil rights in Milwaukee, local contexts informed “unique
formulation[s] of Black Power.” In Milwaukee, Black Power “meant a pragmatic, interracial
approach to coalition politics in a city where angry white working-class residents far
outnumbered African Americans and their allies.”485 Although Ray did not advocate for
separatism, his politics were disconnected from an organizational base. Ultimately, Thomas
failed to convince him that CORE provided a collective means of striving for change.486
Throughout the conversation, Thomas and Ray argued the merits of violence and
nonviolence; in doing so, they tapped into a debate that extended far beyond their moment in the
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Salt City. The apparent incompatibility of post-World War II civil rights liberalism and the
practice of Black self-defense was a source of contention in African American communities
throughout the country. By 1964, it was evident that a young generation of Northern Black
radicals was growing increasingly skeptical of the efficacy of nonviolence. Rather than a sharp
break from the past, these challenges to nonviolent strategies amplified a set of ongoing
conversations. For example, in Monroe, North Carolina, civil rights leader Robert F. Williams
openly carried weapons for defense against white supremacist attacks. He gained further
notoriety in 1961 when he fled the country to avoid being prosecuted on a trumped-up charge of
kidnapping. In 1962 he published the book Negroes with Guns, which was popular among young
militants such as Philadelphia’s Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM). Williams followed
this book with a 1964 article supporting uprisings.487
Another group that fostered the idea of self-defense was the Deacons of Defense, an
organization that formed in Jonesboro, Louisiana, during the summer of 1964. The Deacons
initially protected white CORE volunteers, including some from Syracuse University, who were
living and working in the Black neighborhood. They soon evolved into a formal organization
with chapters throughout the South. Although both Williams and the Deacons of Defense had
their roots in the South, the issues they raised were also relevant to the North. In the North as
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well as the South, African Americans wrestled with the debate over self-defense versus
nonviolence, and Black men often framed the issue in gendered terms.488
In Syracuse, Thomas and Ray referenced masculine characteristics of courage and honor
throughout their conversation. Thomas was infuriated that Ray had considered starting a violent
confrontation with the police but had never marched on a nonviolent picket line with CORE. Ray
rejected nonviolence on two points. The first was that his family would not respect him if he was
struck on the picket line but did not hit back. His honor was already at risk because of the
treatment of African Americans by police. Ray explained his frustration to Thomas: “I’ll never
take my wife to the dances. . .because there’s too many cops around. If they push [me], I might
get myself hurt, and I might get in a lot of trouble. Now why can’t I take my wife to a dance?”
For many Black men, the inability to defend their families was emblematic of their second-class
citizenship status in the United States.
Thomas countered that he was proud when his son saw him on the picket line. He had
been punched during a demonstration on at least one occasion, but he did not hit back because “I
felt much better not to. Because I was there for a reason. When you get nonviolent, then you’ll
be surprised about what you feel.” As the leader of a civil rights organization, Thomas was able
to forge a sense of belonging and develop an identity as an activist. He also acknowledged that
there was a limit to his nonviolence: “If Saturday rioting hadda broke out, I would’ve tried to
stop it. And if it went something like Rochester, man, I’d have to get off the line of
nonviolence.” Rather than a philosophical commitment to pacifism, Thomas had a pragmatic
dedication to using nonviolent means to expose racial inequalities. He was not opposed to acting
in self-defense, if necessary. Drawing a line between the appropriate circumstances for
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employing nonviolence versus self-defense and distinguishing between acts of self-defense and
acts of retaliatory violence, was never straightforward.
Ray’s second objection to nonviolence was that it was ineffective. He insisted that the
mayor would not change in response to peaceful demonstrations, demanding: “Why is he going
to move? For what reason? If he’s not afraid I’m going to do anything, why is he going to
move?. . .Everything in this country that’s ever worth anything has been solved by violence.”
Ray insisted that he would march with CORE if the organization dropped nonviolence. Thomas
argued that “violence is ignorant” and that, had an uprising occurred, the only result would have
been that “more Negroes would’ve got their ass whooped.” Thomas, frustrated by Ray’s
intransigence, questioned Ray’s bravery. Referring to the near-uprising, Thomas asserted that “I
say you’re scared. I think you’re all scared. I think it’s a whole lot of talk.” But Ray had a ready
response to Thomas’s jab: “From what you’re saying, you should drop CORE and forget about
everything because the Negro ain’t got enough courage to fight for anything that belongs to him.
If we’re all cowards, then why CORE?” Thomas insisted that he wanted Ray to try nonviolence.
If the several hundred men who had been prepared to shoot the police would participate in
CORE demonstrations, Thomas was convinced that they could alter the city’s racial
inequality.489
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The conversation, in which Ray and Thomas failed to reach a consensus, began where it
started, with a discussion of the near-uprising on the night of Saturday, July 25th. Thomas and
Ray conceded the anger they both felt in the streets that night, ostensibly at each other as well as
the systemic forces that impelled the crowd to gather in the Fifteenth Ward. Thomas explained
that “I thought I was going to lose my cool, but I didn’t.” Ray, revealing his trust in Thomas by
displaying a surprising degree of vulnerability, admitted the fear he felt that night. Ray had his
.38 Magnum revolver in his hip pocket but seemed relieved that he had not used it: “Now, let’s
face it. I’ve never killed anybody before. . .I’ve shot a lot of woodchucks, a lot of rabbits, lot of
pheasants. If I’da started shooting, I’da been shooting blind. Probably closed my eyes.” In
response, Thomas quipped: “Well, you couldn’t go to war with me, closing your eyes.” The tape
recording ended there.
The conversation between CORE and Ray highlights the limits of the organization’s
ability to fully mobilize the Black community. From a small cadre of university activists, CORE
had evolved into a multiracial and cross-class organization, including low-income and workingclass Black Syracusans. The fact that the chapter was able to locate Ray, and that he consented to
participating in a tape-recorded conversation, reveals the extent of CORE’s influence in the
Fifteenth Ward. Despite his skepticism about the organization’s methods, Ray admitted a
begrudging respect, conceding, “CORE’s done an awful lot. I know what CORE’s done. I’m not
stupid.”490 Yet ultimately Ray rejected nonviolent protest as a tactic. Going forward, CORE
struggled without the full support of the Black community. Ultimately, it was unable to balance
the costs of protesting with the limited gains it yielded
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Given the masculinist framing of Ray and Thomas’s conversation, it is important to note
that although many Black men may have felt that the ability to defend their families was central
to full citizenship, female civil rights activists did not necessarily look to men for defense. In
fact, Black and white women alike put their personal safety at risk in order to agitate for change.
During the near-uprising in Syracuse, Wretha Wiley waded into the fray alongside George and
Bruce Thomas. She described the tense atmosphere that she and George encountered: “We were
both afraid and didn’t know how to deal with that Saturday night scene. . .The bars were scary.
The whole situation was unpredictable. It was a chaotic mess with a potential, even without the
riots, for random violence, the usual knife fights and stabbings.” Wretha could have easily stayed
at home with her two young children rather than put herself in a dangerous situation, but she was
deeply committed to the cause of racial justice. George reflected that the residents of the
Fifteenth Ward noticed and appreciated her presence: “Most of the people in the ghetto know
me, at least by sight, and apparently there was some comment afterward about the fact that
Wretha was down there with me. They had a certain amount of respect for CORE as a result of
their willingness to come down and be present at that time.” As an activist and part of an
interracial couple in the 1960s, Wretha was willing to transgress racial boundaries and also
gender norms.491
Like Bruce Thomas, CORE member Elizabeth Ann Page made a tactical rather than
philosophical commitment to nonviolence. Page offers another female perspective on the role of
violence and uprisings in the civil rights movement. A Black woman who grew up in the
Fifteenth Ward and joined CORE while an undergraduate at Syracuse University, Page was not
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present on the night of the near-uprising, but she participated in similar preventive actions. In an
interview in 2014, she recalled that:
When there was a hint of police confrontation with the kids, [CORE] had teams
that would go out to the different neighborhoods to just walk among the kids and
observe what was going on, and make notes of the things the cops were doing.
Things that didn’t look right. If the kids were just standing there, they might be
milling around, we would walk among them and talk to them. If it seemed like it
was gonna get more hostile, we’d call for back up. . .We were always on call.
[Especially] when the other cities went incendiary. . .Since I was working on the
West side, I did the West Side and South Side, if we got a call. There were at least
twenty or thirty people involved.492
Page was willing to insert herself in a potentially explosive situation in order to keep the peace in
her city.
Page emphasized that she practiced nonviolence as a strategic tool, not a totalizing
philosophy. Off the picket line, Page explained that if “somebody looked at me cross-eyed, I
looked at them cross-eyed right back.” Moreover, although Page did not recall the specific nearuprising involving Ray, she asserted that she wished African Americans had revolted in Syracuse
because “that would have made a whole lot of difference for this country.” Despite working to
prevent bloodshed, Page sensed that violence did serve a function by forcing Americans to
confront racial inequality. “I’ve always felt we should have been a lot more militant. Because
what else are you gonna lose?” Page’s insights reveal that not only men felt ambivalence about
adopting nonviolent tactics. Considering violence or other militant alternatives was a reaction to
the immense resistance displayed by many Northern whites who refused to acknowledge or
address racial inequality. In the Deep North, both men and women considered a range of options
for effecting change.493
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George Wiley came to a similar conclusion as Page: that violence or the threat of
violence did serve a purpose for the civil rights movement. When city leaders recognized that the
alternative to engaging with groups such as CORE was a violent uprising, CORE suddenly
appeared reasonable and pragmatic rather than radical and militant. Following the events in
Rochester and Syracuse’s near-uprising, Wiley organized a meeting of elected officials, law
enforcement, and civil rights organizations to discuss ways to avoid bloodshed. Wiley told the
white city elite that if they continued to impede change that they “may see the end of CORE and
the NAACP—the people are going to take the initiative away.” This was a carefully crafted
statement designed to shock officials into action.
In a recorded memo to a CORE organizer in another city, Wiley shared a radical insight
that he could not make publicly:
I don’t buy the fact that people always want to put in my mouth that these riots
don’t do the cause any good, and therefore we did right intrinsically in avoiding
this. . .I have a deep and clear commitment to pursuit of a nonviolent alternative,
and I think one can do more with the same effort and energies, . . .but I’m not
willing to say that violence doesn’t do any good. People want to make Negros
swallow that, I think, and everybody has been putting this in civil rights leaders’
mouths. . .These violent outbursts have in fact played a role in bringing about
progress.
From his moral and ethical vantage point, Wiley felt compelled to avert bloodshed, if possible.
Yet Wiley, too, was growing frustrated by the effectiveness of white officials in maintaining the
racial system of the Deep North. His experiences in Syracuse radicalized him—not to the point
of endorsing violent extremism, but he did become convinced that he could contribute more to
society as an activist than as a chemist. He soon left academia, never to return.494
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These conversations and reflections demonstrate that violence and nonviolence were not
mutually exclusive. In the context of the Deep North, both were part of a matrix of options for
achieving change. Rather than existing in opposition to one another, violence—or the threat of
violence—often increased the effectiveness of nonviolent protest. Ray theorized that violence
was the only path to racial equality, whereas CORE members considered violence with
ambivalence. The conversation following the near-uprising also illustrates the constraints facing
the relatively small Black population in the Salt City. Thomas did not convince Ray to practice
nonviolence and join CORE, and no alternative groups had sufficient strength to establish a
foothold in the city at that time.
The readers of the Syracuse Post-Standard did not get the full story of the near-uprising.
In fact, the newspaper gave the impression that police handled the situation effectively by
patrolling in their usual manner and that Syracusans did not have to worry about riots in their
city. The role CORE had played in preventing violence went unmentioned. On Monday, July
27th, an article titled “City Remains Calm, Violence Seems Unlikely” quoted the editor of a local
African-American paper stating that “the possibility [of riot] is so remote there is no sense in
entertaining it.” Wiley observed in a private memo that “the community learned nothing from the
incident, having not participated in it. And every indication, from public utterances of politicians
to the letters to the editors in the newspapers, [is] that their longstanding policy of containment
of the ghetto by vigilant and, when necessary, vigorous and militant police action, is a successful
policy.” In a sense, the near-uprising was a Pyrrhic victory for Syracuse CORE: they achieved

195

their short-term goal of avoiding bloodshed, but they left unaltered the system that generated
police brutality.495
If most Syracusans’ views of policing remained unaltered, the anxiety generated by
Rochester’s uprising did compel city elites to pay attention to CORE’s Project 101, a set of
proposals for addressing racial inequality in the city. A forward to the publication explained that
Syracuse CORE “exists because 101 years after the Emancipation Proclamation all men are not
free.” CORE unveiled the project during a program on August 13, 1964. Around 250 people
packed St. Paul’s Episcopal Church in downtown Syracuse to hear about the project. In
attendance were elected officials, union leaders, religious leaders, educators, and members of
various civil rights organizations.496
Project 101 included a range of suggestions that required action from local, state, and
national governments as well as business owners and private citizens. It presented the issues
confronting the Salt City clearly, concisely, and holistically, but its section on policing was
somewhat less robust than the key areas of housing, education, and employment, all of which
CORE had extensively researched. For example, the document included two detailed appendices
on low-income housing and public housing. In a section on the “Administration of Justice,”
CORE offered thirteen moderate proposals to make the police and justice system more equitable
and accountable to the citizens of Syracuse. Recommendations included an increase in police
pay, psychological exams for police candidates, and human relations training for officers. Other
proposals addressed the treatment of arrested individuals. CORE demanded that police inform
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citizens of their rights at the time of arrest—two years before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Miranda v. Arizona made this practice widespread. Further, they demanded that the police
establish a documented procedure to ensure that each arrested individual was able to make a
telephone call soon after the time of arrest. CORE reiterated the complaints it had levied against
the Willow Street Jail, demanding that detained individuals receive adequate food and recreation.
It also repeated the call for a Police Advisory Board and added a demand for a public defender
system to replace Syracuse’s inadequate “assigned counsel system.” The final two proposals
appealed for bail reform and “the continuation and expansion of the Community-Police
Coordinating Council.”497
With its proposals for police and administrative reform, Syracuse CORE’s vision largely
aligned with mid-twentieth century liberalism, but it placed a distinct emphasis on the
obligations of the state to serve and protect Black citizens. CORE did not challenge the state’s
monopoly on force, nor did they contest the important role of police in society. Rather, they
called for a better police force that fulfilled its function “to protect the rights and property of
citizens” and also earned the “respect and confidence” of Black Syracusans.498 This framing of
police reform aligns with what Naomi Murakawa defines as “the ideology of liberal law-andorder” in which “police brutality was the unsanctioned use of force, but more procedures and
professionalization could define acceptable use of force.”499 This ideology enabled the federal
government to facilitate carceral development alongside civil rights legislation.500
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Syracuse CORE also, however, envisioned an active role for Black citizens that, had it
been adopted, may have mitigated against carceral development. As historian Clarence Taylor
argued in his study of New York City, activists “understood that police brutality was a form of
domination, and therefore they were not just attempting to define how police operated in their
communities but were also attempting to define a new and active role for citizens to take with
respect to the policing of their communities.”501 Similarly, in the Salt City, CORE envisioned
citizens participating in a police review board and on the Community-Police Coordinating
Council. And as they demonstrated through the Dennis, Presley, and Brooks cases, CORE stood
prepared to hold the administrative justice system accountable. CORE did not place blind faith in
the capacity of the system to reform and regulate itself, but rather stood ready to protest and
agitate.

Community Safety
In the mid-1960s, in addition to protesting police abuse, Syracusans took action to ensure
community safety when the state failed to fulfill its obligation to do so. In 1965, tenants at the
Salt City Homes, a 260-unit public housing project on the East Side of Syracuse, were concerned
about a series of crimes that occurred on the premises at night. The crimes included the sexual
assault of a woman in the parking lot, as well as indigent non-residents wandering into the
unlocked buildings and even living in the hallways. The Salt City Improvement Organization
(SCIO), a tenants’ group organized by a War on Poverty program based at Syracuse University,
alerted the mayor, the housing commissioner, and the police about the need for increased
security at the project. The SCIO specifically demanded that the Housing Authority hire two
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security officers to work from dusk until dawn. At the time, the lone security officer assigned to
the project worked only during the day and mostly directed tenants to call the police if an
incident occurred. The police department agreed to send additional officers to cruise the area in
the evening. The Housing Authority, however, refused to respond to tenant concerns, insisting
that additional security officers were not in the budget.
In response to the inaction of the Housing Authority, the tenants formed their own
security patrol to protect their homes. About ten men mobilized, donning helmets and
brandishing nightsticks, and walked an assigned “beat” throughout the night. A spokesperson for
the security patrol explained the group’s objective to the Post-Standard: “We’ll continue
policing our own area until we get at least two security guards working here at night to protect
our families.” The tenant directed his frustration specifically at the Housing Authority, noting
that “[t]he police are not at all to blame for not providing adequate protection here.”502 The lack
of criticism of the police is notable given that the security patrol was operating as an extralegal
form of law enforcement at the housing project. Strategically, though, the tenants were dedicated
to holding their landlord, a government entity, accountable for providing a decent standard of
living at Salt City Homes. That they made a pragmatic choice not to challenge the police, which
could have easily led to reprisal, seems plausible.
The security patrol is a powerful example of interracial organizing among low-income
tenants. Although the exact racial composition of the patrol is unknown, the SCIO was
interracial, and the demographics of the housing project were in flux. In a 1964 report, the
League of Women Voters noted that the project was 70% white and 30% Black, with the number
of Black residents rapidly increasing. Although neither the press nor the tenants highlighted the

502

Larry T. Eiler, “Vigilantes Form Night Patrol to Guard Salt City Homes,” The Post-Standard, 15 June

1965.

199

interracial composition of the security patrol, it was nonetheless significant. A few months
earlier, the federal government had published the Moynihan Report, which criticized Black
families as pathological.503 In this context, the mere fact that Black men in Syracuse mobilized to
protect their families countered racial stereotypes.
Both members of the security patrol and residents described the patrol in gendered
language. The patrol members explained that they were taking action to “protect our families,”
and female tenants welcomed this protection. The Vice President of the SCIO, Florence C. Boyd,
a white woman in her mid-fifties, explained that the “fathers and husbands” formed a security
patrol because “[w]e are getting no help from Syracuse Housing authorities.”504 Likewise, a
woman who described herself a “mother, taxpayer and registered voter” maintained that
“someone has to protect the women and children here. No woman wants her husband to stay
awake all night and work all day performing a job that should be done by the City or by the
[Housing Authority].”505 By taking action to guard their community, the patrol members saw
themselves as protecting their families when the government failed to do so.
In contrast, the Post-Standard and the Housing Authority deployed conservative law-andorder rhetoric to critique not the crime that impacted the Salt City tenants, but the security patrol
members and the War on Poverty organizers. The Post-Standard called for the police and the
District Attorney’s office to investigate and respond to any issues at the Salt City Homes, but
emphatically noted that the police department should “never—never, never—surrender police
prerogatives to self-styled vigilantes.”506 This editorial conveniently overlooks the fact that the
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needs of the public housing tenants only gained attention from city officials after citizens formed
their own patrol. The Executive Director of the Housing Authority, William L. McGarry, was
concerned not with the reports of crime at Salt City Homes but with the presence of War on
Poverty organizers in the housing projects. He railed that “[m]aintaining law and order in public
housing developments has become a real problem because of [the antipoverty workers].”507
McGarry equated tenants who demanded improvements to their homes with criminal behavior.
This rhetoric mirrored the language of Southern Democrats who, after World War II, “conflated
predatory street crime with politically motivated, group-organized law breaking in the form of
civil disobedience.”508
While the security patrol continued its nightly operation, the SCIO pressured the police
and the mayor to act. The President of the SCIO reported that Chief Smith agreed that “there
should be some way to secure the area and if necessary that [the Housing Authority] should
provide Security Guards.” The SCIO thanked the police chief “for his cooperation and
support.”509 At the end of June, twenty-five women and children marched to City Hall to appeal
to the mayor. They thanked the city for “increasing police surveillance of the area” and “asked
for protection.”510 Mayor Walsh personally called Florence Boyd, vice president of the SCIO, to
inform her that he would meet with the Housing Authority. The next day, the Housing Authority
agreed to contract with a private security agency to provide a guard for nine hours each night,
although the tenants’ rent would be adjusted to cover the cost. As promised, the tenants’ security
patrol disbanded once the security guard was installed.
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The Salt City Homes security patrol reveals the desire of low-income Black Syracusans
for community safety. Facing neglect by the police department and the Housing Authority, the
residents of Salt City Homes took matters into their own hands. In a climate of law-and-order
rhetoric that assumed Black criminality, an interracial coalition of low-income citizens mobilized
to achieve their own understanding of law and order. Together, the patrol and the tenants’
organization succeeded in obtaining additional security for the housing project. Regardless of the
patrol’s limited success, it should be understood as a significant response to intolerable social
conditions.
As Elizabeth Hinton notes, public housing projects were typically over-policed in the
mid-1960s, a condition that intensified with the initiation of the federal War on Crime. Urban
uprisings therefore often began in public housing. After an uprising at the Sierra Vista projects in
Stockton, California, tenants negotiated the creation of a short-lived tenant patrol. Police agreed
not to enter Sierra Vista in response to minor incidents where a police presence could escalate
situations and lead to violence.511 In contrast, the Salt City Homes security patrol did not
challenge police authority but rather called on the police and the Housing Authority to fulfill
their proper functions. The Salt City Homes security controversy represents an important
example of the range of Black political responses to the issues of policing and public safety.
At least one member of the SCIO went on to join the ranks of law enforcement, revealing
that the tenants had a sincere interest in public safety. David Prater, a Black man in his late
thirties, joined the sheriff’s department as a deputy soon after the SCIO’s victory in obtaining an
additional security guard at the housing project. Prater was one of very few people of color in the
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department at the time. When an uprising broke out in Syracuse two years later, Prater had to
confront the reality of racialized policing in the urban North.
Urban unrest was a national issue during the summer of 1967. In July, President Johnson
established the Kerner Commission to investigate the uprisings of the long, hot summers. A few
weeks later, violence flared up in the Salt City. The precipitating event may have been the sexual
assault of an eleven-year-old Black girl by a white man, who was arrested by police.512 Over the
course of three nights, participants in the uprising smashed store windows and threw Molotov
cocktails at police. Mayor Walsh declared a state of emergency and instituted a curfew. The Salt
City was one of seventy-five cities that experienced collective urban violence between April and
September that year.513 The Syracuse uprising did not result in the same scale of destruction as in
other cities, which some activists attributed to the work of the War on Poverty programs.514
Prater was deeply concerned by the climate among law enforcement when the uprising
began. Law enforcement leaders did not repeat Chief Murphy’s 1964 admonition to show
restraint when responding to the disturbance. Prater recalled:
I reported for duty, like I was supposed to. . .There were officers and deputy sheriffs from
the surrounding areas. . .Everybody was running around the PSB [Public Safety Building]
like they were going on a turkey shoot. I mean it was a carnival atmosphere. . .We were
going out and. . .shoot some people. I didn’t want any part of that, so I refused to go on
riot duty. . .I’m not going to beat up anybody, but I am an officer. I’m going to do my
duty, but I’m not going to go beyond that. . .I went home.515
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As a consequence of Prater’s refusal to go on riot duty, he received a two-week suspension and a
ninety-day probation.516 After Black leaders protested, the sheriff’s department agreed to
reinstate him. Presumably disillusioned with law enforcement, Prater soon left the department.
He went on to work as a photographer for the city, and he also photographed Black community
life for independent newspapers and as an unofficial community historian.517
Following the uprising, civil rights groups and community organizations were largely
stymied in their efforts to reform policing. The limitations of their approaches became apparent
in 1970, when the shooting death of a Black teenager sent waves of shock and anger through the
community. A twenty-one-year-old white officer, Paul Larkin, shot eighteen-year-old Jeremiah
Mitchell in the back and shoulder, killing him. Larkin was responding to a call about a mugging,
and there was a fistfight going on when he arrived at the scene. Bystanders asserted that Mitchell
was unarmed and uninvolved with the fist fight. The officer was acquitted of any wrongdoing.518
This incident presaged the issue of police shootings that would motivate the Black Lives Matter
movement in the second decade of the twenty-first century.
By the 1970s, an ascendant conservative law-and-order discourse limited the landscape of
political possibilities. With a punitive approach to law enforcement and criminal justice, the
federal and New York State governments enacted policies that fueled mass incarceration. With
the 1968 Safe Streets Act, which created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the
federal government began to channel resources to local law enforcement agencies, contributing
to the militarization of the police.519 In 1973, the Rockefeller Drug Laws introduced mandatory
minimums for the possession or sale of narcotics, leading to longer sentences for offenders. Also
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in New York State, officials responded to the Sing Sing Rebellion in 1983, which was triggered
in part due to overcrowded conditions, by constructing new prisons and expanding the state’s
capacity to incarcerate individuals.520 By 2010, the United States had “an incarceration rate that
outstrips those of other Western democracies by a factor of roughly seven to one.”521 As Simon
Balto observes, however, historians must look to local police practices in the early and midtwentieth centuries to understand “why, when the tumorous growth of mass incarceration did
begin to metastasize, it developed so suddenly as a full-blown instrument of racial repression.”522
This chapter has demonstrated that the local context is also crucial for understanding the
alternatives that local actors envisioned. The tragedy and travesty of the American carceral state
was not a foregone conclusion.
Even as they struggled to make progress on the issue of policing during the 1960s,
activists and community organizers in the Salt City continued to seek solutions for the
multifaceted and interconnected challenges facing African Americans. They deployed some of
their most creative strategies in the area of jobs and economic justice. As the following chapters
will demonstrate, in the process they shaped a national conversation about who should dictate the
nature and pace of social change.
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Chapter Four
Confronting Power: CORE and the Quest for Fair Employment

Figure 18: Spirit of Power on the Niagara Mohawk Building

On March 8th, 1965, Syracuse CORE embarked on a major campaign to expose
discriminatory employment practices at Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NiMo), the utility
company that served the Salt City and most of upstate New York. Out of the company’s 1,500
Syracuse-based employees, fewer than ten were Black.523 For the next ten weeks, picketers
gathered daily outside the company’s headquarters on Erie Boulevard. The opulent art-deco
building, constructed in 1932, symbolized the potential of electricity to transform New Yorkers’
lives. High above the building’s entrance, the Spirit of Power, a helmeted stainless-steel angel
with a wingspan of twenty feet, observed the protesters on the sidewalk below.524 By protesting
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the hiring practices that resulted in Black workers representing only one-half of one percent of
the NiMo workforce, picketers pointed out that Black Syracusans had been excluded from the
progressive promise embodied by the “Cathedral of Light.”
Through two case studies, this chapter analyzes CORE’s efforts to press for economic
justice in the Deep North. In 1963, CORE responded to community concerns about exclusionary
employment practices at the Salt City’s most elegant hotel, Hotel Syracuse. This successful
campaign was modest in its objective to help Black workers break into tipped, public-facing
service positions. In contrast, the Niagara Mohawk campaign was not selected in response to
community concerns but as a result of the CORE Employment Committee’s careful research.
During the first half of 1965, the Niagara Mohawk campaign escalated in parallel with voting
rights activism in the South. CORE strategically leveraged the national attention to civil rights.
Creatively juxtaposing the Northern and Southern civil rights movements within a single moral
framework, CORE brought activists from Alabama and Mississippi, including the iconic Fannie
Lou Hamer, to Syracuse in a “Reverse Freedom Ride.” CORE’s employment campaigns also
took place in the context of the federal government’s increasing willingness to address
employment discrimination. CORE drew on federal policy to bolster its position, but this
approach did not compel NiMo leadership to come to the negotiating table. Although carefully
researched and creatively executed, CORE’s Niagara Mohawk campaign was ultimately a fatal
miscalculation that destroyed the organization.
This chapter contributes to the growing body of scholarship on economic justice
campaigns in the Deep North by highlighting the organizational costs of combatting employment
discrimination in the absence of broad-based civic, institutional and governmental support.525 In
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the Salt City, a fractured civil rights leadership thwarted CORE’s ability to effect change. As in
past campaigns, the NAACP was not willing to press as long or hard as CORE. The more
moderate organization did not, for example, assist with the Reverse Freedom Ride. Organized
labor was notably absent from CORE’s employment campaigns. CORE’s ally, the Civil Rights
Committee of the IUE, became inactive after Jesse Epps left the Syracuse area in 1964. Other
local labor unions voiced no support for CORE’s objectives and, given the exclusionary practices
of many unions, may have even worked against CORE behind the scenes. Meanwhile, although

extensively studied Black labor efforts and employment campaigns. For example, Beth Tompkin Bates demonstrates
how the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, formed in 1925, “helped shape the rise of protest politics” and framed
economic rights as civil rights. The Brotherhood, under the leadership of A. Philip Randolph, formed the March on
Washington Movement and succeeded in compelling President Roosevelt to integrate the defense industry during
World War II. Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America, 1925-1945 (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 12, 161.
Martha Biondi has documented how activists in New York City fought for and gained access to defense
jobs during World War II. Following the war, the Black Labor Left worked to preserve hard-won industrial jobs
through trade unionism. In the 1950s, a postwar “capital-labor consensus” and anti-communism stymied Black labor
activists. Biondi notes the legacy of this activism: “[N]orthern Blacks’ demand for proportionate hiring plans
accelerated the push for affirmative action and contributed to the eventual adoption of such plans by some
employers and universities across the nation in the 1970s and beyond.” To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil
Rights in Postwar New York City. Cambridge (Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), 3-4, 17-37, 250-271.
In Freedom is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, Nancy MacLean demonstrates how
“[t]he quest for jobs and justice. . .involved a more robust vision of equality than the legal change evoked by the
phrase ‘civil rights.’” She argues that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was a turning point in the struggle against
exclusionary employment practices that impacted not only African Americans but also other workers of color and
women of all backgrounds. She documents the transformative impact of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and affirmative action policies while simultaneously tracing the conservative backlash that evolved in
tandem with efforts to reduce economic inequality. MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough (New York: Russell Sage and
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 5-6, 8-9, 226-237.
Local studies provide the opportunity to examine specific campaigns as well as to situate economic justice
within shifting organizational and movement priorities. In an exploration of intraracial class politics and activism in
St. Louis between 1936 and 1975, Clarence Lang argues that Black-working-class activists drove the civil rights
agenda for much of the mid-twentieth century, with middle-class Black politicians and entrepreneurs gaining
ascendance as a new historic bloc in the 1970s. Lang’s explanation of the shifts of the 1970s are somewhat
unsatisfactory, but his attention to class politics and the range of Black agendas is important. Clarence Lang,
Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics and Black Freedom Struggle in St. Louis, 1936-75 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2009), 7.
See also: Michael Ezra, ed., The Economic Civil Rights Movement: African Americans and the Struggle for
Economic Power (New York: Routledge, 2013). This edited volume contains essays that shed new light on the
struggle for economic equality between World War II and the 1970s, from an examination of women’s leadership in
the push for the integration of the defense industry to the Black capitalism movement.

208

some local faith leaders endorsed CORE’s NiMo efforts, it was ultimately too little, too late.
Perhaps most crucially, low-income and working-class Black Syracusans did not want to be led.
Many chose to pursue change through other channels, such was the city’s two War on Poverty
funded initiatives.
Through a strategy of cooptation and attrition, business leaders and local officials
attempted to diffuse CORE’s momentum and exhaust its financial and human resources. White
leaders supported the establishment of a local chapter of the Urban League in 1964. As with the
creation of the Mayor’s Commission for Human Rights the previous year, the formation of the
Urban League gave the appearance of change while blunting CORE’s efforts to achieve
measurable results. A hostile press ignored the Niagara Mohawk demonstrations when possible,
and minimized the breadth of CORE’s support in the articles it did publish. During the NiMO
protests, arrests resulted in high bail costs, criminal charges, and mounting legal fees. These
external threats exacerbated internal tensions and destroyed the chapter. Although CORE
succeeded in compelling Niagara Mohawk management to agree to a fair employment policy, the
NiMo campaign was Syracuse CORE’s last major demonstration.

Taking on Hotel Syracuse
In the early 1960s, Black workers throughout the United States were struggling. As
Martha Biondi notes, “[i]n earnings, labor force participation, and occupational attainment,
Black workers were further behind whites in 1960 than they had been at the end of World War
II.”526 In the Salt City, the median income for African Americans was 78% of that of white
Syracusans.527 This was actually a higher Black-to-white income ratio than in other upstate
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cities. However, as noted in chapter one, there were far fewer Black professionals in Syracuse
compared to elsewhere in the state. Only 2.7% of Black workers in the Salt City earned over
$6,000 per year in 1960, in contrast to 5.2% in Buffalo and 3.7% in Rochester.528 Automation
was a looming threat for Black factory workers throughout the urban North. Indeed, 36% of
Syracuse area workers were employed in manufacturing in 1960. This proportion would decrease
to less than 24% over the next two decades.529 Although these losses were partially offset by the
growth of the service sector, the Black unemployment rate, already twice that of white workers,
continued to grow. By 1970, the unemployment rate for Black men in Syracuse was 9.9%
compared to 3.6% for white men.530
One indicator of the prevalence of discrimination in employment and labor unions in
Syracuse is the complete absence of Black men and women from a number of job categories. In
1960, more than 80% of African Americans were clustered in unskilled, semiskilled, and service
jobs.531 Based on a sample of census data, Syracuse University researchers found that there were
no Black male accountants, chemists (the report did not capture George Wiley’s arrival in
Syracuse that year), writers, social welfare workers, teachers, medical or dental technicians,
insurance or real estate agents, electricians, plumbers or pipefitters, elevator operators, fire
fighters, or police officers. There were only four Black carpenters. The almost complete absence
of Black workers in the skilled construction trades is unsurprising given the nepotistic and
exclusionary practices of craft unions.532 The report’s gendered division of data indicated there
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were no Black women accountants, writers, librarians, nurses, social welfare workers, medical or
dental technicians, office machine operators, or stenographers. In contrast, Black workers were
represented in all of the above job categories in Buffalo and in most of the categories in
Rochester and Albany.533 In the years following the 1960 census, Black workers in the Salt City
made incremental progress in some areas—the number of Black teachers, for example, increased
to 47 by 1964—but employment discrimination persisted.
When Syracuse CORE opened its storefront office on East Adams Street in July 1963,
the chapter was gaining momentum along with the national civil rights movement. From its new
location, the university-based cadre aspired to expand its base, foster grassroots Black
leadership, and respond to the issues that most concerned Black residents of the Fifteenth Ward.
The organization did not always realize these aspirations, but it did take on a community issue
that summer. Visitors to the new office expressed their frustration that the Hotel Syracuse
employed African Americans in only the lowest-paying job categories of housekeeping,
dishwashing, and laundry. The hotel did not employ any African Americans as bellhops, wait
staff, or busboys—all relatively desirable, tipped positions. Eager to act on community concerns,
CORE immediately investigated and attempted to initiate negotiations with the hotel’s
manager.534
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Figure 19: The Columns of Hotel Syracuse viewed from S. Warren St. in Syracuse, NY

Located less than a mile from CORE’s office in the heart of downtown, the Hotel
Syracuse symbolized Black citizens’ frustrations with employment discrimination in the Deep
North. Hotel Syracuse had been the Salt City’s most luxurious hotel since its opening in 1924. It
occupied an entire triangle-shaped block and offered over six-hundred rooms spread across three
brick towers that resembled Graeco-Roman columns. Affluent guests and Syracuse’s elite
danced in the hotel’s lavish ballroom, drank cocktails in the Rainbow Lounge, and dined in its
multiple restaurants.535 The hotel was a popular location for government functions and civic
organization meetings and was also a site where white leaders brokered deals about the Salt
City’s future. Within this opulent setting, hotel administrators relegated Black Syracusans to the
kitchens and laundry rooms, and to servicing guest rooms.
Syracuse CORE quickly developed a campaign that had a clear but limited objective. In a
letter to the hotel manager, CORE’s co-chairperson enumerated three demands: that the hotel
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immediately hire a Black waiter, bellhop, and busboy; agree to a timetable for increasing the
number of Black employees in these categories to 5%; and include a statement of equal
opportunity in all future want-ads.536 By demanding proportional hiring, CORE ensured that the
hotel would go beyond tokenism to meaningfully integrate its staff—although CORE did not
extend its demands to management positions. African Americans wanted access to service sector
job categories that would provide a degree of economic security, and they also wanted to be a
visible part of the operation of the most important hotel in the region. In this way, CORE’s
campaign echoed efforts in the 1950s to secure “breakthrough jobs” for African Americans in
positions that entailed contact with white customers, allowing Black workers to demonstrate that
“they were capable of work in any sector of the economy.”537 That the hotel positions were
tipped was problematic. A frequently racialized practice that allowed companies to save money
by offering lower wages, tipping required Black workers to rely on the beneficence of white
guests to make ends meet.538 Thus the protests combined a focus on modest job categories with
an innovative demand for proportional hiring and confrontational direct-action tactics.
After several weeks of negotiations with hotel management failed to yield any results,
CORE initiated demonstrations.539 Over the course of six days, CORE’s Hotel Syracuse protest
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made an impactful statement about the relationship between race, space, and power in the Salt
City. On the evening of Wednesday, August 7th, about sixty protesters gathered at the CORE
office and marched to the Hotel Syracuse. On their journey, they passed by the Pioneer Homes
housing project, the urban renewal demolition sites, as well as homes and businesses that had not
yet been cleared. Additional participants joined the group as it snaked through the Fifteenth
Ward. Singing freedom songs, the protesters entered the hotel on East Onondaga Street, marched
through the hotel lobby, and exited the hotel on South Warren Street.540 Each day, picketers
gathered on the sidewalk outside the hotel in the morning and circled the building from sun-up to
sundown.541 Excluded from most employment categories at the prosperous hotel, Black
Syracusans and their allies resisted this marginalization by claiming physical space in the
business and the center of the city.

Figure 20: Barbara Johnson leads a CORE picket line, August 1963
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The demonstrations followed the CORE playbook for nonviolent protests. On the
sidewalk outside the hotel, the protesters were orderly and embodied middle-class respectability.
A photograph in the Syracuse People’s Weekly captured Barbara Johnson, an African-American
woman who directed CORE’s youth group, smiling, a jacket and handbag tucked over her arm.
Dressed elegantly in a dark pencil skirt, a sleeveless blouse, and a beaded necklace, she appeared
professional and confident. Despite the summer heat, other protesters also turned out in their
Sunday best, implicitly refuting stereotypes of Black Syracusans as degenerate migrant
workers.542 Meanwhile, Anna Mae Williams, an omnipresent force on CORE picket lines,
monitored the teenage boys participating in the demonstration. Williams described onlookers
who spat and jeered at the demonstrators in an attempt to provoke a fight, and she ensured that
protesters remained nonviolent.543 Bruce Thomas, the newly elected CORE chairman,
maintained order and enthusiasm by singing freedom songs in his beautiful, booming voice.544
Hotel staff, guests, and police officers observed the protests with curiosity and irritation, but
none took action to curtail the activity.
With increasing boldness, the demonstrators also disrupted business in the hotel lobby.
Ed Day, a white graduate student who later dropped out to work for CORE, recalled with glee
that they “took over the goddamn hotel” and described the protest as “the most fun action I have
ever participated in in my life.”545 Day described how a fellow graduate student from the
Maxwell School of Public Affairs, Roger Knapp, experienced a civil rights conversion during the
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protests. Although Knapp only went downtown to observe the demonstrations, he became swept
up in the spirit of the moment. He was soon wearing a placard and standing in front of the checkin desk “while the troops marched around him.”546 Formerly one of the most conservative
graduate students among the Maxwell crowd, after the Hotel Syracuse demonstrations, Knapp
became an active member of CORE.
The deployment of more disruptive tactics presaged the approach CORE would use in the
urban renewal demonstrations the following month. By Sunday evening, the demonstrations
intruded beyond the lobby. George Wiley led a contingent of protestors into the Rainbow
Lounge, a swanky drinking spot that had been operating since shortly after the end of
Prohibition. He and a representative from the national CORE office, whom the local chapter had
requested in order to lend credibility and visibility to the protests, took the stage and delivered
short speeches.547
These tactics impelled the hotel management to come to the negotiating table on
Tuesday, August 13th. CORE engaged in some “fun and games” during the negotiations. Ed Day
remembered that “Bruce Thomas would be the heavy and then we would have a white guy who
would. . .try to calm Thomas down during the negotiations. . .And Bruce would growl.”548 These
tactics were effective. CORE reached an agreement with the hotel after two days. In a joint
statement signed by Bruce Thomas and the president of Hotel Syracuse, the hotel agreed to
immediately hire three African Americans to fill busboy vacancies with the understanding that
they could work toward promotion as waiters. The hotel agreed to interview Black applicants for
future waitstaff, bellman, and doorman vacancies and to advertise that the hotel was an equal
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opportunity employer. CORE acknowledged that the hotel had to honor its existing agreement
with the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union when hiring—a potential impediment to the
realization of the hiring goals.549 The hotel agreed to work to increase the proportion of African
Americans in each job category to 5% of the total staff.550 The Syracuse People’s Weekly
triumphantly described this outcome as “[a] major leap forward in the civil rights struggle.”551
CORE’s victory against Hotel Syracuse positioned the chapter at the forefront of local
civil rights activity on employment. As the Syracuse People’s Weekly proclaimed, “CORE
officials believe this is the first time that a Syracuse employer and a civil rights organization
have ever formulated a systematic program to overcome job discrimination. No one else in the
community, says CORE, has done more than talk about being non-discriminatory.”552 Less than
a month after taking on the hotel’s employment practices, CORE had reached an agreement with
the president of Hotel Syracuse. CORE won by causing a disruption that dissuaded potential
guests, costing the hotel thousands of dollars in lost revenue. Not a single protester had been
arrested. With national attention focused on civil rights leading up to the March on Washington
on August 28th, hotel management and police had been hesitant to crack down on the
demonstrations. Although Ed Day remembered the protest as increasing the chapter’s credibility
with Black Syracusans, Bruce Thomas later expressed frustration with the limited nature of the
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victory. Rather than following up on employment at the hotel, CORE moved quickly onto the
issue of housing segregation and urban renewal.553
Thomas might also have observed with frustration that Syracuse CORE missed an
opportunity to incorporate employment demands into the urban renewal demonstrations.
Elsewhere in the country, civil rights activists were protesting at federally funded construction
sites throughout the spring and summer of 1963. In Philadelphia, the local CORE chapter was at
the vanguard of challenging discrimination in construction. Philadelphia CORE began picketing
the mayor’s office in April, and the chapter made a bold demand for racial quotas in
apprenticeship programs and city contracts. In partial response to this unrest, President Kennedy
issued Executive Order 11114, prohibiting discrimination in federally funded construction
projects, in June. Construction protests spread to Harlem, Cleveland, and Trenton and Newark,
New Jersey over the course of the summer.554 As Tom Sugrue argues, within a few years, this
grassroots activism “fundamentally reoriented the civil rights debate,” pressuring the Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon administrations to craft what became known as “affirmative action” policies.
These policies had far-reaching consequences for the employment landscape in the United
States.555
With its urban renewal demonstrations, Syracuse CORE prioritized combatting spatial
segregation over economic justice, which was a strategic choice. Perhaps they feared diluting
their message by layering employment demands onto their campaign. But as other cities
demonstrated, tax-payer funded urban renewal and construction projects provided leverage for an
array of civil rights demands, including employment. Given the Syracuse Black community’s
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expressed desire for expanded employment opportunities, pressing for access to construction
jobs may have resonated with residents of the Fifteenth Ward. Ultimately, CORE did not raise
employment discrimination as a concern at any point during the dramatic protests that led to
ninety-nine arrests in fall 1963.
Following the urban renewal demonstrations, a group of civic and corporate leaders
started laying the groundwork to bring a new—and less controversial—civil rights organization
to the Salt City: the Urban League. With its emphasis on advocacy and service provision, such as
workforce and youth development, the Urban League’s approach to civil rights was less
threatening to the city’s existing power relations than CORE’s. In November 1963, the executive
director of the national Urban League, Whitney Young, made an appearance in the city to help
launch fundraising efforts for the new affiliate. In his remarks, he noted that the Urban League’s
objectives were not in conflict with direct-action groups, which were also necessary.556
According to historian Nancy MacLean, employment was a shared concern of the nation’s
largest civil rights organizations, but they had competing visions for how to achieve change. For
example, A. Philip Randolph’s Negro American Labor Council “believed that union activism
was the best route, the NAACP stressed legal challenges, CORE urged community-based direct
action, and the Urban League promoted job training for workers whom it entreated companies to
hire.”557 At the local level, these differences manifested as competition, cooptation, as well as
moments of cooperation.
In Syracuse, the effort to establish the Urban League of Onondaga County was clearly a
response to CORE’s style of activism and agenda. For those who were uncomfortable with
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demonstrations and protests, the Urban League offered a new channel through which to promote
civil rights. Although CORE members recognized the Urban League’s proponents desire to
diminish CORE’s influence in the city, CORE did not oppose the creation of the new
organization. George Wiley even lent his support to the effort.558 As Wretha Wiley later
explained, the Urban League “was viewed not so much as a threat as funny. We enjoyed that
and. . .demanded a place on the [b]oard.”559
While the local CORE, NAACP, and Urban League chapters competed to represent the
interests of the Black community, Syracuse CORE gained prominence within the national
organization and through statewide coalition building. On the first day of the Upstate CORE
Conference in February 1964, the national CORE office issued a press release welcoming
George Wiley to its governing body, the National Action Council, and announcing the
appointment of Ron Corwin as Field Secretary to upstate New York. Wiley also used the
conference as an opportunity to generate excitement for a statewide “March on Albany” on
March 10th. Directed by Bayard Rustin, the architect of the previous year’s March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom, the demonstration was a coalition-based effort sponsored by
CORE, the New York State NAACP branches, the National Association for Puerto Rican Civil
Rights, as well as “more than 15 New York City fraternal, labor, church, and other civil rights
groups.”560
The March on Albany was an attempt to expand the civil rights movement to more fully
encompass economic justice and progressive politics. Just a few weeks after coordinating the
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New York City school boycott, Rustin appeared at the Upstate CORE Conference, where he
articulated the March on Albany’s main demand: “While the labor movement sleeps. . .it is only
the Negro people who have proposed, with their white friends, marching on Albany to ask for a
$1.50 minimum wage.”561 This statement underscores Rustin’s vision that the civil rights
movement should take the lead in securing economic benefits for all marginalized workers. The
March on Albany served as an opportunity for Rustin to lay out an expansive agenda. In addition
to the $1.50 minimum wage, the demonstration sought to pressure New York State elected
officials to pass legislation to legalize rent strikes, prohibit discrimination in apprenticeship and
training programs, and eliminate voting literacy tests in New York State.562
Syracuse CORE played a pivotal role in mobilizing support for the March on Albany and
ensuring that it was truly a statewide endeavor. Ron Corwin served as the upstate coordinator for
the March, which was no small task. Attendees at the Upstate CORE Conference received a
march manual that instructed participants about how to meet with their legislators, offered a list
of approved slogans for posters, and advised demonstrators to fill out a registration slip and pack
their own lunch. The manual included contact information for groups leaving from Binghamton,
Buffalo, Niagara Falls, Rochester, Syracuse, Utica, and Ithaca.563 The other supporting groups
were based in New York City, where Rustin had an expansive network.
About 3,000 demonstrators from thirty cities converged on the state capital on March
10th. Winter weather prevented the groups from Buffalo and Utica from making the trip to
Albany. While civil rights and labor organizer A. Philip Randolph and other leaders met with
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Governor Rockefeller, Rustin and other protestors trudged through six inches of snow and
endured freezing rain as they marched around the capitol. The results of the lobbying and rally
were disappointing. A national CORE leader told the press that “[b]y and large. . .we got what
we’ve always gotten—sympathy” rather than actionable change.564 For example, the bill to raise
the minimum wage from $1.15 to $1.50 was held up by a Republican-controlled Labor
Committee.565 Neither did the march generate extensive media coverage: The New York Times
published a substantive piece about the demonstration, but in Syracuse the Post-Standard printed
only a brief article on page ten.566 The upstate CORE chapters did not receive recognition in
either article. Given that 250,000 demonstrators had gathered at the March on Washington and
more than 450,000 had participated in the New York City school boycott—both due in part to
Rustin’s organizational brilliance—the turnout in Albany was meager and less newsworthy.567
A largely forgotten protest, the March on Albany represents the attempts of some civil
rights leaders to center economic concerns and to maintain momentum after the surge of activism
in 1963.568 The disappointing results highlight the political challenges that civil rights activists
faced. A spirit of gradualism prevailed in Albany, even though Governor Rockefeller was a
liberal Republican who supported civil rights legislation. Following his meeting with the March
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on Albany delegation, Rockefeller asserted that “I don’t think all of these problems can be solved
as rapidly as these gentlemen would like to have them—and all of us would like to have them—
solved.”569
The CORE archival material does not capture the reactions of the Syracuse members to
the March on Albany. Over fifty-five years after the demonstration, Ron Corwin had no memory
of the initiative. For the Syracuse chapter, perhaps the underwhelming outcome of the march
dissuaded them from continued statewide coalition building and political lobbying. CORE’s
Employment Committee turned instead to initiating negotiations with the Niagara Mohawk
Power Company—a discriminatory employer that carried even greater symbolic weight than the
Hotel Syracuse.

Confronting Power: The Niagara Mohawk Campaign

Figure 21: The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Building on Erie Blvd. W in Syracuse, NY
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A public utility company, NiMo employed fewer than ten African Americans out of a
1,500-member Syracuse-based workforce.570 To Syracuse CORE, this represented a clear case of
“tokenism” in hiring. Formed by the merging of several energy companies in 1950—part of a
post-World War II transformation in energy delivery that sought to lower prices for customers—
Niagara Mohawk’s service area spanned from Buffalo at the state’s western edge to the capital in
Albany, its profits fueled by hydroelectric power generated by the waters of the St. Lawrence
River that cascaded over Niagara Falls. Given its monopoly on providing electricity, every
household in the Syracuse area interacted with the company. CORE felt that Niagara Mohawk
had an obligation to lead the region in integrating its workforce.571
CORE’s Employment Committee, which was co-chaired by Ron Corwin, chose to launch
a campaign against NiMo after researching the employee demographics of companies throughout
the city. Unlike with the Hotel Syracuse campaign, community members had not come to CORE
with a specific concern about the utility company. CORE targeted NiMo in part because Utica
CORE had recently challenged the employer and won. According to a former Utica CORE
member, after only two meetings, NiMO’s Utica manager agreed to hire about ten Black
employees. Utica CORE passed the message onto their peers in Syracuse, where the members
decided that NiMo would be “an easy target.”572 As with Hotel Syracuse, CORE identified a
pragmatic hiring goal based on the city’s demographics: they aimed to persuade the utility
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company to commit to hiring ninety Black employees over the next three years. If this target
were attained, African Americans would represent 6% of Niagara Mohawk’s workforce, aligning
with their proportion of the overall Syracuse population.573 This committee-based approach to
developing campaigns was rational and methodical but lacked the responsiveness of the Hotel
Syracuse initiative.
After the research phase of work, CORE reached out to Niagara Mohawk to initiate
formal conversations about “tokenism” in the utility company’s workforce. The company
referred CORE to Frank Osta, NiMo’s Vice President of Employee Relations. Osta initially
avoided meeting with CORE’s representative, Robert Myers, by dodging two scheduled
appointments and two unscheduled visits. Myers finally met with Osta on July 1, 1964, and
outlined CORE’s objective of bringing NiMo’s African American workforce in proportion to the
Black population of Syracuse. Osta indicated he was willing to engage in further talks but
wanted to avoid committing the company to any hiring program that would implicate it in past
discrimination.574 CORE continued to press for serious discussions, but Osta was unyielding. He
felt that a pledge from the utility company not to discriminate was sufficient and refused to
examine hiring practices at NiMo. As CORE explained, “[t]he negotiations apparently failed, not
because of any disagreement regarding facts and figures, but because Mr. Osta questioned the
basic validity of a clear program for integration of the workforce.”575
Osta undoubtedly brought this attitude to his service on both the board of the newly
established Urban League of Onondaga County and the Employment Opportunities Committee
of the Chamber of Commerce. Through these institutions, Osta and other white business leaders
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attempted to coopt conversations about employment and job discrimination as a means of
blunting the efforts of groups such as CORE. Osta made performative gestures of support for
racial equality, including convening a one-day program on equal employment opportunities.
CORE and ten other agencies attended this program, and the Chamber of Commerce distributed
copies of CORE’s Project 101.576 When confronted with the discriminatory practices at his own
company, however, Osta was intransigent. An archetypal 1960s businessman with thick-rimmed
glasses and a receding hairline, he objected to the efforts of CORE or any outside entity to
dictate the nature or pace of change at his company.
Conspicuously absent from this and subsequent negotiations was any official from, or
even mention of, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) local that
represented NiMO employees. At the national level, the IBEW—not to be confused with the
International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), which represented workers at Syracuse’s
General Electric plant and was an active supporter of the civil rights movement—had an
inglorious record on the issue of racial equality. An IBEW history acknowledged that “[B]lack
electrical workers had been all but ignored by the IBEW prior to World War II, and it took the
rise of a national civil rights movement—and the threat of federal legislation—to persuade the
international to act on their behalf.”577 The grassroots construction protests that erupted in 1963
and Kennedy’s Executive Order 11114, issued that June, finally compelled the union to seek
approval from the U.S. Secretary of Labor for a new apprentice selection process. Despite the
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position of the International, many IBEW construction locals continued to resist opening their
training programs.578
In the Salt City, CORE was aware that some labor unions were an impediment to
progress in employment. The employment section of Project 101 called on unions to “end
discriminatory practices in their apprenticeship training programs” and ensure “a fair and equal
distribution of all jobs.”579 Yet CORE focused its campaign solely on Niagara Mohawk’s
management. CORE’s public-facing materials contain no mention of the IBEW, and the CORE
archival records do not document any correspondence or interaction with the union.580 Likewise,
the IBEW did not issue any public statements related to CORE’s NiMo campaign. The total
silence on both sides is surprising.581 As with the Hotel Syracuse campaign, what is clear was
that organized labor was not actively working to support CORE’s agenda in the city. Even if
CORE succeeded in reaching an agreement with Niagara Mohawk management, the union could
serve as another means of blunting CORE’s progress and impeding change.
By fall 1964, with negotiations having broken down, CORE moved on to direct-action
protest. During a visit to Syracuse, national CORE director James Farmer voiced his support for
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this course of action. He provocatively suggested a “power black-out” as a potential strategy.582
Perhaps not relishing the idea of working by candlelight, the CORE chapter did not take up this
suggestion. A few weeks after Farmer’s visit, CORE picketed outside the Hotel Syracuse while
the Urban League of Onondaga County met inside. Because Frank Osta sat on the League’s
board of directors, CORE demanded to know whether the Urban League would tolerate NiMo’s
employment tokenism.583
As the members weighed next steps in the Niagara-Mohawk conflict at the end of 1964,
the CORE chapter had to negotiate a combination of factors that transformed their membership.
Key members drifted away. Byron Rushing had returned to Boston in July. Exhausted from a
year of non-stop organizing, Ron Corwin stepped back from his CORE participation shortly after
setting up a CORE storefront in Atlantic City during the Democratic National Convention in
August 1964. He was also aware that Black leaders were increasingly challenging the role of
white participants in the civil rights movement. A new issue soon emerged that commanded his
and other activists’ attention: the Vietnam War.584 Indeed, the following year, opposition to the
war escalated as increasing numbers of young men were drafted and sent to Southeast Asia.
College campuses across the country, including Syracuse University, became sites of anti-war
teach-ins and protests. Solving the intractable problems Black Americans faced required
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ceaseless struggle that yielded often ambiguous results, whereas the anti-war movement had a
clear goal: the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region.585
CORE was also a victim of its own success, highlighting the difficulties of scaling social
movements. George Wiley’s organizing work had impressed James Farmer, and in November
1964, Farmer invited Wiley to become associate national director of CORE.586 Wiley accepted
without hesitation and took a one-year leave of absence from Syracuse University. The Wileys
moved to New York City in January 1965. Ed Day soon joined Wiley as the National Business
Manager.587 Syracuse CORE members who were devoted to Wiley understood that the
chemistry-professor-turned-activist could make a broader impact from the national office, but
they nonetheless felt disappointed.588
A new initiative at the university also drained CORE’s leadership. In December 1964, the
Community Action Training Center, organized by Professor Warren Haggstrom of the School of
Social Work, received a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity. One of the nation’s first
War on Poverty programs, the Training Center needed organizers to join the first cohort of
trainees. Bruce Thomas, frustrated with the limitations of CORE’s ability to organize the Black
community, went to work for Haggstrom.589 Inez Heard and Anna Mae Williams also became
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involved with War on Poverty programs. Civil rights leaders across the country felt that the War
on Poverty coopted the movement’s talent.590 For Black antipoverty workers, though, the
programs were an unprecedented opportunity to get paid to serve their communities.591
CORE lacked members who could step into the vacuum left by the departure of these
leaders. Ed Day was hopeful that CORE’s strong committee structure would help it transition to
a new phase. When he left for New York City, there were a half dozen functioning committees,
including employment, police brutality, housing, and education. As Day explained, “the
committees would have a meeting once a week in someone's living room where they would talk
about the issue, research it, gather information. It was extremely well-organized on one kind of
level—the kind of thing you would not expect a bunch of radical nuts to be doing.”592 Day and
Wiley worked with the committee heads to prepare them to run the chapter collaboratively.
Bruce Thomas’s friend, Charlie Goldsmith, a construction worker and automotive body
specialist, assumed the chairmanship. Goldsmith resented Thomas’s perceived defection to the
War on Poverty, and Thomas, although still local, explained that he felt it was important to “stay
away from CORE and leave it up to Charlie how they wanted to go.”593 The chapter pressed
forward with the Niagara Mohawk Campaign in early 1965.
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Throughout the NiMo demonstrations, CORE deployed creative strategies. When the
chapter started picketing, they chose locations that would maximize visibility and would
potentially embarrass the company’s leadership. In November 1964, they demonstrated outside
the World Public Relations Congress in Montreal, Canada, where Niagara Mohawk was
represented. In January, a group of CORE members drove to Oswego, New York, on the shore of
Lake Ontario. They demonstrated outside a meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
which was holding a public hearing about Niagara Mohawk’s application to construct an atomic
power plant in the area.594
Connecting the AEC meeting to employment concerns was a clever move that leveraged
the evolving climate of federal intervention in employment practices. As Tom Sugrue argues,
during the 1960s “[p]rotests and policy innovations reinforced each other in a feedback loop.”595
In 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925, which prohibited employment
discrimination in government jobs and work contracted by the government. It also required
federal contractors to “take affirmative action” to employ workers “without regard to their race,
creed, color, or national origin,” although it left later presidential administrations to more
precisely define affirmative action.596 Kennedy also established a President’s Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity. Although it had no budget or enforcement powers, civil rights
activists nonetheless submitted appeals using the grievance process.597 Syracuse CORE and its
allies would cite Executive Order 10925 in the NiMo campaign. In testimony before the AEC,
however, a member of CORE’s Employment Committee instead argued that “[t]he Civil Rights
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Act of 1964 was a clear affirmation by the federal government of equal opportunity for all its
citizens.”598 CORE demanded that a fair employment clause be included in any agreement the
AEC entered into with Niagara Mohawk.
Because Oswego, a smaller and more homogenous city than Syracuse, was not
accustomed to demonstrations, the CORE members drew a lot of attention. Fern Freel conveyed
the adrenaline-rush generated by picketing in a letter to George Wiley. The mayor of Oswego
welcomed the CORE contingent with a speech, and the police were “extremely helpful.” As
more than a dozen protesters, including CORE lawyer Faith Seidenberg, braved the frigid
temperatures and the bitter wind whipping off the lake, two CORE members spoke at the
hearing. Outside, a “far-right Oswego citizen” was angered by the presence of the picketers.
Freel recounted matter-of-factly that “Sue Tyler, Lillian Reiner and I got punched. The sheriff
had to calm him down.” The fact that a white man attacked three female civil rights activists
speaks to the risks entailed in participating in protest demonstrations in the Deep North.
Ultimately, however, Freel, pleased by the media coverage in Oswego and by WHEN television
in Syracuse, felt that the demonstration was a success.599 Freel’s reaction reveals the importance
of media coverage to Northern civil rights activists, who often struggled to aim the “glaring light
of television” at Northern issues.600 Although the demonstration did not elicit any response from
NiMo officials, it may well have helped build sympathy and support for CORE’s campaign.
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As CORE planned its next move, national attention focused on the civil rights struggle in
Alabama, where activists demanded voting rights. On March 7th, 1965, which became known as
“Bloody Sunday,” civil rights demonstrators led by John Lewis of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee and Hosea Williams of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
set out to march from Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery. They got no farther than the
Edmund Pettus Bridge, where state troopers brutally intercepted the demonstration. Troopers
assaulted protesters with billy clubs and tear gas. The violence, captured by news reporters and
televised across the nation, bolstered public support for the civil rights movement.601 It became
one of the most widely recognized visual events of the civil rights era.
The following day—Monday, March 8th—Syracuse CORE launched demonstrations
against the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.602 In addition to their demand that NiMo
commit to increasing their Black workforce in proportion with the city’s demographics, CORE
also wanted the company to reevaluate the requirement of a high school diploma for certain job
categories.603 These inflated qualifications had a discriminatory impact on Black job seekers who
had struggled in unequal and deficient public schools.
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Syracuse CORE’s new Executive Secretary, John McDowell, arrived in town for the
second day of protests. McDowell, a thirty-three-year-old white man from Buffalo, had spent six
years as a Catholic missionary priest in the Redemptorist Order. He left the priesthood in 1960
and became a founding member of Rochester CORE. From there he became deeply immersed in
the civil rights movement, participating in numerous iconic CORE demonstrations: the Route 40
Freedom Rides, which integrated restaurants on a highway in Maryland frequented by African
diplomats; sit-ins at the Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn; the New York City school
boycott; and Queens CORE’s World’s Fair demonstrations in 1964. A man with deep religious
convictions, McDowell was willing to risk physical violence to further the cause of civil rights.
CORE’s newsletter noted that after a CORE meeting in Brooklyn, he endured an assault that
required five stitches. McDowell “was almost killed while taking part” in a demonstration in
Prince George County, Maryland.604 McDowell’s principles did not, however, necessarily make
him the right leader for the chapter at such a critical juncture.
McDowell was thrust into a major protest with no time to orient himself to the local
climate or CORE’s internal dynamics. As a native of upstate New York and a veteran of
Rochester CORE, he was familiar with the racial politics of the Deep North. But the CORE
chapter was reeling from the recent departure of George and Wretha Wiley, Ed Day, Ron
Corwin, Bruce Thomas, and Anna Mae Williams. In the midst of this leadership vacuum,
McDowell, a white man with no previous connections in the Salt City, became CORE’s only
paid employee. Given CORE’s challenges evolving into a fully grassroots organization,
McDowell was in a difficult position that no amount of missionary fervor could compensate for.
CORE’s low wages meant that no local Black member, especially if they had a family to support,
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could afford to take on the role of Executive Secretary. For example, Goldsmith, CORE’s
chairperson, worked at an autobody shop. Frank Britton, another key local member, lived in
Pioneer Homes with his wife and three children. All three men were fully committed to the
NiMo campaign, but they had no opportunity to get acquainted before the protests began.
In the Salt City, resistance to the racial systems of the Deep South and the Deep North
merged. Although the NiMo campaign was not planned to coincide with the voting rights drama
in the South, Syracuse CORE leveraged the Selma protests with intentionality. On March 9th and
March 10th, CORE members joined students from Syracuse University and others who picketed
outside the Federal Building in downtown Syracuse, demanding federal intervention in Alabama.
The Interfaith Committee on Religion and Race endorsed the demonstrations and sent Monsignor
Charles Brady to Selma.605 In a CORE press release, Executive Secretary McDowell linked the
efforts to combat discrimination locally as well as in the South: “The people of Syracuse are
deeply hurt by the beatings and jailings in Selma. But the same problems exist in Syracuse. If the
people of Syracuse believe in equality, they must start now to solve problems at home.”606 The
release also included the text of telegrams that CORE sent to President Johnson and the Attorney
General demanding a federal response to the situation in Selma.
Later that week, CORE escalated the NiMo demonstrations with new tactics. The
protesters moved from the sidewalk to the lobby of the Niagara Mohawk building. On Friday
March 12th, a group of activists stalled business at the cashier’s window by paying their bills in
pennies.607 Liz Page helped prepare for the protest by going to the bank to cash a hundred-dollar
bill in for pennies. She also recalled the anger of customers who had to wait in line to pay their
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utility bills.608 CORE sought to highlight the fact that “1 out of every 19 people served by
Niagara Mohawk in Syracuse is a Negro, compared with 1 out of every 187 employes [sic].”609
Over the following weeks, CORE’s NiMo demonstrations competed for attention in the
local press with the drama unfolding in Selma. In the Salt City, Niagara Mohawk closed its doors
to non-customers, and police arrested ten CORE members who succeeded in entering and sat-in
at the cashier’s window and outside administrative offices. One activist was arrested for sitting in
the company’s driveway.610 Meanwhile, a Mississippi CORE member who lived in Syracuse was
arrested for chaining himself to the flagpole at the federal building.611 Meanwhile, faith leaders
and activists from Syracuse traveled to Alabama to join a new attempt to complete the fifty-mile
march from Selma to Montgomery. Six Episcopal ministers were arrested during their trip.
During a press conference that the Episcopal group held upon its return, a minister from a suburb
to the east of Syracuse encouraged people to form “a greater awareness that the problems
Negroes face are not confined to the south. Here the barriers. . .are more subtle.”612 To drive
home this point, on March 22nd, some of the Selma veterans joined CORE’s NiMo
demonstrations alongside faith leaders who had been unable to make the trip.
The Post-Standard downplayed the legitimacy of CORE’s conflict with NiMo and also
minimized the breadth of CORE’s support. In fact, the Post-Standard did not cover the
participation of faith leaders in the NiMo protests. Professor Byron Fox, who had been arrested
as part of CORE’s urban renewal demonstrations, pointed out the paper’s disparate coverage of
NiMo and Selma in a letter to the editor, which the Post-Standard published alongside its own
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response. Fox demanded to know why the paper was silent on the faith leaders’ participation:
“This wasn't news? Though it appeared on two television stations?. . .Could the explanation be
that Alabama Power and Light Company gives you no advertising, but that Niagara Mohawk
does?. . .May I remind you that it is our money that pays for discrimination against Negroes at
Niagara Mohawk and for their advertising in your paper?”613 Fox’s statement highlights the
growing importance of local television as a medium through which to gain visibility, something
CORE’s Fern Freel had also noted earlier that year. Additionally, the editorial exchange revealed
the conservative tilt of the newspaper and its disapproval of protests. The Post-Standard
defended its choice to ignore the ongoing protests, stating that “[e]ditors who are worth their salt
become allergic to demonstrators repeating the same actions every day merely to get repeat
headlines.” Immediately after asserting that “[t]he justice or injustice of the picketing was not a
factor in our news treatment,” the editorial went on to comment that “we have felt that the CORE
demonstrators were just as far off base in picketing Niagara Mohawk as they were in most of
their previous demonstrations in Syracuse.”614
An analysis of the Post-Standard coverage of civil rights during the month of March
supports Fox’s claim that Southern events received disparate coverage. On March 18th, the frontpage news stories captured the major developments in the fight for voting rights: AP articles
announced that President Johnson had sent voting rights legislation to Congress and that a
federal judge had awarded a permit for the Selma to Montgomery march. A local article
described the arrest of seven faith leaders in Selma. Flipping through the paper, readers saw an
ad for Niagara Mohawk on page eight. The power company urged housewives to rely on electric
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appliances to complete household tasks because “We Can Clean Anything Better than You
Can”—an allusion to a song from the Broadway hit Annie Get Your Gun.615 Buried on page forty
of the issue was an article about the arrest of two CORE demonstrators at Niagara Mohawk.616
On March 23rd, the day after the Episcopal clergy and other faith leaders joined the
CORE protests, the front page of the Post-Standard announced that the voting rights marchers
were halfway to the Alabama state capital. Local headlines included the gala opening of a new
suburban department store, which the newspaper considered to be more newsworthy than the
ongoing protests at Niagara Mohawk. The newspaper’s response contrasted with its coverage of
the urban renewal demonstrations of 1963, which garnered front page coverage fifteen times.
Regardless of whether the newspaper was motivated to ignore CORE out of animus for the civil
rights organization or whether the occurrence of demonstrations in the city was less shocking
than a few years earlier, the meager and distorted press coverage was a serious challenge for the
CORE chapter to navigate. In general, the Post-Standard’s NiMo coverage focused solely on
CORE protesters and arrests. Journalists chose not to report on the size of the demonstrations or
the civic, civil rights, and faith groups that endorsed CORE’s position.
In fact, a community committee had formed to negotiate with Niagara Mohawk. The
committee included representatives from three civil rights organizations (CORE, NAACP, and
the Urban League), four faith groups (Catholic Interracial Council, Interfaith Commission on
Religion and Race, the Ministers’ Association, and the Northern Christian Leadership
Conference), the Chamber of Commerce, and the Syracuse University Youth Development
Center. NiMo executives agreed to meet with the committee three times during the month of
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March. At the last meeting on March 30th, the Ministers’ Association and the Chamber of
Commerce each presented plans for promoting the integration of NiMo’s workforce.617 Frank
Osta, representing Niagara Mohawk, rejected these proposals and broke off negotiations with the
committee. Osta “claimed that Niagara Mohawk's employment policies were its own business
and that it did not need to discuss them with anyone.”618
In early April, CORE, along with Reverend Emory Proctor of the AME Zion Church and
NAACP chairperson John Acosta, tried to re-start negotiations. Proctor carefully selected a fivemember negotiating team that included himself, two CORE members, another clergyman, and a
representative from the Youth Development Center. According to a CORE report, Niagara
Mohawk rejected this committee and “demanded that Rev. Proctor provide an all-Negro group to
deal with this ‘Negro Problem.’ Rev. Proctor held to the point that this is a community problem
affecting both white and black people.”619 The following day, Niagara Mohawk told the press
that the company would not negotiate with any CORE representatives.
Nearly one month into the direct-action campaign, CORE had mounting legal expenses
and no results. Sandy Myers, a CORE member and SU graduate student, wrote to Ed Day in
New York City pleading for assistance in untangling the chapter’s finances. She was desperately
trying to determine how much remained in CORE’s bail fund and which loans still needed
repaid.620 Day recalled the chapter’s increasing frustration: “They essentially were beating their
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heads against a brick wall and the troops were being depleted and the chapter was being
destroyed. . .so it was really reaching a crisis point and the campaign was going to fail.”621
Rather than give up at this critical juncture, CORE attempted to heighten the drama of the
protests to recapture the community’s attention.
The chapter agreed to try a radical tactic: a stall-in. Executive Secretary John McDowell
has participated in this controversial strategy the previous year when Brooklyn CORE attempted
to block traffic on opening day of the World’s Fair in Queens, New York. James Farmer
disapproved of the action, which was a general protest of racial inequality and not connected
with specific demands, and temporarily suspended the chapter.622 In 1965, as civil rights activists
struggled to bring about a reckoning with the racial system of the Deep North, the tactic was
within the realm of reasonable choices. To assist with the stall-in, Ed Day hopped on a plane
from New York City to Syracuse and helped procure five rental vehicles. The plan was to park
the cars at the entrance of the NiMo parking lot during morning rush hour. A contingent of
dedicated CORE members would chain themselves underneath the cars, making it difficult for
law enforcement to remove them. When the utility company’s more than 1,000 employees were
unable to access the parking lot, they would cause a massive traffic jam in downtown Syracuse.
On Wednesday night, April 7th, the designated CORE members rehearsed in the Wileys’ garage
on Westcott Street.623 With this classic nonviolent action, the activists intended to use their
bodies to disrupt life-as-usual and compel the Salt City to take action on employment
discrimination.
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The following morning, the CORE activists executed the plan as they had rehearsed. Day
and four others chained themselves beneath the rental cars. Police officers, utility company
employees, and other onlookers gathered to observe the spectacle that threatened to disrupt
traffic in the city. Day recalled the terror he experienced when some Niagara Mohawk
“hardhats” tried to move the car that he was under: “I was chained under the rear axle of a station
wagon with my feet just barely exposed out of the back with the center of the axle just above my
chest and they rocked the car and I could see that axle coming right down on my chest and I
thought it was all over. It was very scary.”624 Several police officers also grabbed his feet and
attempted to pull him out, even though they knew he was chained.
The dramatic stall-in did not last as long as expected. The fire department arrived with
hydraulic cutters that sliced through the activists’ chains. Police promptly arrested them and took
them to jail. Day, the last to be pulled from beneath a car, had gone into diabetic shock and was
unconscious. He was charged with four counts of assaulting a police officer, a felony, and
several misdemeanors; the other protesters were charged with misdemeanors. The ensuing legal
battle would nearly end Day’s activist career. That evening, four more protesters were arrested
for standing in the parking lot entrance, including SU professor Byron Fox. Unmoved, Niagara
Mohawk executives refused to negotiate.625
Having recaptured the attention of the local media, CORE highlighted the moral stakes of
the campaign in order to galvanize the faith leaders. The police assisted the chapter with this
work when they arrested Roger Knapp while he was at church on Saturday, April 10th. Police
alleged that Knapp had interfered with arrests during the stall-in. In jail, Knapp, the white activist
who had experienced a civil rights conversion during the Hotel Syracuse demonstrations in 1963,

624
625

Edwin Day, Interview by Nick Kotz, Transcript, n.d., 17.
“NM Blockade: CORE Pickets Arrested,” The Post-Standard, 9 April 1965.

241

refused bail and went on a hunger strike to “[protest] the immorality of the people and the system
responsible for his arrest.”626 He vowed to continue until Niagara Mohawk executives committed
to meaningful negotiations. On Palm Sunday, the beginning of the Christian Holy Week
preceding Easter, CORE members and supporters distributed information about the NiMo
campaign at area churches.
During the NiMo conflict, some Syracuse faith leaders applied their moral authority to
challenge the systemic forces that created and perpetuated racial inequality. Many of the clergy
were steeped in the traditions of Protestant Social Gospel and Catholic Social Thought, which
were responses to the social and economic transformations rendered by industrialization and,
later, the global crisis of the Great Depression.627 In the 1950s, clergy had laid the groundwork
for CORE’s organizing by raising awareness about the challenges facing Black migrant workers
and the substandard conditions in the Fifteenth Ward. Yet as they ministered to the needs of
individuals and attempted to mediate between the Black community and city officials, they had
stopped short of demanding structural change in the Salt City. CORE had pushed the
conversation forward, but many faith leaders had not joined their cause. Now, fresh from the
front lines of the Southern voting rights struggle, some clergy spoke out at home. Others
remained behind-the-scenes or on the side-lines, and later regretted their inaction.628

626
“Comprehensive Report, Niagara Mohawk: Happenings to April, 1965,” Syracuse Congress of Racial
Equality, April 1965, 5.
627
Twentieth-century Catholic Social Thought was based on two papal encyclicals, Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum
Novarum of 1891 and Pope Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anno of 1931. See: Michael Warner, Changing Witness:
Catholic Bishops and Public Policy, 1917-1994 (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Grand Rapids,
MI: William. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 17-18; David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds.,
Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 15-18.
In Protestantism, the Social Gospel movement, which emerged in the nineteenth century, “attempted to
utilize Christian doctrine in the remediation of contemporary crises.” The “social Christians” had differing views on
race and race relations, but Social Gospel thought influenced the civil rights movement and leaders such as Martin
Luther King, Jr. Stanley Keith Arnold, Building the Beloved Community: Philadelphia’s Interracial Civil Rights
Organizations and Race Relations, 1930–1970 (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2014), 12.
628
Fifty years after the protests, Monsignor Charles Fahey and Bishop Thomas Costello expressed regret
that they did not join their colleague, Monsignor Charles Brady, in protesting in Syracuse. Sean Kirst, “Fifty Years

242

The following week, clergy from several denominations mobilized in support of Knapp’s
hunger strike. On Monday, April 12th, the Catholic Interracial Council held an emergency board
meeting and unanimously adopted a statement charging Niagara Mohawk to “show us not only
'How to live better electrically,' in Selmacuse, but also how to live better morally in Syracuse.”629
National CORE director James Farmer came to town and joined a pray-in at the jail, and a group
of ministers began a round-the-clock vigil for Knapp. The Catholic and Episcopal Bishops both
made statements in support of the protests. Fifty Catholics joined the picket lines at Niagara
Mohawk on Holy Saturday. On Easter Sunday, congregations throughout the area prayed for
successful negotiations.630
Negotiations resumed on April 19th. After almost nine days, Roger Knapp ended his
hunger strike, and the ministers likewise ended their vigil. The Mayor’s Commission for Human
Rights stepped in as a mediator between Niagara Mohawk and CORE. Despite CORE’s historic
skepticism of the Mayor’s Commission, CORE agreed that it was the appropriate entity to
mediate. CORE had in fact asked the mayor to intervene earlier that month. The chapter
disagreed, however, with the composition of the mediating team, which was chaired by Ralph
Kharas, Dean of the Syracuse University Law School and member of the Mayor’s Commission.
A CORE report noted that the team “includes no representation of religious leadership. This is a
moral problem: its solution calls for more than a mediator trained and steeped in the legal
tradition.”631
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This new round of negotiations did not progress smoothly. The participants met for a
third negotiating session in downtown Syracuse on the evening of Friday April 23rd. Shortly
before midnight, Dean Kharas adjourned the meeting. The five CORE representatives present
objected to the adjournment and refused to leave the negotiating table. They were locked inside
the building overnight. Executive Secretary John McDowell began a fast in protest of the
situation, and a vigil formed outside. The group agreed to leave the building if Niagara
Mohawk’s Executive Vice President would meet with them. The Executive Vice President
refused. Saturday evening, police entered the building and arrested the activists.632
The arraignment of the CORE activists on Monday morning revealed the commitment of
city officials to diffusing attention for CORE’s campaign. When the judge dropped the bail
requirement, McDowell announced that he would remain in jail until the negotiations with
Niagara Mohawk yielded results. A disagreement ensued between the prosecution and defense
attorneys and the judge: The District Attorney requested a court order to prevent McDowell from
staying in jail. The judge explained that he could not do this if there were charges pending
against McDowell. CORE’s attorney, Faith Seidenberg, asked the District Attorney to drop the
charges. The county’s chief prosecutor was conflicted: he did not want McDowell to generate
publicity through his incarceration and fast, but neither did he want to let McDowell go without
consequences. The DA’s desire to punish CORE members for their agitation prevailed.
McDowell went back to jail, where he remained for nearly two weeks and fasted for half of that
time.633
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With negotiations once again stalled, Syracuse became a test case for a new CORE tactic:
a reverse Freedom Ride. The idea, which originated in the national CORE office, was ahead of
its time. As James Farmer explained in a press conference, Syracuse was the destination of the
first in a series of Freedom Rides North. In coordination with the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), CORE intended to bring activists from the South to bear
witness to Northern racism and expose Northern hypocrisy.634 This was a year before Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. attempted to “bring the movement” North with an ill-fated campaign in
Chicago.635 In the Salt City, the new generation of Freedom Riders would not only assist in the
ongoing Niagara Mohawk campaign but also highlight school and housing segregation. The
initiative required coordination among the upstate CORE chapter, the national office, and SNCC.
Local members had to arrange housing for the nearly two dozen visitors and plan two weeks of
ceremonies, demonstrations, and marches. An expensive endeavor, George Wiley persuaded
Faith Seidenberg to loan the chapter $2,000 in support of the cause.636
With the Reverse Freedom Ride focusing media attention on Syracuse and the Niagara
Mohawk campaign, local CORE critics grasped for reasons to rebut the “Selmacuse” image.
Some returned, once again, to the trope of abolitionism to absolve the Salt City and its residents
of responsibility for twentieth-century injustices. In an editorial, the Post-Standard loftily
proclaimed that “[s]ince the days of. . .the Underground Railroad, Negroes have sought and
found refuge and security in Syracuse.” It went on to depict Black migrant workers as “a group
of newcomers which has given the most problems to the community.”637 Irwin Deutscher, an SU
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sociology professor and CORE supporter, replied that “[i]t seems to me to be the other way
around: our community has created problems for these people.”638
Critics of the civil rights push also differentiated between a demand for voting rights in
the South and Syracuse CORE’s demand for equitable employment opportunities. In response to
CORE’s point that requiring a high school diploma for all job categories unnecessarily excluded
Black applicants from jobs, the Post-Standard asserted that “Niagara Mohawk does not
discriminate against Negroes. The company merely applies equal and fair standards to all
applicants.”639 The newspaper fixated on the education requirements and ignored CORE’s other
points, which CORE laid out in a “Black Paper” published around this time: Niagara Mohawk
was not in compliance with Executive Order 10925 requiring federal contractors to bring their
workforce into proportion with the demographics of the community, and CORE had documented
cases of active discrimination against qualified Black applicants.640 Moreover, in a letter to the
editor, Wiley noted that Niagara Mohawk had only begun requiring high school diplomas of all
candidates in 1959.641 Given the recent nature of the rule, CORE’s request that the company
revisit its policy seemed reasonable. When the Syracuse Herald-Journal printed Wiley’s letter
on May 13th, however, it truncated his observation about the educational requirement, as well as
his point that other civic and religious groups were calling on Niagara Mohawk to address its
employment practices alongside CORE.642
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In the press conference announcing the “Freedom Rides North,” James Farmer criticized
Syracuse’s faith leaders. From New York City, Farmer remarked that the Syracuse volunteers
who had traveled to Selma “do not have the same sense of urgency in their own locality.” He
colorfully noted that “[i]t’s always easier to slay cobras in Borneo than to swat flies in one’s own
kitchen.”643 These comments sparked outrage and defensive posturing. Journalist Eleanor
Rosebrugh responded with a two-part series detailing the human rights activities of area
churches. Through church-based and interfaith groups, white citizens could educate themselves
about discrimination, help Black families find housing, and participate in interracial dialogue.644
The faith community illustrated a range of commitments to racial justice. The Clergymen for
Direct Action, a group of thirty representatives of all faith, engaged in demonstrations and vigils.
As Rev. John C. Fuller of the May Memorial Unitarian Church explained, their goal was “to
confront the decision-makers of the community, including its religious leadership, at various
levels.”645 Other actions, although admirable, represented the gradualism that CORE challenged.
If the pace of action had “accelerated” over the past few years, as Rosebrugh maintained, it was
at least in part because CORE had challenged the complacency of many people of faith. With a
reverse Freedom Ride coming to their city, how would the religious community respond?
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Figure 22: Reverse Freedom Riders in Syracuse, May 1965

On May 5th, a Greyhound bus carrying twenty activists from Selma arrived in Syracuse.
Unlike the original Freedom Riders, who were beaten and attacked at bus stations across the
South, the Black men and women who poured off the bus in the Salt City were met by a cheering
crowd and colorful, bouncing balloons. The Post-Standard respectfully described the Selma
delegates as “dressed simply, quiet and dignified.”646 Led by the Freedom Riders, three hundred
demonstrators marched from the bus station to a rally in Clinton Square. James Farmer addressed
the crowd, noting the conspicuous absence of Mayor William Walsh from town. Fannie Lou
Hamer, an iconic member of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, elevated the rally’s
energy through song. Monsignor Charles Brady, local director of the Bishop Foery Foundation,
also spoke and expressed his support for the Reverse Freedom Ride.647
Over the next two weeks, the group from Selma demonstrated, sang, and prayed
throughout the Salt City. Daily demonstrations continued outside of the Niagara Mohawk
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building on Erie Boulevard, averaging about sixty participants and sometimes attracting counterprotesters. Around half a dozen young white men showed up at NiMo on March 7th carrying
signs for “SPONGE,” or the “Society to Prevent Negroes from Getting Everything.”648 The
demonstrators remained focused on their goal and did not engage the counter-protesters. Some
Reverse Freedom Ride protests entailed acts of civil disobedience that led to arrests. On
Wednesday May 12th, police arrested seven demonstrators, including two from Selma, for
sitting-in at Niagara-Mohawk’s “Powerama” exhibit, which was on display at the War Memorial
in downtown Syracuse and celebrated the marvels of electricity. Then, the night before the
Freedom Riders’ departure, a group of CORE members demonstrated in front of the home of
Niagara Mohawk’s vice president. This action resulted in four arrests, including another two
from Selma.649
When the Selma group departed on Tuesday, May 18th, Syracusans were divided on the
impact of the “Reverse Freedom Ride.” Mayor Walsh described the initiative as a “dismal
fiasco” and an AP article published in the Post-Standard asserted that it was “generally ignored
by city residents, shunned by some Negroes.” The NAACP and the Urban League had not
actively participated, and some African Americans refused to allow the demonstrators in their
homes. Syracuse CORE’s vice chairperson, Paul Leonard, declared the freedom ride a success
and explained that some Black citizens feared risking their jobs, public housing, or welfare
benefits if they participated in CORE.650 The County Welfare Commissioner and Mayor Walsh
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vociferously denied any reprisals against civil rights activists.651 The perception of risk was real:
Fifty years later Liz Page, CORE member and lifelong Syracuse resident, matter-of-factly
recalled during an interview that many Black city workers quietly supported CORE but remained
behind-the-scenes out of fear for their jobs.652 Regardless, the Reverse Freedom Ride did not
generate the level of local engagement that CORE had hoped for. National CORE did not carry
out its plan for a series of “Freedom Rides North.”
Syracuse’s religious leaders, many still stung from Farmer’s criticism in a national
newspaper, sparred in the newspaper as the Reverse Freedom Ride came to a close. The PostStandard published an article by Father Zneimer of the Church of the Saviour, an Episcopal
Church on Syracuse’s North Side, in the religion section on May 15th. In his criticism of CORE’s
Niagara Mohawk campaign, he centered his own feelings as a white man. Zneimer lamented that
the Black meter reader who came to his house and a Black waitress had demonstrated a
“coolness” to him in the past few weeks that he attributed to “insecurity” resulting from the
“pressures” in society. He patronizingly advised African Americans to pursue an education and
assured readers that “I am for the Negro in his quest for economic equality if he will help me to
help him reach that goal.”653 In the quest for racial equality, Zneimer placed the onus for change
on Black Syracusans.
At least one Black minister, John Massey of the True Vine Missionary Baptist Church,
affirmed Zneimer’s position. Massey, who had made the trip to Selma, rejected any comparison
with the Salt City. Although he acknowledged that CORE had supported some progress in the
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area of housing, he resented what he viewed as the effort of “a few handpicked people who have
not lived in this locality to act as a representative group for our people.” He had no sympathy for
CORE’s demands in the Niagara Mohawk campaign and declared that “[i]t is time for the Negro
to stop crying and help himself instead of leaning on others.”654
In sharp contrast to Massey, Reverend Walter Welsh of the Grace Episcopal Church—
one of the few multiracial congregations in the city—refuted Zneimer’s position. Welsh argued
that the white community was responsible for repairing the mistrust between Black and white
Syracusans—not African Americans or CORE. He asked Syracusans to admit that “the sin of
Selma is latent in Syracuse.” At the same time that many African Americans were striving for
higher education and professional achievement, discrimination and poverty were powerful
obstacles to progress. Zneimer’s call for Black Syracusans to attend night school callously
ignored the lived realities of people with families and low-income jobs. Welsh encouraged
educated Black leaders to combat anti-Black stereotypes “not simply by shaking their fingers at
drop-outs along with the unaware white community, but by standing beside those organizations
which, like CORE, are seeking to open opportunity for all Negroes.” The problem was ultimately
that too many white Syracusans did not in fact recognize Black humanity. Welsh concluded that
the failure to do so imperiled American democracy itself.655
The range of positions adopted by Black and white faith leaders in response to the NiMo
demonstrations illustrates the difficulty of unifying the religious community on civil rights issues
in the Deep North. Conservative Black ministers were a political force among Black Syracusans.
From the moment CORE burst on to the scene, some Black clergy had refused to become
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involved in CORE’s demonstrations.656 They disagreed with CORE’s tactics and perceived
CORE as a threat to their own power and influence in the Black community.657 Among white
faith leaders, racial moderates presented the greatest challenge for CORE. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. famously argued that white moderates were the “great stumbling block in. . .[the] stride
toward freedom” in his “Letter from the Birmingham Jail.” King lamented that white moderates
maintained “I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct
action” and felt entitled to “set the timetable for another man’s freedom.”658 Such was the case in
Syracuse. Imbued with racial liberalism, which emphasized moral suasion and gradual change,
many Syracuse white faith leaders hesitated to stick with CORE throughout the controversial
NiMo campaign.659 In the context of this fractured leadership, Syracuse CORE was alone as the
vanguard of civil rights action in the city. Consequently, CORE alone bore the brunt of the
resistance, and its agenda was more easily blunted and diffused.
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In the short-term, CORE achieved its desired outcome. The day after the Freedom Riders
went home, NiMo executives committed to a nondiscrimination policy. In a public statement,
Niagara Mohawk also agreed “to submit its employment policies, practices, and results to a
review by the [the Mayor’s Commission on Human Rights] after six months and thereafter
periodically at request of the commission.” The Mayor’s Commission unanimously adopted a
resolution in support of Niagara Mohawk’s policy. Despite the ceasefire, both sides refused to
formally accept the outcome of the final mediation session. Niagara Mohawk’s Vice President
for Public Relations insisted that “I don’t think we have changed our position any from the
beginning.”660 Given that Frank Osta had repeatedly bristled at the idea of allowing an outside
entity to review NiMo’s hiring policies, the vice president’s statement was an attempt to put a
public-relations gloss on the outcome of protracted negotiations. Likewise, CORE did not
formally affirm the agreement because some of its demands, including a timeline for NiMo to
reach its hiring goals, were not agreed upon. CORE did, however, suspend its demonstrations for
six months, pending the outcome of NiMo’s first report to the commission. The small civil rights
organization, whose membership never exceeded several hundred members, had taken on a
public utility company with 8,800 employees across the state and won.661
Yet the Niagara Mohawk campaign was a Pyrrhic victory. The chapter, whose members
faced court battles over charges related to the campaign, was financially insolvent and its
cohesion was shattered. CORE members’ correspondence captures some of the internal tensions.
Before the Selma group left the city, two CORE members, Clare Pineo and Charles Sparks,
wrote to George Wiley urgently requesting to meet and evaluate the “gains and losses” of the
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Reverse Freedom Ride. In the handwritten note, they explained that “related personal problems
which have developed in connection with the Selma project” were “affecting the stability of the
chapter.”662 Wiley, who took more than three weeks to respond, did not seem to share their sense
of urgency, but he agreed to meet with them when he was in town in June.663 Meanwhile,
Executive Secretary John McDowell circulated a searing letter to the Executive Committee in
advance of a meeting that he felt was “being held to discuss my competency.” McDowell offered
to address questions about his leadership, but he was clearly wounded by the criticism. He
demanded: “Did I spend two weeks in jail and nine days on a hunger strike to further the cause
of racial equality, or were these acts performed for personal reasons?”664 Wretha Wiley later
explained that “[p]eople were getting very disoriented and doing irrational and destructive things
internally. An intolerable sexual affair internally just sent everyone up the wall and finished it.
The internal dynamics [were] partly I think caused by the external pressure.”665 The archival
record is silent on what exactly transpired, but the result was that Syracuse CORE was no longer
a force for change in the community.
Almost six months after the suspension of demonstrations, CORE’s claims of Niagara
Mohawk’s discriminatory practices were vindicated. Judge J. Edward Conway of the State
Commission for Human Rights found “probable cause” of discrimination in four cases relating to
employment applications to Niagara Mohawk. Because only the full State Human Rights
Commission could make a determination that a company was guilty of discrimination, Conway’s
finding of “probable cause” was actually the toughest ruling that he had the authority to issue.
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Conway concluded that Niagara Mohawk told a Black applicant with a degree in business
administration from Fisk University that he would have to start as a janitor. This exposed the
hypocrisy of Niagara Mohawk’s insistence that it matched educational requirements with job
categories. Niagara Mohawk continued to deny discriminatory hiring practices but agreed to
conciliation steps outlined by Conway.666
In the first bi-annual report on Niagara Mohawk’s hiring practices, the Mayor’s
Commission for Human Rights found that the utility company was generally adhering to the
commitments it had made in May. During the six-month reporting period, just under 10% of new
hires were “non-white,” increasing Niagara Mohawk’s Black workforce to twenty-four. Black
employees still only represented 1.3% of the 1,800-member Syracuse workforce, but the
numbers were trending in the right direction. In fact, it was a 300% increase over the eight Black
workers Niagara Mohawk employed at the beginning of 1965.667 The Mayor’s Commission was
critical of Niagara Mohawk’s high school education requirement. While “not illegal,” it
described the policy as “narrowly conceived.” The commissioners encouraged NiMo to work
with the Crusade for Opportunity, one of the city’s War on Poverty programs, to identify and
hire qualified individuals who lacked high school diplomas.668 The report was likely
unsatisfactory to CORE members, especially since the Mayor’s Commission had no enforcement
powers. Continued progress was dependent on the good-faith participation of the company. But
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the commission would never have intervened, and NiMo executives would not have consented to
any outside interference, without CORE’s sustained, multi-year campaign.
The CORE members who had exposed NiMo’s discrimination faced steep fines and harsh
jail sentences. Supportive community members were aware of the injustice that those who
exposed discrimination faced legal consequences. During the meeting of the Mayor’s
Commission, Father Donald Bauer of the Catholic Interracial Council urged support for the
demonstrators who still had pending cases.669 The Syracuse Civil Rights Foundation formed to
help raise funds for the demonstrators. The foundation tallied the financial and personal costs
experienced by CORE members: The thirty-eight protestors who were arrested incurred $20,000
in bail, received 720 days in jail sentences, served 300 days, and paid $650 in fines.670 In the
final issue of its In the Wind newsletter, Syracuse CORE commented on the discriminatory
outcomes of the court cases: All the professors received suspended sentences and no fines. Frank
Britton, a who lived in public housing with his wife and three children, served a ninety-day
sentence. He had been arrested for sitting-in outside the president’s office in the Niagara
Mohawk building. Carol Cositore, a white woman who had been arrested with him, only
received a thirty-day sentence.671 Ed Day, the last demonstrator to go to trial, faced felony
charges that carried sentences totaling up to twenty-one years in prison. He pled guilty to a thirddegree misdemeanor and received a one-year probation. All other charges were dropped.672
CORE had embarked on the Niagara Mohawk campaign with the naïve impression that it
would be an easy victory. This was a fatal miscalculation, and the outcome was in part the result
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of bad timing. Just a few months after CORE called off the NiMO demonstrations, President
Johnson issued Executive Order 11246, which “gave the newly created Office of Federal
Contract Compliance the power to terminate government contracts to firms that did not practice
‘affirmative action’ in employment.”673 Kennedy’s President’s Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity had lacked such enforcement powers. Had CORE waited six months to launch the
NiMo campaign, Johnson’s executive order would have bolstered CORE’s position. Perhaps the
utility company would have come to the negotiating table more quickly. On the other hand, the
NiMo campaign in 1965 did not necessarily contribute to the “feedback loop” of activism that
shaped federal affirmative action policy. Had CORE incorporated employment demands into its
urban renewal demonstrations two years earlier, Syracuse would have contributed to the
groundswell of resistance that moved the federal government to address employment
discrimination. In spring 1965, Syracuse CORE members, of course, had no means of knowing
that the Niagara Mohawk campaign would expose the limits of direct-action tactics in the Deep
North.
Ultimately, the campaign that destroyed Syracuse CORE yielded only eighteen jobs. This
piecemeal attack on employment discrimination was not sufficient to bridge the gap in economic
opportunity that Black Syracusans experienced. It would be programs affiliated with the
emerging War on Poverty that would attempt to effect a more holistic transformation in the Salt
City’s low-income neighborhoods. The next and final chapter examines how federal resources
provided new avenues through which Syracuse activists pursued the goals of racial and
economic equality.
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Chapter Five
The Syracuse Front in the War on Poverty

Syracuse CORE served as a catalyst for action on civil rights issues in the Salt City, but
the organization was unable to sustain its momentum following the departure of George Wiley
and other key leaders. By the end of 1965, CORE was no longer a force for change within the
city. Chapter Five examines the organizing strategies of community leaders who emerged
alongside—and sometimes emerged out of—CORE, and who rose to prominence following
CORE’s decline. Between 1965 and 1974, federally funded War on Poverty and Model Cities
initiatives provided resources and institutional bases for a new set of leaders to experiment with
interracial economic justice activism. Examining the ways that grassroots leaders implemented
federal policy as part of their strategy for change sheds new light on the relationship between the
civil rights movement and the War on Poverty.
Previous studies of activism in Syracuse have emphasized the limitations of the War on
Poverty rather than its achievements and the possibilities it fostered, treated the War on Poverty
and Model Cities in a cursory fashion, or overlooked it entirely. In Salt City and Its Black
Community, Stamps and Stamps conclude that the War on Poverty “did little other than raise the
level of frustration and despair.”674 Noel Cazenave and Zoe Cornwall both provide an overview
of the conflicts that emerged as a result of the Training Center and the Crusade for Opportunity
but do not focus on the community organizations that emerged as a result of these efforts.675 Ron
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Corwin notes the role of War on Poverty-supported community organizations in fighting for
more equitable schools, and Felicia Kornbluh connects Syracuse’s War on Poverty to the
emergence of the welfare rights movement.676 None of these studies engages with the Model
Cities Program. This chapter addresses the controversies and the constraints facing federally
funded antipoverty organizations, and it expands on previous scholarship by excavating the
agendas that low-income Syracusans articulated and attempted to realize through these new
institutions.
Historians of movements for economic justice have highlighted the interconnectedness of
the civil rights and antipoverty struggles at both the federal and the local levels.677 Excellent
recent scholarship on the civil rights movement in the urban North, however, does not fully
interrogate the unique role that federal War on Poverty and Model Cities resources played in
these struggles.678 For grassroots actors who experienced the limits of direct-action protest in the
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urban North, the War on Poverty offered a new set of tools and resources for pursuing civil rights
goals. This chapter therefore uncovers the fluid way in which low-income Black activists
participated in multiple movements.
Funded by the federal government, civil rights activists and community organizers
struggled to democratize decision-making processes while traditional power-holders attempted to
maintain the status quo. The ensuing conflicts brought low-income Syracusans into direct
conversation with federal officials about the implementation of federal policy. The Salt City’s
antipoverty activists believed the federal government should play an active role in fostering
citizen participation in all levels of government. Their implicit message was that the government
that funded the destruction of Black communities and facilitated hypersegregation had a
responsibility to help impacted communities develop and implement their own agendas for
change.
By recovering the contests over on-the-ground implementation of federal policy, this case
study also highlights the tensions in mid-twentieth-century liberalism. The local actors in this
chapter, for the most part, believed in the potential of liberalism to remedy the inequality that
marred their city. Historian Michael B. Katz concisely summarizes the “hallmarks of American
liberalism in the 1960s: an uneasy mix of environmental and cultural explanations of poverty; a
continuation of the historic American reliance on education as a solution for social problems;
trust in the capacity of government; and faith in the power of experts to design effective public
policies.”679 Low-income Syracusans believed in the power of the state, but they also believed
that they themselves were experts on the conditions they faced, and their solutions. The struggle
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to reshape the local political landscape of the Salt City played out on a national stage, and the
experimentation speaks to the power of marginalized citizens to impact policy and change when
given the opportunity.680
Looking at three different community development initiatives, this chapter establishes a
vivid picture of the competing strategies that activists and civic leaders employed to achieve
change in the 1960s and 1970s. To understand the conflicts that erupted, this chapter begins with
an examination of Syracuse’s anti-juvenile delinquency program, which the mayor launched in
1962 with funding from the Kennedy administration. Two years later, this resulted in a
comprehensive plan for neighborhood change, including job training, community organization,
and youth development. In 1964 this program became the Crusade for Opportunity, one of the
first Community Action Agencies established under President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on
Poverty. A second and competing federally funded program soon emerged from Syracuse
University, where faculty members established a Community Action Training Center. The
Training Center aimed to mold a cohort of community organizers steeped in social science and
radical political thought. These programs triggered a multi-axis power struggle—between City
Hall and university professors, among civic leaders, and within the low-income neighborhoods
the programs purported to serve and empower. Amidst fierce backlash, by 1967 both War on
Poverty programs lost their federal support.
A third initiative funded by Model Cities in the early 1970s marked another possible
solution for redistributing decision making power in the Salt City. A decade after CORE
680
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challenged segregation in the Syracuse school system, Syracuse’s Model Cities Agency picked
up CORE’s efforts to give Black parents a voice in educational policy. When the federal
government terminated Model Cities nationwide in 1974, Syracuse’s effort had fallen short of its
goals. The premature closure of the Model Cities Agency marked an end both to federally funded
experimentation and to the civil rights movement in the Salt City. Black Syracusans continued to
pursue agendas for change through political leadership and other community activities, but they
no longer had an organizational base through which to sustain a civil rights movement.
Ultimately, the Crusade for Opportunity, the Community Action Training Center, and
Model Cities infused the Salt City with more than $10 million in funding, but these funds were
not adequate to stem the impacts of deindustrialization and suburbanization. Distributed over a
decade, the programs, while significant, were proportionally small in a city whose annual budget
topped $50 million by 1967.681 In statistical terms, the economic prospects of Black Syracusans
did not improve over the course of the decade. In 1960, the African American unemployment
rate was 10.4%, compared to 4.7% for all workers.682 By the end of the decade, unemployment
had climbed to 14.3% for African Americans and 5% for all workers.683 Yet, as Michael Katz
notes, “[t]he heart of the War on Poverty was an institutional critique rather than a program.
Community action was the method for ‘shaking the system’ and forcing change.”684 In this
respect, the initiatives pursued the same sort of goals that had animated CORE organizers and
brought them into a new decade.
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Mayor’s Commission for Youth: A Blueprint for the War on Poverty
In April 1964, a month after CORE’s March on Albany, the Mayor’s Commission for
Youth (MCY)—a collaborative initiative launched by Mayor Walsh—published Syracuse Action
for Youth, a comprehensive plan to improve conditions in three of the city’s low-income
neighborhoods. Syracuse University’s Youth Development Center had overseen the research
portion of the project. The center, which received funding from the Ford Foundation beginning
in 1958, was a hallmark project of SU’s School of Social Work, which was itself only seven
years old in 1964.685 The United Community Chest and Council (which would eventually
become the United Way) had administered the program planning.686 Syracuse Action for Youth
contained proposals to address four areas: employment, education, community-based prevention
programs, as well as diversionary services for those convicted of delinquency.
The MCY staff contained a number of idealistic academics and social workers who were
optimistic about the potential for change in Syracuse.687 The Executive Director, Ben
Zimmerman, was an anthropologist by training. Betty Baer, the Planning Director from the
Community Chest, was an unconventional social worker with a commitment to community
organizing. Irwin Deutscher, a sociologist and the director of the Youth Development Center,
served as the Associate Director. Deutscher had been arrested during the urban renewal
demonstrations in September 1963, and Baer described him as “kind of an anarchist.”688 The
MCY staff operated independently of the mayor’s office, and they crafted Syracuse Action for
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Youth so that it simultaneously contained the subversive potential to reshape power dynamics in
low-income neighborhoods while still gaining approval from “the establishment.”689
The Mayor’s Commission for Youth staff launched their experiment in achieving holistic
neighborhood change by applying social science theories that were popular among policymakers
at the time. The MCY had arisen out of federal funding from President Kennedy’s Committee on
Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD), and so it had an initial focus on reducing youth crime.690 The
PCJD and MCY were inspired by the influential 1960 book Delinquency and Opportunity, which
was authored by sociologists Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin. According to historian Michael
Katz, in contrast to the post-World War II social scientists who psychologized juvenile
delinquents, Cloward and Ohlin “wanted to reinsert delinquency into the social and cultural
matrix.”691 They theorized that delinquent subcultures developed when adolescents were unable
to achieve their goals through socially acceptable channels. Cloward and Ohlin explained that
“[f]aced with limitations of legitimate avenues of access to these goals and unable to revise their
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aspirations down, the exploration of non-conformist alternatives may be the result.”692 According
to this logic, community programs needed to create opportunities for young people to realize
their goals, and adults who resided in the community needed to contribute to the establishment of
a more stable community.
The community organization model promoted by self-proclaimed radical Saul Alinsky
also inspired MCY staff. Drawing on his experiences in the poverty-stricken Back-of-the-Yards
neighborhood in the meatpacking district of Chicago during the 1930s, Alinsky published
Reveille for Radicals in 1946, a manifesto in which he laid out the principles and methods of
community organizing. Alinsky believed that “power flowed from two sources: money and
people—organized people, that is, who through their numbers could effect political change.”693
He envisioned marginalized citizens coming together in neighborhood organizations that could
transform American society—and reinvigorate democracy—from the bottom up. In order to gain
power, “People’s Organizations” had to identify local issues that could mobilize a neighborhood,
provoke a conflict, and result in a tangible victory. Alinsky’s ideas gained renewed relevance in
the early 1960s as the civil rights movement accelerated and federal policymakers envisioned
large-scale social change.
In Syracuse Action for Youth, MCY staff applied these social science theories to propose
how to serve three neighborhoods with high juvenile delinquency rates. These neighborhoods
constituted the “Action Area.” A fourth neighborhood was included in the research as a control
group.694 On the Action Area map, the census tracts with the highest delinquency rates and, not
coincidentally, the highest poverty rates, are outlined in heavy black ink. The proposal’s
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introduction noted the relationship of “poverty, unemployment, delinquency, [and] dropouts”
and observed that they were not “randomly distributed geographically or racially. . .the poverty
problem is largely an urban problem, to a great extent a racial problem, and will become
increasingly a youth problem.”695 The Action Area enveloped the Central Business district on the
East, South, and West. Over 80% of the city’s non-white citizens (of whom 90% were Black)
lived in the Action Area, and 70% of all Black citizens lived in one neighborhood—the Fifteenth
Ward. In contrast, the control neighborhood, located to the North of the former Erie Canal, was
predominantly Italian American.696 The decision to target Black neighborhoods with services
aligned with the federal concern with Black urban areas and their perceived cultural
pathologies.697
Syracuse Action for Youth served as the blueprint for what would soon become the
Crusade for Opportunity, one of the first Community Action Agencies sponsored by the War on
Poverty. A hefty volume of about six hundred pages, it combined proposals for traditional social
services with innovative plans to empower low-income citizens to create change. The social
scientists and social work professionals on the MCY staff originated the approach, but they
assigned an interracial and cross-class team of over 150 citizens to five separate task forces
(Education, Employment, Group Services, Individual Services, and Community Development) to
develop the content. The task force membership included religious leaders, lawyers, social
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workers, physicians, university administrators, and labor leaders. Sociologist Noel A. Cazenave
contends that this expansive membership, particularly the Community Development task force,
served to legitimize the pre-determined goals of the MCY staff.698 The presence of so many
actors, however, created the potential to alter the city’s established power structure. For Black
and low-income participants, Syracuse Action for Youth provided an opportunity to articulate
their own agendas for change. The proposal set the stage for bold experimentation with
antipoverty initiatives and created a new path to political power for Black Syracusans.
As the task forces began their work in February 1963, the proposal development process
incorporated the perspectives of Black and low-income Syracusans who had rarely, if ever,
provided input on policy development alongside traditional civic leaders.699 During the research
phase, Youth Development Center interviewers spoke with neighborhood residents. Among the
interviewers were Lorraine Merrick, one of the first African American teachers in the Syracuse
school district, and SU undergraduate and CORE member Elizabeth Page. CORE attorney Faith
Seidenberg served on the “Special Services to Individuals and Families” task force alongside
Chief of Police Patrick Murphy and George Sparkes, an AFL-CIO representative who would go
on to participate in the mediation between CORE and Niagara Mohawk. Elaine Clyburn—the
first Black student to graduate from Le Moyne College, a Jesuit school in Syracuse—represented
the State Commission for Human Rights on the “Special Services to Groups” task force.700 Civil
rights activists did not secure representation on the education and employment task forces, but
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CORE secretary Byron Rushing and member Inez Heard served with Elaine Clyburn on the most
radical task force: Community Development.701
Of the five task forces, Community Development had the best representation of women
and Action Area residents.702 Eulalie Malone—a Black woman who lived in Syracuse with her
husband and two sons—chaired the task force.703 She had migrated to the Salt City from Florida
after World War II.704 After working with MCY, she went on to run a daycare and helped launch
the Head Start early education program in Syracuse.705 She and ten of her fellow female task
force members were identified as “civic workers” in the front of Syracuse Action for Youth, a
designation which appears to signal working-class neighborhood residents without other
institutional affiliations. The proposal celebrated the composition of this interracial task force,
observing that “[t]he members were drawn from all three action neighborhoods; five of them
lived in public housing; three were recipients of public welfare.”706 It also included
representatives from General Electric, General Motors, Memorial Hospital, Carrier Corporation,
Plumbers Union Local 54, the Second Olivet Baptist Church, CORE, and the State Commission
on Civil Rights.707 In January 1964, the task force completed a fifteen-page report, which
appeared in the MCY proposal as an appendix to the Community Development section. The task
force also presented its findings to the full MCY.
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Malone expressed the significance of the task force when she spoke before the Mayor’s
Commission for Youth. She praised the MCY for being “the first major project which has sought
the ideas and understanding of neighborhood residents before moving into action” and for
“giving us a voice in what is being planned for our areas.”708 In the report, the interracial group
of working-class citizens demanded to be recognized as “more than statistics, cases, numbers, or
pins on the map in the Urban Relocation Office. Yes—some of us have been relocated, or
uprooted while still others of us spin in bewilderment at the rapid changes occurring in our
neighborhood. The social conditions and the problems, you (others of the Commission)
explore—we experience.”709 The report concluded by expressing confidence in the abilities of
residents to solve their own problems, noting that “[w]e need the kind of help the broader
community can offer but we also must use the skills, talents and resources of the people in the
neighborhood.”710 This call for inclusion prefigured the War on Poverty’s mandate to involve the
poor in developing and implementing antipoverty programs.
The Community Development Task Force Report provides a window into the issues that
motivated low-income residents in the Salt City, and it also reveals the extent of support for the
types of demands that CORE was making. The authors divided the report into sections on
education, public and private housing, welfare, police, and community services. They balanced
calls for city-wide change with recommendations that the Action Area residents themselves
could take to improve conditions. They emphasized the need for access to information and
resources in a transparent manner that minimized “red tape.” For example, in the education
section, they called for “more effective means of disseminating information concerning how
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school operates” and recommended the creation of neighborhood based “sub-boards” to advise
the Board of Education.711 This course of action would be taken up a decade later by Model
Cities, which is covered later in this chapter. Their critique of public housing—including better
channels of communication with the Housing Authority, a demand for the creation of Tenant
Councils, and methods to enable tenants to save to purchase a home—would be reflected in the
Tenants Report that inflamed Housing Authority Executive Director, William McGarry, the
following year.
With two CORE members on the Community Development Task Force, it is no surprise
that the report also directly reflects issues tackled by local civil rights activists. Just a few months
after CORE’s urban renewal demonstrations cast a spotlight on housing discrimination and
blight, the task force members highlighted the necessity of a coordinated and concerted effort to
create fair housing practices, including commitments from all landlords, bankers, realtors, faith
leaders, and citizens. In the meantime, they recommended that Action Area residents create
neighborhood organizations to address the quality of housing.712 The task force inverted the
focus on juvenile crime by calling for an examination of police practices, legal aid for young
people arrested by police, and the need for youth to be aware of their rights.713 The task force
published its report in January 1964, a month after an appellate court overturned Ralph Dennis’s
juvenile delinquency conviction and ruled that his constitutional rights had been violated.714
Although the task force adopted a class-based rather than race-based approach to solving
neighborhood problems, its endorsement of CORE’s agenda indicates the extent of support for
action on the city’s rampant racial discrimination.
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The content of the Community Development program proposal provided the means
through which neighborhood residents could implement their vision. The proposal explained that
the objective of community development was to enable citizens to act on their “right and. .
.responsibility to participate in planning and decision-making activities which effect [sic] their
lives and those of their children.”715 In a multi-stage process, three professional community
organizers—one for each of the action areas—would help develop Neighborhood Councils that
were open to all residents. These councils would eventually become independent of MCY, thus
representing the opinions and priorities of residents themselves.716 By employing organizers to
create neighborhood organizations, the community development section subtly incorporated Saul
Alinsky’s methods without explicitly citing him.
Mayor Walsh had his own conception of the initiative, one that differed from the
neighborhood residents and the MCY staff. In the introduction of the Syracuse Action for Youth
proposal and in his testimony before Congress, Walsh identified welfare dependency was a
major factor shaping community problems. The mayor’s experience as welfare commissioner
convinced him that welfare incentivized the poor to live off the state and that it encouraged
family disorganization.717 Walsh’s stance reflected the growing concern of conservative
politicians with the welfare system. For example, when Ronald Reagan launched a successful
campaign for California’s governor’s office in fall 1965, an opposition to public welfare was
central to his platform.718 In contrast, the Community Development task force argued that
welfare recipients needed access to more information about their rights and budgets and that
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welfare allowances did not adequately cover families’ needs.719 The implication is that the
welfare system created challenges for families struggling to raise their children and stigmatized
young people who might become juvenile delinquents. Walsh thought that welfare payments
constituted an appealing way of life for poor families, whereas the recipients themselves
described the experience of living on welfare as a constant struggle to survive.
In April 1964—while Southern Democrats in the Senate waged a sixty-day filibuster
against the Civil Rights Act—Walsh traveled to the nation’s capital to testify at Congressional
hearings on the Economic Opportunity Act, the legislation that authorized the War on Poverty.720
The House Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program questioned Walsh for about an hour,
which was longer than they spent with the mayors from New York City, Chicago, Detroit, or St.
Louis.721 Walsh informed the committee about Syracuse’s efforts to address poverty through the
Mayor’s Commission for Youth, gave his analysis of the causes of poverty, and offered feedback
on specific sections of the bill. For example, concerned about the negative impact of removing
struggling young men from their families and their communities, Walsh persuaded the
subcommittee to add urban as well as rural centers to the proposed Job Corps program.
During the hearing, Walsh introduced the term “Crusade for Opportunity” to describe his
vision of the War on Poverty.722 In a population with memories of World War II, a declaration of
war evoked the understanding that a full mobilization of resources would be required in service
of a patriotic cause. The term “crusade” went a step beyond to infuse this war with a religious
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zeal. For Walsh, the attack on poverty had to be fought on a spiritual and moral battleground as
well as a material one.723 The emphasis on opportunity rather than an equitable outcome firmly
placed responsibility on individuals to take advantage of opportunities presented to them. The
state did not have the obligation to guarantee a basic standard of living, only to provide the
opportunity (an arguably subjective term) for individuals to thrive.
Finally, in June 1964—over two years after the city had launched the MCY—Attorney
General Robert Kennedy came to Syracuse to award the city its PCJD grant in person. The
Mayor’s Commission for Youth received $750,000 out of the $30 million allocated through the
PCJD.724 The visit not only increased the Attorney General’s visibility in upstate New York, it
also positioned Syracuse at the forefront of innovation in addressing juvenile delinquency and
poverty.
Officials’ exuberance about securing the grant papered over the unresolved tensions that
had been present during the planning process. In an editorial, the conservative editor of the
Syracuse Herald-Journal, Alexander Jones, noted that “Syracuse did not for one minute
surrender its dignity and yield to pressure, which at times has been unnecessarily tense.” He
contrasted Syracuse with New York City, where another PCJD grantee had become embroiled in
controversy. Syracuse “had proceeded in an orderly manner in such pressing matters as housing,
employment and discrimination of racial minorities,” said Jones. “All we have to do to see the
other side of the coin is to consider the unbelievable conditions existing in New York City.”725
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Jones referred not to poverty and racial inequality but to the controversial actions of Mobilization
for Youth, the PCJD’s flagship program. Mobilization for Youth helped organize tenants in
dilapidated buildings and supported a rent strike in spring 1964.726 The newspaper’s familiar
emphasis on order and its opposition to tenant organizing hinted at the conflicts that would ensue
after the War on Poverty launched in the Salt City.
By securing the PCJD grant, the Salt City had the funds to begin implementing the
ambitious program it had envisioned—and it also needed to continue to fundraise to fully fund
the bold three-million-dollar budget it had proposed, of which over half was allocated for
educational programs. The budget assumed the federal government would finance 65% of the
program, but the initial grant covered less than 33%.727 City officials, however, anticipated new
sources of federal funding would soon be flowing through the War on Poverty.
In August 1964, Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act, which created the Office
of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to oversee the War on Poverty and to allocate funding to
antipoverty agencies. Federal officials identified many pilot programs that had been initiated
under the PCJD, including MCY, as candidates to become the local agencies that administered
War on Poverty funds. To carry out this transition, in October 1964 the MCY board formally
changed the organization’s focus from antijuvenile delinquency to antipoverty, extended its
service area to cover the entire county, and expanded its services to includes adults as well as
youths. The board also changed its name to the mayor’s preferred name, Crusade for
Opportunity, which de-emphasized the focus on youths.728 The federal government recognized
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the Crusade as a War on Poverty agency and granted it additional funding in January 1965.
Despite the unity implied by the hefty and thorough Syracuse Action for Youth proposal, the
competing visions of the mayor’s office, Crusade staff, Syracuse University faculty, and
neighborhood residents quickly diverged.

The Rise and Fall of the Community Action Training Center
The Crusade was not the first Syracuse program to receive War on Poverty funding.
Warren Haggstrom, faculty member in the School of Social Work at SU and a Senior Research
Associate at the Youth Development Center, had served as a consultant for the Mayor’s
Commission for Youth. By mid-1964, Haggstrom realized that MCY staff were wary of pursuing
the Community Development program they had proposed. Haggstrom decided to secure his own
funding for a community organizing initiative. In the fall of 1964, Haggstrom and a group of
Syracuse University faculty members went to Washington, D.C. to meet with officials at the
newly created OEO. Their goal was to establish a Community Action Training Center to
demonstrate how to effectively organize low-income neighborhoods. They also aimed to create a
curriculum for training organizers that could be utilized around the country.729 With OEO
encouragement, they applied for and received funding in December 1964—just weeks before the
Crusade received recognition as the Community Action Agency for Onondaga County.730
The presence of two OEO-funded programs in a mid-sized city such as Syracuse set the
stage for competition and conflict. The tensions that quickly emerged reveal the federal and local
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machinations around the War on Poverty. Crusade staff initially approved of the Training Center,
but a subsequent lack of communication and coordination led relations to devolve.731 Many lowincome citizens initially viewed the Training Center as empowering, whereas others felt that the
Crusade was controlled by City Hall. Neither proved to be exactly true, perhaps in part due to the
origins of the respective organizations. Whereas neighborhood residents contributed to the
planning for the Crusade, Haggstrom and other university faculty and staff did not consult any
low-income residents when hastily preparing a proposal for the OEO.732 In its methodology, the
Training Center was technocratic and top-down.
The Training Center had the twin purposes of determining the best methods for training
professional organizers and creating “powerful self-directed democratic organizations in areas of
poverty.”733 Trainee organizers would do this by blending Saul Alinsky’s model of community
organizing with social-psychology principles.734 A Training Center brochure explained that
“[t]he process through which low-income populations pass from a condition of powerlessness to
self-responsibility may also be understood as a therapeutic helping process of direct
psychological benefit to those affected.”735 In this framing of community organizing, the poor
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needed more than access to channels through which they could redress their grievances, they
needed therapy. The brochure went on to explain that trainees would discuss “methods for
drawing people out on their individual problems and the role of 'self-interest' in mobilizing
people to action.”736 As part of their field placements, trainees would work in local Syracuse
neighborhoods. In other words, the poor became objects of study. Local residents could apply to
become trainees without educational prerequisites or admission to the university, but Haggstrom,
as director, had control over the curriculum and the goals of the center. This approach was in
tension with the War on Poverty’s mandate that Community Action Programs should be
“developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation” of the
poor.737
The ambiguous “maximum feasible participation” directive seeded conflicts around the
country. The architects of the War on Poverty introduced the phrase as a compromise in
language, intentionally leaving the meaning vague.738 Given the open-ended nature of
Community Action Programs themselves—they could be private or public entities, or a
combination of both, and could pursue any activity that promised to improve citizens’ lives—
maximum feasible participation perhaps inevitably generated disagreement once put into
practice. In many cities, program administrators actively resisted the mandate. Congress
amended the Economic Opportunity Act in 1966 to clarify that poor citizens must compose at
least one-third of Community Action Agency board membership.739
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To Haggstrom, “maximum feasible participation” simply did not apply to his research
and demonstration project. The Training Center director had a strong and polarizing personality.
He grew up in Minnesota during the Depression, working as a farmer then serving in the Marine
Corps between 1944 and 1946. After earning a PhD in social work and social psychology from
the University of Michigan in 1962, he joined the faculty at Syracuse University as an assistant
professor.740 In Syracuse, Haggstrom inspired the devotion of social work students such as
Rhoda Linton, whose admiration for Haggstrom resonates throughout the master’s thesis she
wrote on the Training Center. In contrast, Betty Baer, who worked for the Crusade, was more
skeptical. In an oral history interview, she commented acerbically that “[a]s a faculty person, he
did not teach so much as indoctrinate.”741 Wretha Wiley, who left Syracuse just as the Training
Center launched, recalled that she and George “recognized the rightness and value” of
Haggstrom’s work, although they did not want to see CORE displaced as the catalyzer of action
in the city.742
Haggstrom was temperamentally ill-suited to fill the leadership vacuum created by the
Wileys’ departure, and his racial politics were also incompatible with the grassroots activists he
wanted to mobilize. Haggstrom did not deny the existence of racial discrimination and
inequality. He had been arrested during CORE’s urban renewal demonstrations in September
1963.743 In a scathing letter to President Johnson in 1966, he demanded that Johnson “help to
create a society which does not first stifle and crush the potential of Negro children and then
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complain when Negro adults reveal a smoldering anger and despair.”744 Yet he also expressed
antipathy towards the Black freedom struggle and its leaders. In the same letter to Johnson,
Haggstrom dismissed “silly purveyors of militant black puff rhetoric.” Haggstrom criticized the
desire of some of his trainees “to fight little holy wars ranging from those of black nationalism to
those of the civil rights movement. Such groups have in common a resentment of supervision,
but lack of a unifying purpose around which to unite.”745 An educated white man engaged in
civil rights, Haggstrom expressed an elitist confidence that his own expertise was more valuable
than activists who were both Black and poor.
Despite his racial blind spots, Haggstrom assembled a multiracial staff. The Associate
Director, James Tillman, was a Black man who came to Syracuse from Minnesota, where he had
served as the director of the Greater Minneapolis Interfaith Fair Housing Program.746 Fred Ross,
a white man who had briefly worked for the MCY, became the Training Center’s Director of
Field Instruction. Ross was an Alinsky protégé with experience organizing Mexican-American
communities in California, where he mentored labor activists Cesar Chavez and Delores
Huerta.747 Haggstrom persuaded Alinsky himself, who was working in Rochester at the time, to
serve as a consultant and lecturer for the Training Center, although Alinsky expressed skepticism
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about the War on Poverty and never had much enthusiasm for spending time in the Salt City.748
The Training Center also attracted several veterans of the Syracuse civil rights movement: Faith
Seidenberg served as legal counsel, and Bruce Thomas and Anna Mae Williams were trainee
organizers.
The training program required long days and an unwavering commitment from trainees.
In addition to Thomas and Williams, the organizers included a priest from the local Catholic
diocese, “a former seminarian who worked in Chicago slums, a Negro woman from Kansas City
who was active in the garment workers union, a master's degree candidate sponsored by the
Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles, the editor of a national civil rights journal, a man who led
rent strikes in Philadelphia and a young Negro woman recommended by the National Council of
Churches.”749 For these trainees, the low-income neighborhoods of Syracuse became their
classroom. After completing the training program, they would disperse to cities around the
country, spreading the Training Center’s ideology. In order to learn and apply community
organizing skills, trainees received a stipend and attended three seminars a week that exposed
them to the writing of Alinsky, E.J. Hobsbawm, Che Guevara, Mao Tse Tung, and Howard
Zinn.750 In the midst of the Cold War, this leftist literature was undoubtedly controversial
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material to read and discuss in a federally funded program. From the outset, this approach
provided ample fuel for conflict with City Hall and other civic groups.
As trainees conducted a forty-hour-per-week field placement, public housing projects
proved to be an ideal place for them to gain experience. Public housing tenants faced an array of
shared challenges that arose from living in the poorly maintained projects, particularly in
communicating with their landlord, the Syracuse Housing Authority. The first batch of eleven
trainees began meeting with tenants in March 1965. Benefitting from the previous work done by
CORE, which had helped establish the Citizens of Pioneer, by June organizers had established or
strengthened organizations in the Pioneer Homes, Central Village, James Geddes, and Salt City
projects.751 Haggstrom claimed that approximately two-hundred public housing tenants had
joined these groups.752 Within nine months, trainees created eight neighborhood organizations;
obtained paint, linoleum floors, and new refrigerators in the housing projects; and registered
2,500 new voters.753 These activities generated varying degrees of alarm and outrage among the
city government and the local Housing Authority. The conflict between the Training Center and
the Housing Authority, which resulted in the Mayor’s Commission on Human Rights conducting
an investigation of public housing, was previously described in Chapters Two and Three.
The local controversy over the Training Center escalated to the point that Mayor Walsh
took his grievances to Congress. In June 1965—just weeks after CORE’s Niagara Mohawk
protest campaign—Mayor Walsh joined a federal Republican task force to investigate the
implementation of the War on Poverty. He asserted that some antipoverty programs, including
751

“Community Action Training Center Newsletter,” 28 May 1965, 5th ed. SCDA, Box 02, SCDA
Communications-Correspondence CATC & OEO Folder, Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University
Libraries.
752
“SYRACUSAN HITS POVERTY PROGRAM: Housing Chief Charges Plan Is Marxists Inspired,” New
York Times, 24 June 1965.
753
“Information Sheet,” 1965, SCDA, Box 02, SCDA Folder, Special Collections Research Center,
Syracuse University Libraries.

281

the Training Center, engaged in “dangerous social experimentation.” He did not criticize the
goals of the Economic Opportunity Act but rejected the idea that “creating tensions and class
struggles” was necessary to realize them.754 Walsh’s rhetoric echoed Cold War criticism of civil
rights and other potentially liberatory programs. By insisting that Black and poor Americans
achieve change without tension and struggle, opponents foreclosed protest as a legitimate way of
achieving change.755 Walsh was far from alone in his criticism of Community Action Programs.
They were igniting controversy throughout the nation, and President Johnson himself was
growing frustrated.
Despite the backlash, the Training Center organizers and the neighborhood groups did
not back down. After confronting the Housing Authority, they moved onto the County Welfare
Department. Since forty percent of public housing tenants received welfare, this was a logical
next step.756 Welfare was a key concern for low-income residents: The Community Development
Task Force had identified struggles communicating with the County Welfare Department and the
inadequacy of benefits in the MCY proposal in early 1964. When the neighborhood
organizations formed welfare committees, recipients coalesced to put collective pressure on the
Welfare Department. The Citizens of Pioneer led the way by meeting with John Lascaris, the
Commissioner of Welfare, in August 1965.757 Anticipating the start of the school year, the
activists demanded that the department distribute new clothing to all children, rather than
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reviewing each parent’s request for clothes individually. Lascaris strongly objected to a
wholesale distribution of clothing.
The welfare committees escalated their actions in response to Lascaris’s intransigence. In
September, welfare recipients converged on the Welfare Office and inundated social workers
with phone calls, reiterating their demands for clothing. Commissioner Lascaris met with forty
Citizens of Pioneer activists but balked at making any changes to how the office distributed
benefits. He told the Post-Standard that the Training Center organizers were pressuring
recipients to protest, and some formerly pleasant recipients were being “hostile” to the social
workers. Invoking the politics of civility, the Post-Standard observed that the welfare recipients
were “orderly” at the Welfare Office, whereas anonymous callers were “harassing and abusive”
on the telephone.758 This rhetoric cast welfare recipients as supplicants who should maintain
pleasant and docile behavior in order to receive resources they needed to survive. By mobilizing
and pressing for the full benefits the law guaranteed them, the welfare activists rejected the
politics of civility.
The arrest of eleven welfare protestors in early October provided a new pretext for the
Training Center’s opponents to undermine the War on Poverty program. On October 6, about
thirty members of the North East Side Progress Organization’s welfare committee and several
Training Center organizers went to the Welfare Office to meet with a senior administrator.
Eleven members of the delegation, including nine women who were welfare recipients, remained
in the building after it closed for the evening and were arrested.759 After the arrests, Lascaris
struck a moderate tone, admonishing his staff that “these people. . . are still our clients and we
still have to treat them as such. I want no attitude on my staff that smacks of reprisal or
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recrimination.”760 Mayor Walsh, however, went on the attack. He expressed outrage that a
Training Center representative used federal funds to bail the protestors out of jail.761 Walsh
alerted Richard Daley, the Democratic mayor of Chicago and the head of the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, and also asked a Republican Congressional task force to investigate.762 Another
Training Center investigation served to further de-legitimize the initiative, which seems to have
been Walsh’s intent. For Walsh, the federal intervention that disrupted his control over the city
was intolerable.
Syracuse’s welfare protest marked one of the first organized confrontations with a
welfare department in the nation. The Salt City’s experimentation would soon help fuel a
national attention to economic justice. In the short term, the Training Center claimed the protest
as a success, asserting that 1,000 children had received clothing.763 It did not elicit an immediate
change in the Welfare Department’s procedures, but city and county leaders were aware of the
recipients’ new assertiveness. They could not return to business-as-usual without further
confrontation.
While external threats to the program increased, the Training Center also experienced
internecine conflict. During the fall of 1965, organizers and trainees increasingly expressed
resistance to Haggstrom’s domineering leadership style. In September, despite Haggstrom’s
objections, three neighborhood organizers and six residents traveled to Newark, New Jersey, to
help plan a conference of the poor in the nation’s capital for January 1966. Haggstrom
reprimanded the organizers when they returned to the Salt City. Angered by his interference, a
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group of low-income residents converged on the SU campus to picket Haggstrom.764 The
director who unleashed Alinsky-style organizing tactics in Syracuse had himself become
embroiled in a conflict with low-income citizens.
With his vision for the Training Center and his authority under assault, Haggstrom
proceeded to purge noncompliant organizers. In October, Haggstrom fired trainee and former
CORE member Anna Mae Williams for “refus[ing] to accept supervision” and “refus[ing] to
report to the Community Action Training Center.”765 Williams was likely among the rogue group
that had traveled to Newark. She appealed the decision, but the dean of the School of Social
Work upheld her dismissal. The gendered and racialized implications of the dismissal are stark.
Williams, a determined Black woman who had come to the Salt City as a migrant worker and
who had been a dedicated CORE picketer, was not going to allow a white man to dictate how she
pursued change in her own community. Moreover, Williams’s organizing acknowledged the
intersecting and compounding experiences of racism, sexism, and poverty. Haggstrom was
unwavering in his own color and gender-blind approach to solving poverty. Ejected from the
Training Center, Williams would have to seek another channel through which to achieve her
goals.
By the fall of 1965, the Training Center had alienated federal War on Poverty
administrators, conservative Syracuse officials, the Crusade for Opportunity, and many of the
poor residents themselves. In December, OEO officials informed Haggstrom that the Training
Center would receive a three-month extension rather than the anticipated one-year renewal. The
Training Center would close in March 1966, and federal officials instructed the Training
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Center’s nonprofit branch, the Syracuse Community Development Association, to apply for
funding through the competing Crusade for Opportunity organization.766 For the low-income
Syracusans who saw the neighborhood organizations and the Development Association as an
effective means for achieving change, the OEO’s action threatened everything they had
achieved.

The People’s War Council against Poverty
Supporters of the Development Association resisted the federal government’s decision to
shut down the experiment. On December 2, 1965, a group of low-income Syracusans
representing eight neighborhood organizations formed the People’s War Council against
Poverty. Armed with some private funding with which to continue, the People’s War Council
refused to approach the Crusade, which they viewed as under control of City Hall, for money.
The group found itself in the position of challenging the federal agency that had authorized its
creation. As one Training Center organizer told the New York Times, “We are always looking for
issues to rally the poor around. . .[b]ut I never though a protest of the O.E.O. would become
one.”767 On December 8th, a War Council delegation traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet with
Sargent Shriver, director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. One Development Association
employee recalled that Black organizer Charles Fain objected to the superficial and performative
nature of the meeting. According to the employee, Fain told Shriver, “I didn’t come here for no
goddamn cookies. And I don’t want to hear about the law.” Rather, Fain wanted to know what
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action Shriver was going to take to resolve the situation.768 The answer was not what the
delegation was hoping to hear: Shriver maintained his position that the Development Association
first apply to the Crusade for funding. If the Crusade turned them down, then and only then
would he consider a request to fund them directly.769
Disappointed in the outcome of the meeting with Shriver, the War Council decided to
appeal directly to the man who had declared the war: the president of the United States. They
first attempted to meet with Johnson in the nation’s capital on December 21st. In a telegram to
the president, the War Council used the holiday season to support their case, arguing that “2000
years ago a similar journey was made. This journey affected the future of all mankind. On
Tuesday we will be making the journey. Please dont [sic] turn us away from your door.”770 This
appeal was unsuccessful. President Johnson was busy wrapping up business in D.C. in order to
spend Christmas at his ranch outside Austin, Texas. A determined group of four Syracusans
decided to follow him to Texas. They sent Johnson a bold telegram in which they sarcastically
thanked him for his “quote hospitality unquote in Washington” and asserted that “[i]f the
government is really the people's government we will see you at twelve noon tomorrow at your
ranch if this is not the people's government please reply.”771
The People’s War Council represented the deep possibility and hope in the power of
democratic participation. They not only believed they could achieve change locally, but that if
they went to the president, the president would personally hear and respond to their concerns.
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The People’s War Council was not only asking Johnson to intervene in the lives of average
Americans, they were also fighting for the autonomy to implement federal policy according to
their local context. They sought to give meaning to the concept of “maximum feasible
participation,” and they wanted to hold the president accountable for the promises he had made
through the War on Poverty. Johnson’s lack of responsiveness did not undo their politicization or
their belief in an expansive role for the state. They would continue the fight through whatever
channels they could identify.
At 7:30 AM on December 23, 1965, the War Council delegation appeared on Ranch
Road One at a bridge to the president’s estate. The group represented the possibilities of uniting
across racial and gender lines to fight poverty. The leader of the delegation was thirty-three-yearold Richard Hewitt, a white bricklayer who was president of the James Geddes Organization. He
was joined by Fain, a forty-four-year-old Black man from another neighborhood antipoverty
group. Thirty-year-old Catherine Nolan, a white mother of six, represented the Near East Side
People’s Organization. The trio was accompanied by an employee of the Development
Association. The group had flown to San Antonio, and a San Antonio antipoverty worker drove
them to the ranch. Prepared for a long wait before they got an audience with the president, the
group pitched a tent by the side of the highway. Their appearance caused consternation among
Johnson’s team. A Secret Service memo observed that “the group appeared to be orderly with no
intent of violence.”772 A member of the president’s staff explained that the president was in
Johnson City listening to Christmas carols and offered to arrange for the delegation to meet with
an aide.773 They refused to meet with anyone but Johnson himself.
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That afternoon, state police arrested the four members of the War Council for obstructing
the state highway.774 They were taken to a jail in Fredericksburg, the county seat. Within a few
hours, the quartet was released from jail. They returned to the ranch, where they met with Jake
Jacobsen, a Johnson aide. Jacobsen promised to inform the president of their concerns. A few
days later, Jacbosen followed up with the delegation’s leader in a letter, explaining that he had
briefed the president on their problem and that the president directed him to relay their concerns
to Shriver. Jacobsen genially expressed the hope “that you and the others who were in Texas
were able to spend Christmas with your families.”775 Given that Shriver had already rejected the
War Council’s concerns, the fact that Johnson passed the issue back to the OEO director was
likely less than satisfactory to the Syracuse antipoverty activists.
The arrests resulting from the nonviolent demonstration generated an outpouring of
support from both national and local leaders who lobbied the president to fund the Development
Association directly. Community leaders and civic and religious organizations in Syracuse sent
telegrams to the White House, as did some of the nation’s most prominent civil rights leaders.
Rev. Ralph Abernathy of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Roy Wilkins,
Executive Secretary of the NAACP, each urged the president to meet with the activists from the
Salt City.776 This support highlights the linkages between the civil rights movement and the War
on Poverty. By traveling to Texas, the People’s War Council elevated a local dispute over
control of federal funds to the highest levels of leadership in the nation, raising questions over
the future of the War on Poverty itself.
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The protest at Johnson’s ranch is an example of the pressures on mid-twentieth century
liberalism. With his civil rights and Great Society legislative achievements, Johnson expanded
the power of the state to remedy racial and economic inequality. In implementing Johnson’s
policy, the Syracuse War on Poverty programs deployed federal funds to transform decisionmaking processes in the Salt City. Their success tested the Johnson administration’s commitment
to empowering the poor to address the persistence of poverty. As the Post-Standard gleefully
noted in an editorial, the Syracuse experiment in a Republican city represented the trouble that
could spread to Democratic strongholds across the nation.777 Johnson, Shriver, and other federal
officials were unwilling to see the experiment through because it ultimately threatened their own
hold on power and influence. As Elizabeth Hinton has argued, “[p]olicymakers in the 1960s had
the answers—give political and economic power to the people—but walked away” because they
“believed ‘maximum feasible participation’ worked against their self-interest.778
As the Training Center staff and organizers grappled with the loss of funding, race
became a fracture point. Organizational correspondence reveals the ongoing internal conflict. In
January 1966, Haggstrom wrote an acrimonious memo to two Training Center staffers and
copied several SU and OEO administrators. He reflected on options for continuing the Training
Center’s organizing work independent of federal and university support. He also reflected on the
lack of internal cohesion, criticizing trainees and staff who approached their work with an
explicit civil rights or Black Power orientation.779 After writing this memo, Haggstrom
proceeded to fire four Black male organizers. In response, the former trainees publicly asserted

777

“End of a Bad Program? Democrats Fear CATC Approach,” The Post-Standard, 2 December 1965,

Editorial.

778

Elizabeth Hinton, “Opinion | George Floyd’s Death Is a Failure of Generations of Leadership,” The New
York Times, 2 June 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/opinion/george-floyd-protests-1960s.html.
779
Warren C. Haggstrom, “Memo to Daniel Mitchell and Edward McGuire,” 24 January 1966, SCDA, Box
02, SCDA Communications-Correspondence CATC & OEO Folder, SCRC, SUL.

290

that the Training Center had “become oppressive and suppressive” and argued that they had been
scapegoated for the failure of the organization.780
The Training Center’s internal conflicts negatively impacted the fragile unity of the
neighborhood organizations themselves. Despite the bold effort of the War Council to secure
funding for the Development Association, within two months some neighborhood organizations
were ready to break away. Haggstrom’s dismissal of the organizers angered some residents. As a
result, the Central Village and East Side Action Organizations planned to request funding from
the Crusade, the very action that OEO had recommended the previous fall.781
In April, the East Side Action Organization issued a press release demanding an
investigation into the use of Training Center and Development Association funds. The release
expressed a sense of frustration and betrayal. “We cannot figure out where the [Training Center]
money goes or where these trainees and organizers have their loyalty. They certainly are not for
the people of the East Side.” 782 The foundation of trust necessary for the Syracuse University
initiative to succeed had clearly eroded. The Development Association continued as an
independently funded initiative and supported the formation of a federation of Syracuse rights
groups under the umbrella of an “Organization of Organizations” in the fall of 1966.783 Without
sufficient resources, the umbrella group quickly lost momentum. The People’s War Council did
not save the Development Association, but they helped ignite the grassroots energy of lowincome citizens and, in the process, sparked a new movement: welfare rights.
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Just a few weeks after the Salt City antipoverty workers were arrested at the president’s
ranch, the People’s War Council convened a two-day conference to establish a National People’s
War Council Against Poverty. At the Elks Lodge in Syracuse, 600 participants representing
twenty states from across the nation discussed how “to unite. . .to insure [sic] total participation
by the poor in all aspects of the anti-poverty program.”784 Given Syracuse’s reputation for heavy
snowfall, persuading hundreds of people to travel to upstate New York in January was no small
feat. The People’s War Council worked with the Catholic Interracial Council to arrange housing
and solicited food donations from local merchants.
The conference highlights the innovative role that the Salt City played in setting national
strategy for the War on Poverty. Just as Syracuse CORE’s Reverse Freedom Ride brought
nationally recognized civil rights leader Fannie Lou Hamer to town, the antipoverty conference
attracted celebrity activists and leading organizers. Comedian and activist Dick Gregory hosted a
benefit performance at Central Technical High School to cover attendees’ travel expenses. Cesar
Chavez, president of the National Farm Workers Association, addressed the convention. These
leaders implicitly endorsed the group’s bold intention to “promote a ‘national attack’ on OEO”
and to “lift federal programs out of the clutches of politicians.”785 Despite the star-studded
conference, the National People’s War Council never really got off the ground. After holding a
steering committee meeting in Detroit the following month, the initiative seems to have
dissipated.786
The National People’s War Council was short-lived, but the January conference planted
the seed for another national organization. George Wiley, who came back to Syracuse for the
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conference, was in search of a new outlet for his social justice activism. He had just lost a
bruising contest to succeed CORE director James Farmer. On January 3, 1966, the National
Action Committee selected Floyd McKissick, a civil rights pioneer from North Carolina who
emphasized the need for Black political unity, as the new head of CORE.787 Wiley missed out on
his chance to lead one of the “Big Six” civil rights organizations, but he was not prepared to
return to his chemistry lab. Social scientist Richard Cloward sought out Wiley at the conference
to pitch a new concept.
Cloward and his fellow social scientist and spouse, Frances Piven, had been researching
the need for welfare reform. They theorized that welfare recipients could agitate for benefits,
gain political power, and ultimately force politicians to replace welfare with something better.788
Cloward had already approached Bayard Rustin and Urban League director Whitney Young with
the idea of organizing “campaigns using confrontation tactics. . .to weaken the capacity of the
[welfare] system to deny assistance as well as to activate people to apply for assistance.”789
Wiley was intrigued by the idea. Within a few months, he had resigned from CORE and moved
his family to Washington D.C., where he formed the Poverty/Rights Action Center. The Action
Center, more a concept than an organization, operated out of Wiley’s office in the nation’s
capital.
The emergent movement of welfare rights coalesced out of grassroots energy and vision,
Wiley’s organizational skill, and Cloward and Piven’s research. In May 1966, a group of female
welfare recipients attending a conference at the University of Chicago convened to discuss their
shared struggles. The Salt City’s Anna Mae Williams was among the group. The women were
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energized by the gathering and agreed to demonstrate in unity with a Cleveland-to-Columbus
welfare protest march at the end of June. They asked Wiley’s Action Center to organize the
initiative.790 Rather than an exclusively top-down or bottom-up movement, Wiley helped bring
strategic cohesion to a wave of organizing that was already occurring in Syracuse and other cities
across the country.
On June 30, 1966, Syracuse was one of twenty-five cities around the country that
demonstrated for welfare rights. In the Salt City, seventy-five individuals marched from a school
playground to the county welfare office, where Commissioner Lascaris spoke to them. The
protestors called for systemic changes, such as the replacement of welfare with a guaranteed
income, and lodged specific complaints against Lascaris’s office, such as “night raids,” in which
investigators attempted to discover a man living at the house that would to disqualify welfare
recipients from receiving benefits.791 Wiley also returned to Syracuse to support the welfare
organizing efforts. He called Syracuse a “decadent community” and described the welfare
system “as bad as any in the northern part of the country.”792 Wiley intended he was planning a
national convention for January 1967.793
The strands of Syracuse activism sparked by CORE and the War and Poverty converged
in an unexpected way to contribute to the national welfare rights movement. Although CORE
had faltered in 1965, the Training Center and the neighborhood organizations picked up aspects
of CORE’s nascent economic justice agenda and demonstrated that organizing around welfare
rights was possible. Wiley was not directly involved with Training Center activities, but he
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maintained his connection to Syracuse activism and to the university even while he worked for
national CORE. Throughout 1966, Salt City continued to be a laboratory of innovation, offering
a new way to combat racial and economic in equality through welfare rights. By the following
year, Wiley realized the movement required a national organization with this explicit focus. In
August 1967, he launched The National Welfare Rights Organization. Wiley served as the
Executive Director and reported to a board composed of welfare recipients. His former Syracuse
CORE comrades Ed Day, Faith Seidenberg, and Bruce Thomas were by his side.

Testing the Limits of Maximum Feasible Participation
Although the Training Center had opposed the Crusade as a moderate organization
dominated by City Hall, the goals of the Crusade were not synonymous with the will of the city’s
elected officials. In May 1965, the Crusade responded to demands “for greater involvement of
the poor in its community action program” by amending the organization’s by-laws to create
neighborhood boards and to increase the neighborhood representation on the board of
directors.794 Crusade director Ben Zimmerman later explained that the Crusade had initially
intended to incorporate the neighborhood organizations created by the Training Center in the
planning and implementation of its programs.795 When this collaboration did not develop, the
Crusade restructured itself in order to achieve this participation.
The Crusade held elections for three, thirty-member boards—one in each of the lowincome neighborhoods that the organization served. The neighborhood organizations created by
the Training Center were invited to participate in this process, but only one did so. Zimmerman
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admitted that the turnout for the special election was poor due to bad weather and confusion, but
he maintained that “a significant number of Syracuse's action area residents have taken what for
many of them is a first step toward participating in making decisions that affect their lives.”796
The ninety neighborhood board representatives became part of the 150-member Crusade
commission, meaning they composed over half of the organization. Moreover, a minimum of
one-third of the Crusade’s board seats were set aside for neighborhood board members. Although
the federal government had not precisely defined its mandate that community action programs
should include “the maximum feasible participation of the poor,” the Crusade’s restructuring
marked one of the most rigorous attempts to realize this goal in the nation.797
In spring 1966, the selection of a new Executive Director for the Crusade presented an
opportunity for the neighborhood residents to make their voices heard. Zimmerman, who had
been with the Crusade since its inception as the Mayor’s Commission for Youth, stepped down
at the end of May. The Crusade board announced that they would seek a qualified Black man to
become the new director. To the ire of neighborhood residents, however, the board
simultaneously engineered a staff restructuring, including the creation of two new assistant
director positions. This raised concerns that a qualified Black director would be treated as “a
figurehead and a flunky.”798 Although these concerns were valid, the man who landed the job
was neither.
Under pressure from neighborhood residents, the Crusade board selected James Tillman,
former Associate Director of the Training Center, as its new leader. In a controversial move,
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Tillman had canvassed the neighborhoods to gather support for his candidacy. Tillman embodied
the traits of other notable Syracuse antipoverty and civil rights leaders: He had a strong vision
and a healthy ego—he often referred to himself in the third person—that rivaled Warren
Haggstrom’s. Like George Wiley, he was an educated Black man who could connect with
diverse audiences. Tillman’s penchant for multisyllabic words convinced middle-class white
board members that he would not assault the status quo. Low-income Syracusans appreciated
that Tillman did not patronize them, and they felt that he would wield his rich vocabulary to fight
alongside the poor. The Crusade board viewed Tillman as a moderate antipoverty leader who
was acceptable to the neighborhood residents. Board chair Alfred Seigle later told the Wall Street
Journal that “I guess I’m responsible as anyone for hiring him; he seemed bright, articulate,
understanding, very moderate. I didn’t want the selection of a new director to be an issue.”799
Ultimately, however, Tillman’s strong personality combined with increasing resistance to
antipoverty initiatives to create a combustible situation.
About six months after he became Executive Director, Tillman fomented a revolution
that occurred during the annual meeting of the Crusade’s corporate membership on January 25,
1967. During a contentious two-hour meeting at the War Memorial in downtown Syracuse, the
membership convened to elect a new cohort of board members and officers. The nominating
committee of the board presented nominations for twelve neighborhood board representatives,
ten institutional members, and ten at-large members that constituted the thirty-two-member
board. In a radical move, the membership voted to suspend the by-laws to allow an unofficial
“Joint Neighborhood Nominating Committee” to introduce a second slate of nominees for the atlarge board positions. Whereas none of the official nominating committee’s at-large candidates
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were residents of the Crusade’s service neighborhoods, the alternative slate included six
residents and four non-residents. These six residents were key to the revolution: When the votes
were counted, the new board chair and a total of eighteen of the thirty-two members were
representatives of low-income neighborhoods.800 The neighborhood residents, a majority of
whom were Black, had applied their knowledge of democratic governance and procedures to
secure majority representation on the Crusade board. The poor had taken control of the War on
Poverty in the Salt City.
The new board chair was Norman Hill, a young Vietnam veteran. After spending eight
years in the Air Force, Hill returned to Syracuse to settle down. He worked for the Prudential
Life Insurance Company and was committed to serving his community.801 He explained that “I
was recently out of the military, and I had a young family, and lived in a neighborhood that was.
. .targeted as a low-income neighborhood. . .I felt the need to become involved, and do
something to help ourselves.”802 Hill was concerned by the “constant belittling of neighborhood
people” by middle-class board members. One member directed constant taunts at Hill. Hill
confessed that as a result of his “youth and inexperience,” he sometimes responded to his fellow
board members in counterproductive ways.803 Hill’s honest self-reflection points to the
discomfort that white, middle-class board members felt with the board takeover, and their
attempts to undermine Hill’s authority.
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Following the board takeover, the Crusade faced intense scrutiny of its activities. The
media raised questions about how the Crusade’s multi-million-dollar budget was being used, or
misused. The Crusade administered an array of services—including Head Start, Teen Center
Programs, Legal Services, and Employment Programs—at four neighborhood centers.804 In a
series of articles published in March 1967, the Syracuse Herald-Journal attempted to determine
how many residents the Crusade actually served and what it had achieved since its inception in
1964. One area where the Crusade had clearly fallen short was in job training. Where the
responsibility for this failure was located was less clear. In September 1966, the Crusade had
received a federal grant from the Bureau of Apprenticeship Training to operate a job training and
placement initiative.805 They subsequently lost the grant because they were unable to form
partnerships with industry. Business leaders, apparently due to discomfort about the role that
low-income Syracusans played in the organization, resisted collaborating with the Crusade.806
Neither the Manufacturers Association of Syracuse, nor the Chamber of Commerce, nor the
Urban League participated in the Crusade’s job services initiative. As with CORE’s protracted
negotiations with Niagara Mohawk, business leaders realized that stonewalling was an effective
means of maintaining power. Funding issues added to the Crusade’s troubles, as Congress
slashed funding for the War on Poverty, reducing the Crusade’s appropriation for 1967 from $3.2
to $1.7 million.807
By April 1967, three months after the board takeover, the Crusade became embroiled in
conflict with the local NAACP chapter. The NAACP president and Crusade corporation
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member, Curlean Shelton, objected to educational materials presented at a Crusade staff training.
One controversial statement read “[t]here is a time—which no one can accurately predict—when
the right of the oppressor will be militantly questioned. . .his right to rule ultimately has to be
settled in the arena of battle.”808 Shelton asserted that the materials “can do nothing but polarize
the community and eventually lead to a worsening of community relations.”809 Crusade board
members insisted that the materials had not been approved by the board for distribution and
refused to release them. The NAACP, however, called for the resignation of the executive
director and developed a fourteen-point proposal for reforming the antipoverty agency.810
Shelton emphasized that she wanted to see the Crusade continue, and she acknowledged that
“misunderstanding is part of the process, and conflict is inevitable when a confrontation results
between the old and tried and the new and untried—but reasonable compromises can be
effected.”811 Many Crusade leaders and members, however, were uninterested in compromise.
The militant rhetoric of an impending race war had no space to gain traction in
Syracuse’s small political arena. The anonymous Crusade members who circulated training
materials that called for battle were a minority within Syracuse’s Black population. And although
Tillman’s detractors sought to label him as a Black Power radical, sociologist Noel Cazenave
points out that the Crusade director in fact espoused a deep belief in the potential of American
democracy to foster Black and white cooperation.812 Regardless, the inflammatory rhetoric was
unacceptable to the moderate leadership of the NAACP. Whereas CORE had negotiated a careful
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balancing act, pushing the NAACP to support direct-action campaigns without entering into
open conflict with the more moderate group, the Crusade directly challenged the NAACP’s
leadership.
Crusade officials escalated the tension with the NAACP through aggressive tactics. On
Saturday evening, April 15th, a group of Crusade members showed up at the Dunbar Center
where the NAACP was meeting. Board chair Norman Hill was among the crowd. The Crusade
group insisted that they had been invited to the meeting to discuss the NAACP’s charges against
the antipoverty agency. President Shelton said the Crusade was not on the evening’s agenda and
offered to discuss the issues at another time. When the Crusade representatives refused to leave
the building, Shelton called the police.813 A few weeks later, several dozen Crusade members
applied to become members of the local branch of the NAACP in an apparent attempt to take
over the chapter. Shelton declared that “[t]he Crusade has tried in every manner, devious, decent,
and indecent to shut me up. . .I’m fighting mad.”814
The Crusade’s trajectory of self-destruction continued as the board chair alienated both
new and existing board members. Hill blocked efforts of the board to discuss the problems the
Crusade faced and refused to call a board meeting for that purpose. Instead, he called a meeting
of the corporate membership for May 11, 1967—an act that his critics considered to be a
violation of the Crusade’s by-laws.815 During the contentious meeting, the membership voted to
“investigate” seven members of the board for criticizing the Crusade. Among the group were two
Black board members, Gloria Mims and Reverend Emery Proctor—both of whom had been
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elected as at-large members on the rogue slate of nominees earlier that year. In light of this
motion, which passed over a number of dissentions and abstentions, Norman Hill announced the
suspension of the board members pending the outcome of an investigation.
Statements made by Crusade members to the Post-Standard highlight the racial
component of the conflict that was ripping apart the antipoverty agency. One Black minister
asserted that “the power structure” has “got some house niggers to destroy you,” an apparent
reference to Curlean Shelton or Proctor and Mims.816 An unnamed member summed up the
conflict by saying that “people think a Negro can’t be allowed to exercise the power Mr. Tillman
has.”817 Some of the resistance to Hill’s and Tillman’s leadership, particularly from white
middle-class members, was undoubtedly racial backlash to shifting power relations. The
suspension of Proctor and Mims, however, belies a simple categorization of the conflict.
The tangled politics of the Crusade conflict cannot be reduced to a power struggle
between the white power structure and the low-income and Black citizens of Syracuse. Rather,
the issue divided the very neighborhood residents the Crusade was supposed to empower. Gloria
Mims, a Black mother and activist, was an exemplar of the impact of community organizing in
the Salt City. A resident of Pioneer Homes, she lived at ground zero of the spatialized power
struggle in the Salt City. She joined the Citizens of Pioneer, the city’s first tenants’ group, and
had served as the secretary of the Joint Action Committee of Public Housing Tenants. Mims was
outspoken about the need for security guards, egregious charges, and rent increases.818 In
addition to her antipoverty work, Mims was active in the conflict over school integration. In
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spring 1966, she coordinated a boycott of Croton School, the elementary school that five of her
children attended, in response to the district’s plans to close the majority-Black school and bus
the students to achieve integration.819 After her suspension from the Crusade board, Mims told
the Post-Standard that she wanted to defend the Crusade, but the executive director had not
addressed the criticisms of the NAACP or the concerns of neighborhood residents in an effective
way. She felt her removal was unjust and remained firm in her commitment to represent her
neighborhood.820
Hill’s decision to suspend board members triggered the involvement of the Office of
Economic Opportunity. A few days after the contentious Crusade membership meeting, the
OEO’s New York City district office telegrammed Hill demanding an explanation of the
events.821 Hill issued a rejoinder asserting that the suspension of the members was a local issue
where the OEO had no jurisdiction or interest.822 OEO officials found Hill’s response to be
unsatisfactory. In mid-June, they informed him that the Crusade needed to demonstrate that it
was holding regular board meetings with a functioning board that was representative of the
community.823 Given that Crusade’s funding needed to be renewed on July 1st, time was running
out for the Crusade to satisfy the OEO’s expectations. Instead, at a June 14th meeting, the board
fully imploded.
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During the Crusade’s June board meeting, twenty-one board members resigned. Unless
Hill reinstated the suspended Crusade members, the resignations were effective as of June 23rd,
1967.824 The resignations included nine institutional representatives, five neighborhood
representatives, eight members-at-large, and all the board officers except Hill himself. A press
release issued by neighborhood residents summarized the conflict: “We want Crusade. The
people who resigned want Crusade. But all of us want a responsible administration of Crusade.
We do not want Mr. Tillman. We do not want Mr. Hill. They are not being fair to us or to the
community.”825
After the board resignations, the Crusade went into a tailspin from which it did not
recover. In response to the mass resignation, the OEO placed the Crusade in trusteeship, the first
time it had done so with any Community Action Agency, and required the Crusade to obtain
OEO approval for all expenditures.826 Local Congressmember James Hanley criticized the
OEO’s actions as a “blundering mish-mash of indecision” on the House floor.827 Meanwhile,
Governor Rockefeller dispatched legendary baseball player Jackie Robinson to Syracuse to
gather information about the poverty program.828 The OEO announced the trustees in mid-July,
and the Crusade’s polarizing executive director, James Tillman, resigned effective July 17th.829
The new Crusade board tried and failed to convince the OEO to take the Crusade out of
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trusteeship in September.830 In early October, the OEO announced its decision to terminate
funding to the Crusade.831 Salt City’s experiment with maximum feasible participation had come
to an inglorious end just three years after it began.
The Crusade’s implosion was connected with national concern over the Community
Action Program. In fall 1967, Congress took steps to ensure that the poor would no longer be
able to take over Community Action Agencies. Edith Green, a Democratic Congresswoman from
Oregon, successfully introduced an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act stipulating that
Community Action Agency boards would be composed of a maximum of one-third poor
representatives. This instituted a ceiling, rather than a floor, for the participation of low-income
citizens.832 According to Daniel Knapp and Kenneth Polk, “Syracuse was the impetus for the
‘Green Amendment.’”833 The Crusade had found the limits of maximum feasible participation,
and its experiment had repercussions for antipoverty agencies throughout the country.
Reflecting on the legacy of the Crusade, former members acknowledged some
meaningful achievements. Norman Hill was circumspect about the Crusade’s impact, explaining
that “[w]e were so polarized that we ended up, a year later, really not having done much. Much
other, I think, than giving folks, unwittingly, a road map. And that was one that said you can
speak up, and you can become involved, and you can be principled.”834 The politicization of lowincome individuals and the invigoration of democracy were in themselves valuable outcomes of
the War on Poverty. Hill was also proud of low-income citizen’s influence on the Head Start
program. Dr. Julius B. Richmond, a pediatrician at Upstate Medical Center in Syracuse, had
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pioneered an early daycare model during the summer of 1964. The following year, the OEO
invited him to serve as the first director of Head Start so that he could scale up the innovative
program across the country.835 In Syracuse, the implementation of Head Start resulted in class
conflict. Social service professionals wanted to focus on delivering free meals, while community
members wanted Head Start to include a rigorous pre-Kindergarten curriculum. Hill recalled
with pride that the neighborhood parents succeeding in “getting our kids the teacher funding. . .as
opposed to the milk and cookies.”836
Gloria Mims described a similar victory for neighborhood representatives in creating a
Neighborhood Health Center. As members of a Neighborhood Health Council, Mims and other
low-income residents shaped the project, which was overseen by the County Health
Commission.837 Mims explained that “[w]e got to put the Neighborhood Health Center in from
the ground up. We looked at maps, where and why. . .It was a tough battle. We had to fight the
dentist association, the AMA association. We had to fight City Hall. . .Never mind the poor. We
dictate to you. You don’t tell us.”838 The Crusade board approved a plan for the Neighborhood
Health Center in April 1967. After the Crusade closed, the health center secured its own funding
from the OEO. When the center opened in July 1968, it offered free comprehensive medical
services, from emergency to dental, to low-income families.839 It still operates out of the same
building on South Salina Street fifty-four years later.
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Syracuse’s War on Poverty programs grappled with competing agendas and with the
tension between bottom-up and top-down change. A few bold individuals tested the capacity of
the poor to mobilize and create change. Before they reached the limit of this potential, divisive
leadership combined with the resistance of elected officials and the business community to shut
the experiments down. The Salt City’s contributions to antipoverty efforts, however, would
continue.

Model Cities
A third federally funded community organization, the Syracuse Model City Agency
(MCA), offers a useful lens for understanding the decline of the civil rights movement and the
transformation of Black politics during a moment of urban reorganization. Initiated by President
Johnson in 1966, Model Cities promoted the development of comprehensive programs to
improve the physical and social environments of low-income neighborhoods throughout the
country.840 Because the authorizing legislation mandated that low-income citizens constitute a
majority on governing boards and advisory councils, Model Cities provided a means for cities
such as Syracuse; Oakland, California; and New Haven, Connecticut, to continue work begun
through civil rights organizations and the War on Poverty.841
By the time Syracuse received a Model Cities grant in 1970, agitating for structural
change through federal programs had become increasingly difficult because local government
officials resisted engaging with grassroots leaders. For activists in Syracuse, however, federal
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funding provided crucial resources for building an institution that could redress injustice in the
city. Although the MCA was not a traditional civil rights organization, it became a vehicle
through which Black community members could breathe new life into the struggle for
educational equity that CORE had initiated in the 1960s. MCA did not exclusively focus on
education, but its most sustained and innovative campaigns related to school issues. Like the
civil rights coalition of the previous decade, the MCA’s agenda was ultimately stymied by the
intransigence of the school district.842
The MCA had the daunting task of improving socioeconomic conditions in the poorest
sector of the city, known as the Model Neighborhood. Spanning 937 acres on the city’s Near
West and South Sides, the Model Neighborhood was the creation of city planners rather than a
distinct community recognized by residents.843 Citizens in the neighborhood experienced the
highest unemployment rates and most dilapidated housing stock in the Salt City. Although the
population was 50% white, the neighborhood encompassed the majority of Syracuse’s African
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American citizens as well as a small but growing number of Puerto Ricans and an even smaller
number of Native Americans.844 The minority residents were not, however, distributed evenly
throughout the neighborhood: the Central Village and Pioneer Homes housing projects near the
neighborhood’s eastern border were over 75% nonwhite.
Despite the backlash against the War on Poverty’s maximum feasible participation
mandate, Model Cities included a citizen participation requirement. This requirement aligned
well with the strategies and priorities of the late phase of the civil rights movement in the North.
It imbued Model Cities with a transformative potential that scholars have not fully recognized.
The administrative structure of the MCA allowed citizens to direct the development and
implementation of programs themselves. In a February 1970 election, low-income residents
selected representatives for an advisory board and eight, six-member task forces. The election
resulted in a disappointing 5% turnout that nonetheless yielded some advisory board members
who were committed to representing the neighborhood.845
Lawrence Briggs, a dynamic Black resident of the Model Neighborhood, served as the
first chair of the Advisory Board.846 Briggs had grown up in Louisiana, served in the Air Force
during the Korean War, and migrated to the Salt City in the 1950s. He and his wife raised two
sons and a daughter in Syracuse. A colleague described Briggs as “a fighter, but he kept his
dignity and respect.”847 Briggs would go on to attend divinity school. A fellow faith leader
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explained that Briggs “saw his role as a minister as being a prophet—not in the grandiose sense,
but rather as the voice for citizens who couldn’t speak for themselves.”848 Briggs attempted to do
just that through MCA.
Each MCA task force analyzed a separate program area, such as education, housing, and
health and sanitation, and proposed specific projects to address community needs. Ultimately,
the MCA reported to the mayor’s office. Although local power struggles over the control of
Model Cities ensued in many instances, this was not the case in Syracuse. After decades of
Republican domination, Syracusans chose Democrat Lee Alexander for mayor in 1969. When
Alexander took office, the MCA was preparing its program proposal. Alexander established a
positive relationship with the agency, which received federal approval for its program in
September 1970.
Perhaps due to the fact that the Model Neighborhood was simultaneously multiracial and
disproportionately black, the African American agency leadership espoused a unique version of
Black Power that reflected the local context. The MCA had to balance a primary orientation
toward racial equity with the fact that the Model Cities neighborhood was 50% white. All
residents of the Model Neighborhood benefited from MCA programs, but the agency particularly
attacked the racial barriers faced by minority citizens.
In spring 1970, the MCA sought to establish itself as a new stakeholder within urban
politics. An outbreak of racial violence created space for the agency’s grassroots leaders to gain
recognition and power by speaking out on the unacceptable conditions in the city schools. The
school board’s failure to commit to and implement an integration plan—over half of Syracuse’s
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forty-five schools were racially imbalanced, meaning that Black students in the schools
represented a greater proportion of the student body than in the district at large, in October
1969—had created a toxic and combustible environment in the district. Violence between white
and Black students erupted in the city’s junior and senior high schools in May 1970 and again in
the fall, resulting in several days of school closures.849 Representatives of the MCA responded to
the school disturbances by engaging the community in seeking solutions. Lawrence Briggs
served on a special committee to investigate the violence.
Despite the committee’s conclusion that racial prejudice had fueled the violence, the
school district’s primary response to the crisis was to enact a stricter student behavior code.850
Briggs mobilized Model Neighborhood parents to challenge the policy. After a school board
meeting in April 1971, they confronted the board members with the fact that 105 students had
been suspended that school year and most of them were Black. School officials insisted that the
suspension policy was fair, but Briggs argued that the ostensibly race-neutral disciplinary
procedures in fact disproportionately affected Black students. He called for a state and federal
government investigation of the school district.851 Just as school officials were unwilling to
engage with citizens about issues of school discipline, they also balked at collaborating with the
MCA on implementing programming in the Model Neighborhood.
The Model City Agency identified education as a top priority for achieving the goal of
neighborhood change, and staff members recognized that the school district would be a
necessary partner in this process. The MCA’s education task force proposed to use Model Cities
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funds to contract with the district to deliver special programs and resources to Model
Neighborhood schools, where students lagged behind their peers in reading and math.852 To the
detriment of MCA education projects, district officials resisted collaborating with the new
agency because it threatened to disrupt the status quo. In reality, the first-year education
programs were not particularly innovative. They included increasing the number of teachers and
teacher aides; a teacher-training program to place education students from area colleges in
special internships in the Model Neighborhood schools; and a tutoring and counseling
program.853 To school officials, however, any proposals from an outside organization represented
a challenge to their authority. From the outset, the MCA and the school district were locked in a
tense standoff.
Seemingly benign programs such as the teacher aide project highlighted a fundamental
issue facing the neighborhood: the school district lacked leaders willing to confront the
inequality within the system. Syracuse schools employed over one-hundred aides throughout the
district, but budget cuts endangered these positions. The education task force proposed
contracting with the district to hire twenty-four neighborhood residents, including two-bilingual
individuals, to work as aides in Model Neighborhood schools. Between January and September
1971, however, the organizations failed to finalize a contract.854 A primary point of contention
was the requirement that aides come from the neighborhood, which fulfilled the Model Cities
goals of citizen participation and economic development but conflicted with district employment

852

In four Model Neighborhood elementary schools, third grade students were 7.1 months behind the city
average in reading and fourth and fifth grade students were 7.1 and 7.3 months behind in math, respectively. Based
on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills. These dismal statistics were actually distorted because one elementary school had a
special magnet program for high achieving students, therefore somewhat inflating the overall results.
Comprehensive City Demonstration Program (1970), 34.
853
Comprehensive City Demonstration Program (1970), 81-95.
854
Harry S. Balmer, Syracuse, “Model City Teacher Aide Contract,” Memorandum to Hanford P. Salmon,
Syracuse, 28 September 1971, Binder: Model Cities Data, Syracuse School District, Box 3, Subseries 2: Files on
Cities, New York State Office of Model Cities Program Services, NYSA.

312

policies. The MCA also wanted the district to allow residents to participate in decision-making
processes, particularly the placement of personnel in schools.
After months of delay, the MCA abandoned the aide program and re-directed the unused
funds to other projects. The school district’s rigid adherence to its existing policies prevented
children in the Model Neighborhood from receiving additional resources, further damaging the
relationship between the schools and the community. District officials insisted that they had to
consider the education of all students in the district and could not operate special projects
exclusively within the Model Neighborhood—despite the fact that this neighborhood was the
epicenter of the educational crisis facing the district.855
Thwarted by the district in implementing the teacher aide program, the MCA proposed an
innovative and bold initiative as part of its second-year plan: The Educational Advocacy
Program. In recognition of the school-community disconnect, this program proposed to hire and
train neighborhood residents to serve as advocates for children and parents and to mediate
between the families and the schools. It offered a path to achieving systemic change: once a
cohort of Model Neighborhood parents achieved a better understanding of the school system,
they could work to “improve the education environment for all concerned and eradicate racism
and discrimination on a social class basis.”856 Independence from the school district was critical
to the success of the advocacy program. In response to the district’s intransigence, the MCA staff
members attempted to shift the institutional power dynamics. They intended to redefine how the
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district interacted with the community through a mediation process. Although this program
assisted students and families on a case-by-case basis, the MCA also sought a broader platform
for impacting the operation of the school district.
The federal Title I program provided the clearest opportunity for the MCA to reshape the
school district’s practices. A significant source of funding that was ostensibly ear-marked for
schools with a high percentage of “educationally disadvantaged” students, all but two of fifteen
schools in the Model Neighborhood qualified as Title I schools.857 The funds were considerable.
In fact, the $3 million the school district received in Title I funds for the 1972-1973 school year
exceeded the MCA’s total annual operating budget, which was $2.5 million.858 In October 1972,
Briggs and Walt Shepperd, a white War on Poverty veteran and the director of the MCA’s
Educational Advocacy Program, demanded an accounting of the school district’s use of Title I
funds. The duo also wanted details about the criteria the superintendent used to select
representatives to the Title I Citizens’ Advisory Board.859 When the school district was
unresponsive, Briggs and Shepperd demanded a meeting.
On October 31, 1972, representatives of the MCA and the school district sat in a tense
four-hour meeting debating the best way to educate the city’s low-income students.
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Representatives of the MCA expressed apprehension that insufficient Title I funds were going
toward math and reading education and that the district was instead using the resources for
administrative costs. Indeed, the Title I program became infamous because districts around the
country used funds contrary to Congress’s intentions.860 The administrator who oversaw the
district’s Title I funding insisted that $2.75 million of the $3 million funds went toward “direct
instructional services,” but was vague on specific details.861 Briggs pulled no punches in his
determined effort to hold the school district accountable for educational outcomes. “You keep
telling me you're interested in the education of inner city children,” said Briggs, to the president
of the board of education. “I've heard that long enough. I want to see the figures. I'm not
illiterate. I can read. Just show me the figures.”862 Instead of assuring parents that the district
used the funds to maximum effectiveness for high-priority programs, the district persisted in
operating with a lack of transparency.
After the unsatisfactory meeting, Briggs and Shepperd deployed what they hoped would
be the ultimate weapon: a letter to the State Commissioner of Education, Ewald Nyquist,
requesting an investigation of the Syracuse public schools. Briggs signed the letter, but Shepperd
likely contributed his technical expertise about school district policies. The letter raised six
points relating to the composition of the district-wide parent advisory committee and recently
implemented school-based liaison groups.863 Briggs charged the district with having an
improperly constituted advisory committee, failing to establish liaison groups at every Title I

860

Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, 169-170.
Rappaport, “Review School ‘Feud’ for 2 State Officials,” The Post-Standard.
862
Larry Briggs quoted in “That School Hassel,” Neighborhood Report, November 1972, New York State
Office of Model Cities Program Services Program Files, Subseries 2: Files on Cities, Box 3, Folder 30: Syracuse-Administration of Title I--Re: Larry Briggs’s Letter to EBN, NYSA.
863
John Mungovan, “Meeting, October 31 with Dr. Gunning and Armand Magnarelli,” Memorandum, 30
October 1972, Folder 30: Syracuse--Administration of Title I--Re: Larry Briggs’s Letter to EBN, Subseries 2: Files
on Cities, Box 3, New York State Office of Model Cities Program Services Program Files, NYSA.
861

315

school, failing to provide a parent training program to educate parents about Title I, and
generally neglecting to inform citizens about the content of the Title I program. The
inflammatory letter was succinct and direct, but Briggs gave a passionate statement about the
importance of community participation in a neighborhood newsletter:
The schools are not educating our children to become better human beings; they are not
preparing them for the achievement of a good life. It is in this sense that community
participation holds great promise for the education of our children. If we don't protect our
interests, who will? The task of producing effective representatives who are capable of
suggesting and designing ways of increasing the educational benefits for our children is a
difficult but very necessary one.864
Acting as an elected representative of the Model Neighborhood, Briggs responded to the school
district’s indifference by involving the highest-ranking educational official in the state.
The institutional culture of the State Education Department favored the status quo in
school administration. The passionate Syracusans underestimated how hesitant the State
Education Department would be to act as mediator in a local squabble. One complicating factor
was the fact that the department was embroiled in school desegregation battles across the state,
and the commissioner most likely did not want to expend his resources and political capital on
the Title I controversy in Syracuse.865 More importantly, however, the state technocrats generally
held a low opinion of Syracuse’s Model City Agency. In particular, the state employee who was
the liaison to several upstate Model Cities organizations doubted the ability of citizens to operate
education programs and wanted education experts to direct change from above. He viewed
Briggs and Shepperd as power-hungry troublemakers rather than as legitimate representatives of
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a federally funded initiative. By disparaging the agency and its leaders, the liaison laid the
groundwork for the state to dismiss Briggs’s charges about Syracuse’s Title I program.866
In its response to the MCA’s appeal, the State Education Department displayed an
unwillingness to challenge the fundamental inequities built into the existing education system.
Rather than launching a full-scale investigation, the department spoke to several school district
officials and collected materials regarding the Title I program. Notably, the department did not
contact any parents of children in Title I schools. In January 1973, an employee in the state Title
I office, not Commissioner Nyquist himself, sent Briggs a perfunctory letter. The measured
response addressed each of Briggs’s concerns but contained no directives for the school district
to alter its administration of the Title I program.
Although the district was not in violation of federal guidelines, the state’s response
revealed that the district had done the bare minimum to conform to the letter of the law. It
certainly did not fulfill its spirit. For example, the school district required parents to learn about
Title I by contacting their school principal or making an appointment with the Special Projects
office. Requiring parents to self-educate about a complicated, multi-million-dollar federal
program designed in part to promote parental involvement in the schools indicates once again the
district’s resistance to community input. On this point, the State Education Department
commended the district for preparing a Title I informational pamphlet. With bureaucratic
formality, the department suggested “that written communication with parents of Title I, ESEA
eligible children should be a continuing process and that a brochure or pamphlet published at
regular intervals could impart information that would be of inestimable value in keeping parents
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informed about Title I programs and educational practices which can be bolstered by parental
support.”867 The state did not acknowledge the persistent disconnect between the district and the
public that had impelled the MCA to create the Educational Advocacy Program. With its tepid
response, the state, too, had chosen to engage the Syracuse community to the minimum possible
extent. After mailing the letter to Briggs, the State Education Department thereafter absolved
itself of the matter.
What the MCA hoped would be the key to victory—appealing to the state government to
intervene—was in fact a fatal blow to the agency’s education program. Embedded in a web of
institutional relationships spanning all levels of government, the agency was unable to activate
these institutions to achieve the change it desired. Despite federal financing and the tacit support
of the mayor’s office, the MCA could not compel the Syracuse school district to change its
approach to the provision of education in the city without the assistance of the State Education
Department.
Following the conflict with the school district, additional factors caused the MCA to
unravel: a key community partnership ruptured, the executive director resigned, the agency
received drastically reduced funding for its third action year, and President Nixon revealed his
intention to phase out Model Cities altogether. Given these obstacles, the agency altered its
objectives. The MCA board redirected a large portion of its funding to the construction of the
Syracuse Model Neighborhood Facility, a community center that opened in 1975. It housed
multiple agencies under one roof, thus making it easier for residents to access services, and
included a library and community meeting space as well as a community pool. Lawrence Briggs
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became the center’s first director, and he prioritized building relationships with neighborhood
youth and convincing them to participate in center programming.
The Syracuse Model Neighborhood Facility, now known as the Southwest Community
Center, stands as a concrete reminder of the short-lived Model Cities initiative. After forty-seven
years, it still operates out of the same building on South Avenue. This lasting presence in the
neighborhood cannot be discounted, but many community members who participated in Model
Cities had dreamed of far achieving more. Model Cities representatives mobilized citizens,
petitioned local government officials, and demanded a state government investigation to compel
the school district to better serve the neighborhood where the majority of Black Syracusans
lived. Once again, activists searched for any means to improve the lives and futures of their
children. Though these Syracusans had persisted in fighting for change within a set of limited
parameters, the elimination of the Model Cities program signaled the end of an organized and
sustained movement for civil rights in the city. Community leaders continued to serve the Model
Neighborhood, but much of the momentum to push for structural change was lost. At the local
level, the decline of the civil rights movement was often intimately tied to the evolution of urban
institutions. The decimation of federal programming in the mid-1970s severely hindered the
ability of African Americans to develop and control such institutions and led to the redirection of
Black activism toward social service provision and electoral politics.

Conclusion
The Salt City was at the forefront of experimentation in reducing economic inequality.
For low-income and Black citizens, the War on Poverty presented the opportunity to implement
federal policy and exert political influence. They attempted to fight economic, social, and
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political marginalization by transforming the processes by which decisions were made and
resources were allocated in the Salt City. Their creative experiments impacted fueled national
debates about the nature of “community action” and the meaning of the war on poverty, and they
put welfare rights on the agenda as a priority. Their goals were unrealized at the national level,
but if we forget this legacy of activism then we have a distorted understanding of the kinds of
possibilities they were imagining. During this time of national transformation, there was no lack
of imagination or solutions. Had local and national officials taken the voices and concerns of
Black Syracusans more seriously, perhaps they might have saved the Salt City from
hypersegregation and concentrated poverty.
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Epilogue

In the mid-twentieth century Black Syracusans experienced marginalization in all facets
of life—in education, housing, policing, employment, as well as in decision-making processes.
The activists featured in this narrative contested this marginalization, made systemic racism
legible to the broader community, and proposed alternative agendas for change. To do so, they
had to disrupt the mythology that Syracuse was a bastion of “peace and harmony,” which white
city leaders had carefully constructed, and which most white citizens were resistant to
questioning.868 By building interracial and cross-class organizations, activists contested the
narratives and the policies that marginalized Black citizens.
This project recovers the Salt City as a laboratory of experimentation for innovative
tactics to achieve change in the Deep North. Between 1962 and 1965, Syracuse CORE
implemented the Washington Irving School boycott, urban renewal demonstrations, the Citizens
of Pioneer campaign against the Greyhound Bus Terminal, and the Reverse Freedom Ride.
Nationally renowned activists such as James Farmer and Bayard Rustin came to Syracuse not
just to give speeches, but to actively support CORE’s efforts. These campaigns in and of
themselves constituted remarkable creativity and organization for a mid-sized city such as
Syracuse. Yet CORE had also fostered grassroots leadership and catalyzed movements for
change that continued after the organization itself collapsed.
Through community organizing facilitated by federally funded War on Poverty and
Model Cities Programs, low-income activists mobilized to continue the fight for better housing,
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education, community safety, and economic justice. Between 1965 and 1967, public housing
tenants’ councils secured new refrigerators and security guards; welfare recipients fought for and
received clothing for their children; and Black parents staged a school boycott to prevent the
school board from closing Croton Elementary School. Syracuse’s Model City Agency continued
the struggle for educational equity, pressing the school board to be more responsive to parents’
concerns and to administer federal school funding with more transparency. A coherent
movement collapsed in the mid-1970s with the end of the Model Cities program. Despite the
futility of their efforts, which could not avert the Salt City’s urban decline, Syracusans had
pursued agendas for change grounded in the optimism that government could and should respond
to the needs, interests, and visions of Black and low-income citizens.
In the twenty-first century, the city’s legacy of civil rights and antipoverty activism is
newly relevant as Syracusans once again grapple with the city’s and the nation’s ongoing racial
inequality. Concerns about police brutality and the potential destruction of the city’s remaining
Black neighborhoods have stirred a new wave of activism. Once again, activists must work to
disrupt narratives of progress that contradict the reality of Black experiences of hypersegregation
and concentrated poverty in the Salt City.
During summer 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic raged across the globe, a new wave of
racial protests and uprisings surged across the United States. Americans took to the streets in
record-breaking numbers in response to the deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Daniel
Prude, and many other Black and Brown individuals at the hands of police. In the Salt City,
Black Lives Matter (BLM) Syracuse demanded that authorities reform police practices to ensure
justice for Black Syracusans. They felt that the mayor Ben Walsh—William Walsh’s grandson—
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was merely paying lip service to activists’ demands for change.869 Echoing CORE’s charges
against William Walsh over fifty years earlier, BLM Syracuse expressed frustration that the
mayor “has equivocated, passed the buck, and refused to show meaningful leadership and
courage on implementing the agenda” for police reform.870
The local civil rights and antipoverty activism of the mid-twentieth century is largely
absent from public memory in the Salt City. The dominant narrative of the civil rights
movement, one in which racism was a unique feature of the Jim Crow South that was
triumphantly obliterated with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
does not accommodate the Salt City’s story. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s observation that
“remembrance is always a form of forgetting, and the dominant narrative of the civil rights
movement-distilled from history and memory, twisted by ideology and political contestation, and
embedded in heritage tours, museums, public rituals, textbooks, and various artifacts of mass
culture-distorts and suppresses as much as it reveals” remains prescient.871 The story of Syracuse
activists who crafted bold agendas for change between 1955 and 1975 has indeed been
suppressed by the dominant narrative, and with great potential cost to the Black and Brown
citizens of the Salt City in the twenty-first century.
In the next decade, Syracuse has the rare opportunity to correct past mistakes as it once
again remakes the physical and social geography of the city. After fifty years, the elevated
portion of Interstate 81 became functionally obsolete in the second decade of the twenty-first
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century. Officials weighed numerous options for addressing the highway, including building a
new elevated arterial and digging a tunnel or sunken highway, but they ultimately selected a
“community grid” option, which will remove the arterial and reconnect the city streets.872 This
choice illustrates a key departure from past planning decisions: city and state officials did not
defer to the wishes of many white suburbanites, who opposed the grid plan because it would add
to their commute time.873
In March 2021, President Joe Biden, a graduate of the SU College of Law, highlighted
the I-81 project in a speech outlining his $1 trillion infrastructure package.874 New York’s
Senators, Democrats Chuck Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand, and Mayor Walsh all celebrated
Biden’s decision to feature I-81 and endorsed the infrastructure package. Walsh stated that the
president’s “vision bodes well for Syracuse. . .$20 billion for a new program to reconnect
neighborhoods, increase opportunity, and advance racial equity and environmental justice can be
a game changer for this community and can help us realize the full potential of this
project.”875 This political support for a national reckoning with the racially discriminatory
impacts of the nation’s interstate highway system is a result of years of racial justice organizing.
Whether leaders deliver on their promises to “advance racial equity and environmental justice,”
however, remains to be seen.
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Officials hail the I-81 project as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity.” They present it as
a universally beneficial initiative, and they also promise that it is “just the beginning of a yearslong community process to reimagine the city.”876 By making promises about the benefit of the
project to the entire community, city leaders deploy the same discourse of progress that the first
Mayor Walsh did in the 1960s. To avoid repeating history, they should instead ask: What does
Syracuse owe to the community members who were harmed by urban renewal and highway
construction?
Those who have lived in the shadow of I-81 for decades want more than promises of jobs
and equity. They want reparations. Although most residents welcome the removal of the elevated
arterial, they also have unanswered questions about the change that the project entails. After all,
their community was a casualty of the discourse of progress once before. Residents are all too
aware that their property will be highly desirable to real estate developers who have transformed
the hill to the east of the highway, where new medical complexes and luxury student housing dot
the landscape. Homeowner Lloyd Baines frankly explained that “[i]f this place gentrifies, those
developers are going to charge whatever they want and raise all my property taxes. If they cared
about us, they would freeze our taxes to keep things fair.” Alternatively, his wife, Bebe Baines,
proposed that the city could “just buy us out. . .Compensate us for everything and then we don’t
have to breathe in this bad air anymore.”877
In summer 2021, community activists protested a plan that would have routed travelers
from the highway through a traffic circle near Dr. King Elementary School—the former Croton
Elementary. In response to the concerns of activists and elected officials, the New York State
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Department of Transportation agreed to relocate the traffic circle away from the school. Lanessa
Owens-Chaplin of the New York Civil Liberties Union lauded the decision: “I-81 has been a
structural barrier to opportunity and racial equity in Syracuse since its original construction, and
today, NYSDOT took an important step by recognizing that our schoolchildren must not be a
stone’s throw from the pollution of a highway ramp.”878 The protest evoked the actions of the
Citizens of Pioneer who resisted the city’s attempts to situate the Greyhound Bus Terminal
across from Pioneer Homes in 1964.
Just as post-World War II planners envisioned constructing a series of arterial highways
in conjunction with urban renewal projects, the twenty-first century I-81 project has spurred new
plans for the surrounding neighborhood, including Pioneer Homes. In 2019, the Allyn Family
Foundation announced “Blueprint 15,” “a new non-profit organization that is working with the
city, the Syracuse Housing Authority, and Syracuse City School District to transform the
Southside neighborhood through housing, education, wellness, and economic opportunity.”879
The organization proposes to demolish Pioneer Homes, Central Village, and another Syracuse
Housing Authority project, supplanting them with mixed-income housing. Current residents will
be displaced by the demolition and construction, but they will have the option to return: the
federal government now requires that the city replace each demolished unit with a new public
housing unit.880
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Blueprint 15 has elicited concern from many residents who see the potential for the city
to repeat past mistakes by uprooting the Black community yet again. Ken Jackson, a local
journalist, expressed skepticism about the project, which was originally unveiled without
soliciting community input. He wrote in 2019 that “as we’ve learned from past practices, not all
interests are invited nor welcome when reinventing the city of Syracuse.”881 Maxwell graduate
student Madeleine Hamlin echoed these concerns in a recent opinion piece, pointing out that
“residents of tony neighborhoods like Sedgwick or Strathmore [are not] being asked to move in
order to foster social and economic mixing. No, as usual, it is the urban poor who must shoulder
this weight.”882 Despite these concerns, the project is moving forward. City planners recently
applied to the federal government for the first $50 million in funds.883 If approved, the first phase
of construction may begin as soon as 2023.
This dissertation demonstrates that citizens’ concerns about Blueprint 15 are well
founded. Just as Syracuse CORE demanded that the city carry out urban renewal with the
explicit and measurable goal of achieving residential integration, I argue that to achieve a truly
equitable outcome both Blueprint 15 and the I-81 Project should center the goal of reparations.
Moreover, a past harm cannot be repaired without a process of truth and reconciliation. The
current Mayor Walsh is quick to assert that the city is embarking on Blueprint 15 “with our eyes
wide open, with a very clear understanding of where this community has failed in the past.”884
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Yet the Salt City cannot avoid repeating history unless and until the broader community reckons
with historic and current racism. Recovering and centering the voices of past and present
activists may well provide a different blueprint than the one proposed by philanthropists and city
officials.
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Education
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
Doctor of Philosophy, History, May 2022
Dissertation: “Saving Salt City: Fighting Inequality through Policy and Activism in Syracuse,
NY, 1955 - 1975”
Committee: Jeffrey Gonda (Advisor), Susan Branson, Kristopher Burrell, Andrew Wender
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Fields of Study:
Modern American Social and Political History (Jeffrey Gonda)
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Master of Philosophy, History, May 2016
Master of Arts, History, May 2016
Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio
Bachelor of Arts, History and Education, May 2009 (Magna cum Laude)

Public Humanities Experience
Senior Development Officer, Ohio Humanities, Columbus, OH, 2022 – Present
• Collaborates with the Executive Director and senior leadership team to organize fundraising
initiatives that further the organization’s mission
Director of Grants, Humanities New York, New York, NY, 2016-2022
● Administered Humanities New York’s grants programs, distributing more than $400,000 annually
● Administered $2.5 million in federal COVID relief funds
● Trained and supervised a Grants Officer, Grants Assistant, and several interns
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Project Director, Amended Podcast, Humanities New York, New York, NY, 2019-2021
• Co-created a narrative history podcast about the struggle for women’s voting rights
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349

Director, Local History Summer Camp, Southwest Community Center, Syracuse, NY, Summer 2016
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trips
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Teaching Mentor, Graduate School, Syracuse University, 2016-2017
• Led discussions with a group of fifteen graduate students during New Teaching-Assistant
Orientation
• Co-developed and presented a workshop on Student Motivation
Teaching Assistant, Department of History, Syracuse University
• History 101: American History to 1865 (with Susan Branson), Fall 2016
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• History 121: Global History (with Junko Takeda), Fall 2014
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Syracuse University History Department Conference Travel Grant, Spring 2015, Fall 2015, and Fall 2016
Maxwell School Summer Research Grant, 2014, 2015, and 2016, and 2017
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Syracuse University, March 2022
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“The Transatlantic Slave Trade,” History 121: Global History, Syracuse University, November 2014

High School Teaching Experience
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Reading Teacher, Loy Norrix High School, Kalamazoo, MI, 2009-2010
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Steering Committee Member, Civics 4 Action, a Collaborative in the Southern Tier of NY, 2019 – 2022
Next Generation PhD Planning Committee Member, Syracuse University Graduate School, 2018 – 2019
President, History Graduate Student Organization, Syracuse University, 2016-2017
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AmeriCorps VISTA, Kalamazoo Neighborhood Housing Services, Kalamazoo, MI, 2010-2011
Tutor, Kalamazoo Communities in Schools and Peace House, Kalamazoo, MI, 2010-2011
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Volunteer Instructor, Carmel School Jorhat, India, Summer 2008

Professional Memberships
American Historical Association, Urban History Association, Onondaga Historical Association
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